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Vendor’s Privilege: Adheret Visceribus Rei
L. David Cromwell
As the price for an immovable, a purchaser assumed payment
of the seller’s debt that was secured by an existing mortgage that
the seller had granted a year earlier. More than ten years after
recordation of the mortgage, but less than ten years after the act of
sale was recorded in the mortgage records, a judgment creditor of the
purchaser seized the immovable, arguing that the mortgage had lost
its effectiveness for failure of timely reinscription. Unfortunately for
the judgment creditor, however, she had overlooked a powerful
security device that resulted by operation of law from the purchaser’s
assumption of the mortgage debt: the vendor’s privilege. Affirming a
ruling that the immovable remained subject to this vendor’s privilege,
the Louisiana Supreme Court held it to be wholly immaterial whether
the mortgage was reinscribed in a timely manner or whether the
mortgage was recorded at all, for the failure of timely reinscription of
the mortgage did not affect the vendor’s privilege that arose from the
assumption in the act of sale “as a legal concomitant . . . without the
requirement of any stipulation at all.”1 As authority for this
proposition, the Court cited, without translation, an obscure Latin
maxim: Adheret visceribus rei.
The Court’s use of this Latin expression certainly suggests that the
security device known as the vendor’s privilege, like many other
creatures of the civil law, originated in Roman law. Indeed, support for
that proposition can be inferred from Baker v. Frellsen,2 in which the
Louisiana Supreme Court a year earlier invoked the same Latin
phrase, in the process providing both a translation and an apparent
indication that the vendor’s privilege finds its source in Roman
law:
[The vendor’s privilege] is a guarantee which attaches so
tenaciously to the nature of the contract of sale on term,
Copyright 2015, by L. DAVID CROMWELL.
 Member, Louisiana Bar, and Vice President and Member of the Council
of the Louisiana State Law Institute, as well as Reporter of its Security Devices
Committee. J.D., 1983, Tulane University of Louisiana. This Article is derived
from, and expands upon, a paper presented by the author to the Society of Bartolus
in New Orleans, Louisiana, on October 12, 2012. The author expresses
appreciation to Professors A.N. Yiannopoulos and Dian Tooley-Knoblett, both of
whom were in attendance when the paper was presented, for their thoughtful
comments and suggestions, and to Claire Popovich for her able research
assistance.
1. Conté v. Cain, 33 La. Ann. 965, 968 (1881).
2. 32 La. Ann. 822 (1880).
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that the Roman law says that it adheres to the very entrails
of the thing, adheret visceribus rei.3
Objection might be made to this statement on the ground that
it, unfortunately, is without basis in historical fact and appears to
have arisen from a mistaken belief that Latin words necessarily
imply roots in Roman law. Indeed, the Supreme Court recanted
just two years later in De L’Isle v. Succession of Moss,4 explaining,
in a footnote, that the use of the word “Roman” in the Baker case
was in error; instead of Roman law, the reference was intended to
be “modern civil” law. The Court acknowledged that the vendor’s
privilege was unknown to Roman law but rather is of Gallic
creation.
Whatever its origin, the vendor’s privilege has been a coveted
and powerful form of security throughout Louisiana’s history. This
Article begins with a short excursus recalling some central notions
about the definition and nature of privileges and posits that there
actually exist two different vendor’s privileges: the vendor’s
privilege on movables and that bearing on immovables. After
tracing the origin of both of these vendor’s privileges, this Article
explores the policies underlying the privileges, requirements of
registry, status of the privileges as real rights, events causing a loss
of the privileges, and problems involving ranking. By focusing on
the vendor’s privilege as an example, this Article seeks to
illustrate, from a broader perspective, the reasons for the existence
of privileges, the manner in which they relate to each other and to
other forms of security, and the extent to which privileges can
remain relevant in a modern civil law system.
I. GENERAL NOTIONS OF PRIVILEGE
Article 3186 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which was borrowed
verbatim from the Code Napoléon,5 provides that “[p]rivilege is a
right, which the nature of a debt gives to a creditor, and which
entitles him to be preferred before other creditors, even those who
have mortgages.”6 A privilege is thus a preference established by
legislation and is an exception to the general rule of the Civil Code
that the proceeds of the sale of an obligor’s property are distributed
ratably among his creditors.7 A privilege is a form of real security.8
3. Id. at 828.
4. 34 La. Ann. 164, 166 (1882).
5. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2095 (Fr.) (1804).
6. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3186 (2015).
7. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3134 (2015). As comment (a) to that article explains,
this rule continues the familiar principle of article 3183 of the Louisiana Civil
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Privileges cannot be granted contractually; they can arise only by
operation of law based upon the nature of the debt.9
Planiol defines a privilège as “a disposition of the law which
favors a creditor.”10 This definition not only underscores the rule
that privileges arise only by operation of law but is true to the
term’s Latin etymology—law made for private or particular
interests: privilegium, from privus - legis.11
Some privileges are general and operate on all property of the
debtor, such as those securing funeral charges, law charges, and
expenses of the last illness.12 Other privileges are special; that is,
they operate only on specific property. One of the most important
special privileges is that in favor of the vendor as security for the
unpaid purchase price. The law itself grants the unpaid vendor this
privilege; it is unnecessary for the vendor to obtain a mortgage, or
even to obtain written recognition of the existence of the vendor’s
privilege, for it to arise.13
The definition of “privilege” contained in article 3186 has been
criticized on the ground that it envisions merely rights of
preference that exist upon property while in the debtor’s patrimony
and that the general privileges comprise the only category of
Code of 1870 that “the property of the debtor is the ‘common pledge of his
creditors.’” Id. cmt. a. The reference in the source article to the concept of
“pledge” was deleted, because the term was used in that article in a “nontechnical sense.” Id.
8. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3137 cmt. c (2015). The fact that a privilege is a
form of real security does not necessarily mean that it is a real right. Id.
9. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3185 (2015); see, e.g., Southport Petroleum Co.
of Del. v. Fithian, 13 So. 2d 382, 383 (La. 1943); In re Liquidation of Hibernia
Bank & Trust Co., 162 So. 644, 645 (La. 1935); State v. Miller, 126 So. 422,
428 (La. 1930); Succession of Rousseau, 23 La. Ann. 1, 3 (1871).
10. 2 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW,
pt. 2, No. 2544 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 11th ed. 1959) (1939).
11. LE PETIT LAROUSSE ILLUSTRE 822 (Larousse 2010).
12. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3191, 3252 (2015). The need for explanation of the
reasons for the existence of privileges has often afforded courts the opportunity
to demonstrate their prowess in the use of poetic and figurative language, as
evidenced by an early case providing this moving explanation for the privilege
for funeral charges:
[W]ere it not for the privilege which the law allows to those who dig
the grave, furnish the coffin and drive the hearse, many a lifeless frame,
deprived of sepulture, would rot in unnoted or forsaken homes. Were it
not for that privilege, when Death enters a city and knocks at every
door-watchful and indefatigable as it is, Charity would inevitably be
unequal to the increased task which-otherwise-would be imposed upon
it.
Alter v. O’Brien, 31 La. Ann. 452, 454 (1879).
13. Conté v. Cain, 33 La. Ann. 965, 968 (1881).
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privileges that truly fits within this definition, even though the
Code establishes other privileges, such as the special privileges on
immovables, that include a right of pursuit in addition to a mere
right of preference.14 It is asserted that those privileges constitute real
rights that are inconsistent with the definition given in article 3186.15
The degree to which vendor’s privileges can be viewed as real rights
will be explored in substantial detail below.
Among two or more competing privileges, the general rule is that
they rank according to their nature rather than the date on which they
arise.16 Privileges that are of the same rank are paid concurrently from
the proceeds of the thing that they burden.17 These general rules are
applied consistently only to privileges burdening movables,18 though
there are instances under Louisiana law in which they continue to
apply to immovables.19
The last phrase of article 3186 is critical, for it contains the general
rule of ranking of privileges upon immovables against mortgages. By
their nature, privileges are preferred to mortgages, regardless of
whether the mortgage may have previously arisen or become effective
against third persons, unless some other provision of law provides to
the contrary.20 It is for this reason that the general privileges that arise
under the Civil Code outrank mortgages.21 Nevertheless, in order for
14. 2 BERNARD KEITH VETTER & THOMAS A. HARRELL, LOUISIANA
CREDITORS’ SECURITY RIGHTS 154, 241–43 (1988). See also PLANIOL &
RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2547 (observing that there are no general
characteristics of privileges, except in the case of general privileges).
15. VETTER & HARRELL, supra note 14, at 243.
16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3187 (1870).
17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3188 (1870).
18. See 8 ROBERT BEUDANT & PAUL LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, COURS DE
DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS § 325 (11th ed. 1948).
19. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3254–3270 (1870). A more modern
example is found in the Private Works Act, which ranks privileges arising under
its provisions by nature among themselves but by priority in time against
mortgages and vendor’s privileges. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4821 (Supp.
2015).
20. See 3 C. AUBRY ET C. RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS § 290
(6th ed. 1938). There are many exceptions to the general rule, such as the
ranking provisions of the Louisiana Private Works Act, in Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 9:4821. Some French writers assert that the traditional rule that
privileges by their nature outrank mortgages has been rendered illusory by the
requirement of inscription, which now determines ranking for most privileges
and mortgages alike. See BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, §§ 319–22.
21. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3269 (1870). Under Roman law, general privileges
ranked behind mortgages. The policy reason for reversing the ranking so that
mortgages rank behind general privileges has been explained by the fact that the
holders of general privileges usually have small claims that would often not be
paid if those privileges ranked behind mortgages. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note
10, Nos. 2628–2631. See also VETTER & HARRELL, supra note 14, at 299.
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most privileges upon immovables to enjoy this favored ranking, the
acts that evidence them must be filed for record within the period
prescribed by Civil Code article 3274.22 If the act evidencing a
privilege is not filed within that time, it takes effect against third
persons from the date of registry and affords the holder of the
privilege no preference over previously recorded mortgages.23 As
will be seen, these rules are of particular importance when applied
to the vendor’s privilege on immovables.
It is fitting that the vendor’s privilege on movables24 and that on
immovables25 arise under different articles of the Louisiana Civil
Code, for they are actually entirely different privileges. If these two
privileges can be seen as twins that share the same family name and
several common attributes, they are fraternal twins at best, for they
were born at different times and of different sources. Moreover, apart
from the obvious difference in the domain of things upon which they
operate, they are wholly different in their status as real rights, the
means by which they are made enforceable against third persons, and
their ranking against competing interests.
II. THE GENESIS OF VENDOR’S PRIVILEGES
At Roman law, no privilege existed in favor of the vendor.26
However, no privilege was necessary, for so long as the price was
unpaid, the vendor remained the owner of the thing.27 Indeed, it
was impossible for the vendor to hold a privilege, because a person
cannot have a privilege on his own property.28 As owner, the seller
could revendicate the thing sold if he was not paid; however,
revendication was unavailable if the vendor agreed to allow the
vendee a term for payment of the price, because ownership
transferred immediately to the vendee. In that case, the vendor was
deemed to have trusted in the faithfulness of the buyer and held the
status of only an ordinary creditor if the price was not paid when
due.29
22. The period is 7 days if the property is located in the same parish where
the act was passed; otherwise, it is 15 days. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3274 (2015).
23. Id.
24. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3217(7), 3227 (2015).
25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3249(1) (2015).
26. 21 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & P. DELOYNE, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, DU NANTISSEMENT, DES PRIVILÈGES ET HYPOTHÈQUES ET
DE L’EXPROPRIATION FORCÉE, TOME PREMIER No. 484 (2d ed. 1899).
27. See BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 508; PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra
note 10, No. 2604.
28. BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 508.
29. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2604; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE
ET AL., supra note 26, No. 484; BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 508. Modern
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For centuries, France followed these rules: the vendor under a
sale without a term for payment of the price could avail himself of
the right of revendication if the vendee failed to pay the price.30 The
vendor under a sale on term was relegated to a personal action.31 In
time, the vendor’s privilege arose as a creature of customary law.32
Beginning in the 16th century, vendors of movables began to
introduce a new practice to protect themselves—the thing sold was
delivered under a precarious title, such as a fictitious lease. Because
this kind of transaction did not transfer ownership, the vendor
remained protected to the same extent as if he had sold without a
term. Over time, this practice blurred the distinction between a sale
on term and a sale without a term, and this distinction became
viewed as a mere “subtlety.”33 The revision of the Coutume de Paris
in 1580 introduced a new article providing that, when the thing sold
is seized by another creditor of the vendee, the vendor can prevent
the sale and “is preferred on the thing to the other creditors.”34 This
same article was reproduced literally in the Coutume d’Orléans in
1583.35 It is noteworthy that the word privilège was not expressly
used;36 however, the concept proved so useful that it was adopted
by the jurisprudence even in those parts of the country that
otherwise followed the written law based on Roman tradition.37
continental civil codes based on the German model continue to follow the
Roman rule without establishing a privilege in favor of the vendor.
30. This right was expressly recognized in the Coutume de Paris article 176
(1580): “Qui vend aucune chose mobiliaire sans jour & sans terme esperant
estre payé promptement, il peut la chose poursuivre en quelque lieu qu’elle soit
transportée, pour estre payé du prix qu’il l’a venduë.” 1 CLAUDE DE FERRIÈRE,
NOUVEAU COMMENTAIRE SUR LA COUTUME DE LA PREVOSTE ET VICOMTE DE
PARIS 370 (2d ed. 1688).
31. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2605.
32. See BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 508; HARRIET SPILLER DAGGETT,
LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE § 33, at 91 (1942).
33. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2606.
34. Coutume de Paris article 177 (1580): “Et neanmoins encore, qu’il eût
donné terme, si la chose se trouve saisie sur le debiteur par autre creancier, il
peut empecher la vente, et est preferé sur la chose aux autres creanciers.” See
FERRIÈRE, supra note 30, at 374 (author’s translation). Ferrière explains that the
Coutume gives to the unpaid seller, who is a privileged and preferred creditor, a
special mortgage on the thing as security for the payment of the price. Id. at 375.
35. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2606.
36. Planiol observes that, when Pothier and Ferrière would speak of this
right, they would refer to it alternately as either hypothèque or privilège. Id.
37. See Bessie Margolin, Civil Law: Vendor’s Privilege, 4 TUL. L. REV.
239, 242 n.12 (1929) (quoting X PAUL PONT, EXPLICATION THEORIQUE ET
PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL § 146 (3d ed. 1883)). See also DAGGETT, supra note
32, § 4. Those areas of France that followed the customary law recognized first
the existence of a vendor’s privilege in the case of all sales without a term and
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At this point in history, however, the birth of the vendor’s
privilege on movables was yet incomplete. There remained a strict
dichotomy between rights of the vendor under a sale without a term
and those of the vendor under a sale with a term. The former still had
the right of revendication; the latter had what became known as a
vendor’s privilege. Ultimately, the evolving jurisprudence removed
this distinction by confining to a very short period of time the delay
within which the vendor under a sale without a term was permitted to
exercise his right of revendication. If he delayed beyond that time, he
was viewed as having tacitly agreed to payment of the price on term
and thus became relegated to a mere privilege.38 Article 2102 of the
Code Napoléon further confined this limitation on the exercise of the
right of revendication to a period described as “la huitaine,” which
was understood to be approximately one week running from the time
of delivery. The same article also provides expressly that the vendor’s
privilege is equally available whether the seller sold with or without a
term.39 To the redactors of the Code Napoléon, there was a very
compelling reason to provide for a vendor’s privilege in both kinds of
sale: in contrast to both Roman law and ancient French law, the sales
articles of the Code Napoléon force the transfer of ownership once
agreement is reached upon the thing and the price, regardless of
whether the sale was made on credit, and a privilege is therefore
necessary to protect the unpaid vendor.40
Essentially these same concepts have appeared in all three of
Louisiana’s Civil Codes. Presently, the vendor’s privilege on
movables is established by article 3227 of the Civil Code,41
immediately followed by three articles providing for the right of

later extended this privilege to credit sales. More time was required before the
privilege was recognized in those areas where the traditions of Roman law were
in vigor. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 485.
38. See FERRIÈRE, supra note 30, at 373 (explaining that, if the seller
allowed additional time, such as seven or eight days or more, to pass before
exercising his right of revendication, then, depending on the circumstances and
the prudence of the judge, he was presumed to have tacitly trusted the buyer and
had only the rights of a vendor on term).
39. After recent revisions to the French Civil Code, these rules are now
found in article 2332. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2332 (Fr.).
40. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 486. It has been
asserted that the difference between protection granted to the unpaid seller under
Roman law and the privilege afforded to him by the Code Napoléon is really a
matter of form or technique in expressing the same idea: both systems provide
the seller a real right and a right of preference until payment of the price. See
BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 508.
41. The vendor’s privilege on movables is also provided for under
Louisiana Civil Code article 3217(7).
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revendication, which is called the right of restitution rather than
revendication.42 It is little known that this right of restitution, which
is a vestige of the old Roman rule of revendication, has been
preserved in the Civil Code. These three articles permit the seller of
a movable not sold on credit to reclaim the movable as long as it is
still in the possession of the purchaser, provided that the claim for
restitution is made within eight days, the translation given to the
term of “la huitaine,” and the identity of the movable has not been
lost.43 Nevertheless, this appears to be a seldom-used remedy
indeed, as these articles have not been applied or interpreted in any
reported Louisiana case since 1881.44 As will be discussed below,
42. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3229–3231 (1870). The French versions of the
1825 Code and the Digest of 1808, borrowing from the Code Napoléon, used the
word revendication, which was translated into English as restitution. It should
be understood that this action in revendication, or restitution, is not founded on a
claim of ownership and is wholly different from the revendicatory action
available to the dispossessed owner of a movable under Louisiana Civil Code
article 526. See XIII THÉOPHILE HUC, COMMENTAIRE THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE
DU CODE CIVIL No. 100 (1900) (describing this view as the prevailing view).
One French treatise explains that the French analogues to Louisiana Civil Code
articles 3229 through 3231 do not use the term revendicate in a technical sense
because, if they did, it would be essential that the seller retain the right of
ownership in order to assert the action. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL.,
supra note 26, No. 523. The seller’s right of revendication under these articles
has been explained as a sui generis form of revendication having nothing in
common with the ordinary right of revendication available to an owner. See
BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 520. But see HUC, supra, No. 103 (asserting
that the legislator used the word revendication because he intended a resolution
of the sale of right). The Louisiana Civil Code avoids this confusion by using
the term restitution rather than revendicate in Louisiana Civil Code articles 3229
through 3231.
43. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3229 (2015). As French writers explain, the text of
the corresponding article of the Code Napoléon imposes four conditions on the
right of revendication: (i) that the sale be made without a term, (ii) that the thing
still be in the possession of the buyer, (iii) that the revendication be claimed
within eight days from delivery, and (iv) that the thing sold still be in the same
condition in which delivery was made. The first and fourth of these conditions
existed under the customary law, but the other two were added by the Code
Napoléon. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 522;
BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 518; HUC, supra note 42, No. 104.
44. The last reported case to interpret these articles was Florsheim Bros. v.
Howell, 33 La. Ann. 1184 (1881), in which the Court held that the seller of
cotton had lost both his vendor’s privilege and his right of restitution, even
though he had filed suit to enforce his rights within only two days after
delivering the cotton to the buyer, because the buyer had surrendered possession
to a cotton factory. The cotton in Florsheim was sold in Shreveport. In response
to a previous holding of the Court in Campbell v. Penn, 7 La. Ann. 371 (1852),
the Civil Code had been amended in 1854 to provide a five-day right of pursuit
in favor of the vendor of agricultural products in the City of New Orleans. See S.
Gumbel & Co. v. Beer, 36 La. Ann. 484 (1884). Act 63 of 1890 enacted special
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the reason that the right of restitution is provided for immediately
after the article that establishes the vendor’s privilege on movables
is that the right of restitution is designed to afford the unpaid seller a
means of protecting his privilege against the risk of a second sale
that would cause a loss of the privilege.
But, what of the birth of the vendor’s privilege on immovables?
Though it shares the same lineage, it was born later. Just as was the
case with the sale of a movable, a privilege in favor of the vendor of
an immovable did not exist under Roman law.45 The vendor of an
immovable without a term continued to be viewed as owner and
protected by the Roman rule of revendication.46 The 16th-century text
of the Coutume de Paris did not provide for a privilege in favor of the
vendor of an immovable on term. Accordingly, the courts of Paris, in
the early 17th century, held that the vendor of an immovable on term
had no privilege and was protected only by the tacit general mortgage
that the law then attributed to sales made in notarial form.47 Thus, it
was necessary for the vendor’s protection that the vendor on term
stipulate a special mortgage, and this usage became so general that, in
two judgments of the Parlement of Paris in 1628, it was held that the
vendor of an immovable on term enjoyed a special mortgage and
privilege on the immovable securing the payment of the price, even
without having obtained a conventional mortgage.48 The vendor of an
immovable became viewed as having a tacit privileged mortgage that

legislation, now Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:4541, extending the
application of this rule to any chartered city or town of this state. Act No. 63,
1890 La. Acts 51. This statute provides that the vendor’s privilege has
precedence over any “warehouse privilege or claim for warehouse charges, or
any privilege or claim by the holder of a warehouse receipt.” LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:4541 (2007). In John M. Parker Co. v. E. Martin & Co., 88 So. 68 (La.
1920), the Court held that the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act impliedly
repealed this provision insofar as negotiable warehouse receipts are concerned.
Section 9:4541 mentions only a privilege and not the seller’s right of restitution.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4541 (2007).
45. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 564.
46. Id.
47. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2889. The usage of stipulating a
mortgage in all acts creating obligations led the ancient customary law of France
to find an implied general mortgage in all such acts executed under seal. See
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, at xx–xxi. See also M. BUGNET,
1 OEUVRES DE POTHIER, COUTUME D’ORLÉANS, DE L’HYPOTHÈQUE, No. 6, at
639 (2d ed. 1861). This custom of implying a general mortgage even in the
absence of a formal stipulation was continued under legislation known as the
law of 9 messidor An III, enacted during the French Revolution. BAUDRYLACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, at xxviii.
48. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2889.
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was analogous to the privilege that the seller of a movable already
enjoyed.49
Legislation adopted during the French Revolution, known as the
law of 11 brumaire An VII, confirmed the privilege of the vendor
under the name of the “right of the preceding owner.”50 Shortly
afterward, article 2301 of the Code Napoléon specifically provided for
a privilege for the price in favor of the seller of immovables and
movables alike.51 In Louisiana, the Digest of 1808 was even more
explicit,52 providing that the privilege existed whether the estate was
sold for ready money or on credit and regardless of whether a
mortgage was expressly stipulated.53
Thus, it can be seen that both of the vendor’s privileges were born
out of the constancy of usage, but of different usages. For
movables, the repeated usage was the practice of delivering a
movable under a precarious title in order to place the vendor in the
same position as if he had made a sale without term. In the case of
immovables, the repeated usage was the stipulation of a special
mortgage in favor of the vendor, a practice leading to the
recognition of a tacit privileged mortgage.54
III. THE POLICY BEHIND VENDOR’S PRIVILEGES
In De L’Isle v. Succession of Moss,55 the Court succinctly stated
the policy reasons for the vendor’s privilege:
It would indeed be unjust to place an unpaid vendor on a
footing of equality with the other creditors of the purchaser,
and permit these to devour his substance . . . . It would be
iniquitous to permit the property sold to become the prey of
the creditors of the purchaser, without requiring, as condition
precedent, the payment of its costs.56

49. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 565.
50. Id. Other reforms effectuated by the law of 11 brumaire An VII were to
eliminate all conventional general mortgages and to make impossible the
creation of mortgages for indefinite sums. See PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note
10, Nos. 2680–2686; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, at xxxii.
51. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2374 (Fr.).
52. A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF
ORLEANS art. 475 (de la Vergne ed. 1968) (1808) [hereinafter LA. DIGEST of
1808].
53. In the 1825 Louisiana Civil Code, as well as the 1870 Code, the latter
proviso was omitted.
54. See discussion supra.
55. 34 La. Ann. 164 (1882).
56. Id. at 166–67.
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French writers gave essentially the same justification but in
language that evokes other concepts of the Civil Code: The unpaid
vendor has gratuitously augmented the common pledge of the
vendee’s creditors, who are thus unjustly enriched at the vendor’s
expense.57 Because the sales articles of the French Civil Code58—
and of course the Louisiana Civil Code as well59—force the
immediate transfer of title to the vendee even though the price has
not been paid, the privilege is necessary to prevent an inequity.60
The vendor is privileged because he has augmented the patrimony
of the vendee.61
There is another policy reason for the vendor’s privilege based
upon the justification that exists generally for most privileges: The
existence of the privilege benefits the debtor by allowing him to
obtain credit that would otherwise not be available to him.62 In the
specific case of the vendor’s privilege, its existence facilitates sales
that otherwise would simply not occur. For without a privilege, the
seller either would refuse to sell on credit or would insist upon
other security.63 This policy justification was invoked by the
Supreme Court in W. T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell,64 in holding that the
exemptions from seizure allowed by law65 cannot be asserted
against a provisional seizure by writ of sequestration to preserve a
vendor’s privilege on a movable66:
The law of vendor’s privilege in this state operates to favor
the vendor and the vendee alike. The long history of vendor’s
57. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2608. See also BAUDRYLACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 567.
58. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1583 (Fr.).
59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2456 (2015).
60. See also BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, Nos. 483, 486.
61. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, Nos. 2608–2609.
62. See VETTER & HARRELL, supra note 14, at 283.
63. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 484.
64. 269 So. 2d 186 (La. 1972).
65. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881 (Supp. 2015).
66. Justice Tate dissented, pointing out the incongruity in the majority’s
interpretation that a debtor cannot claim the exemption from a temporary seizure
but he may do so to prevent the sale of the exempted property under a writ of
fieri facias issued in execution of the judgment in favor of the seizing creditor.
Justice Tate believed that the case should have been controlled by Young v.
Geter, 170 So. 240 (La. 1936), which held that a lessor’s privilege could not be
asserted against property exempted by the predecessor provision to Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 13:3881. If W. T. Grant truly stands for the proposition
that a vendor can sequester goods that he cannot expose to an execution sale in
the enforcement of his privilege, the practical effect of the decision would seem
to be to permit the vendor to exercise, through sequestration, what is tantamount
to a right of restitution, even when the conditions of Louisiana Civil Code article
3229 are not satisfied.
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privilege in Louisiana demonstrates that it enables the
purchaser to acquire property he may otherwise be unable to
buy as much as it induces the vendor to sell. Without the
benefits accorded the vendor, it may well be concluded that in
a substantial number of instances the possession and title to
property would not be surrendered to prospective purchasers.
Because of it, many impecunious citizens are enabled to
acquire property to foster their livelihood and provide for their
sustenance.67
The justification underpinning the priority that the law affords
to a vendor’s privilege is the principle that no one can grant a
greater right than what he himself holds. On this point, Planiol
cites Pothier:
As Pothier explains, the reason that he who has sold the
heritage should be preferred to all the other creditors is that
the owner has acquired the heritage only with the charge of
the mortgage which his vendor has reserved on it in
alienating it. The purchaser cannot mortgage it to his other
creditors except subject to the charge of this mortgage,
because he cannot transfer to them a greater right than he
had on it himself.68
IV. NATURE OF VENDOR’S PRIVILEGES
The vendor’s privilege gives the seller the right to be satisfied
from the proceeds of the thing sold with preference over other
creditors of the buyer.69 It attaches automatically to anything that is
sold—movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal.70 It is a
67. W.T. Grant Co., 269 So. 2d at 191. The Court also rejected the
purchaser’s constitutional due process arguments, finding that the purchaser
holds possession with the “implied-in-law” knowledge that he has acquired the
right to possession subject to the vendor’s paramount right to seize the property
without hearing upon a default in payment. Id. at 191. The Court’s holding on
the constitutional due process claim was affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
68. See PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 3140.
69. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 483.
70. Id. No. 489. See also PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2610
(explaining that the vendor’s privilege extends even to the sale of a credit);
BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 513; HUC, supra note 42, No. 90. Louisiana’s
revision of Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in 2001, which brought
the outright sale of many types of credits within its scope, included a nonuniform provision designed to preserve vendor’s privileges arising from the sale
of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes. Where
the language of the model act provides that the seller of property of that nature
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matter of substantive right incident to a contract of sale and not a
mere remedy for enforcing its execution.71 Because a vendor’s
privilege arises by operation of law, the concurrence of both spouses
is not required to establish it, even if it encumbers community
immovables.72 A vendor’s privilege will arise only from a sale, and
not from other kinds of transactions, such as a building contract.73
Thus, there must be a transfer of ownership for a price.74 A vendor’s

does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the property sold, the non-uniform
Louisiana provision instead provides that the seller does not retain an ownership
interest. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-318(a) (2002). Louisiana Official Revision
Comment (a) to this section explains that the reason for the Louisiana variation
was to be consistent with Louisiana law under which the seller of a thing
acquires a vendor’s privilege by operation of law.
71. See, e.g., Willey v. St. Charles Hotel Co., 28 So. 182 (La. 1899); Deal v.
Lexing-Powell, 824 So. 2d 541 (La. Ct. App. 2002). This rule was also cited in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Fontaine, 539 So. 2d 986 (La. Ct. App. 1989), in which
the court held that the plaintiff, which sold furniture to the defendant on credit,
was entitled as a matter of law to a vendor’s privilege and had therefore stated a
cause of action. An interesting defense that was mentioned, though not resolved,
in the opinion was that no vendor’s privilege arose because the defendant had
paid by credit card. Id. at 987.
72. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2347 cmt. a (2015) (stating that encumbrances
such as a vendor’s privilege imposed by law are not subject to the requirement
of concurrence by the spouses, cited approvingly in Magee v. Amiss, 502 So. 2d
568, 570 (La. 1987)). Nevertheless, Magee held that a non-concurring spouse is
entitled to notice of the foreclosure sale of former community property under
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983). Magee, 502 So.
2d at 572.
73. See Long Leaf Lumber, Inc. v. Summer Grove Developers, Inc., 270 So.
2d 588, 591 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that no vendor’s privilege existed in
favor of a company that had contracted to install heating and air conditioning
units in a building, since there was no contract of sale and no vendor–vendee
relationship existed between the company and the owner). Of course, the
company would be entitled to a privilege on the entire immovable under the
Private Works Act. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4801 (2007); Long Leaf, 270
So. 2d at 591–92. For a discussion of the difference between a sale and a
building contract, see DIAN TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & DAVID GRUNING, SALES §
1:10, in 24 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 23 (2012).
74. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 73, § 1:9; BAUDRYLACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 487. Thus, the contribution of an
immovable to a partnership without stipulation of a price other than the
allocation to the transferor of shares in the partnership does not give rise to a
privilege. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 575. A donor has
no privilege even if pecuniary obligations are imposed on the donee. AUBRY ET
RAU, supra note 20, § 263. But see HUC, supra note 42, No. 109 (arguing that it
is arbitrary to grant the privilege in the case of contracts of sale but not in other
contracts that augment the debtor’s patrimony). For a case in which a buyer
curiously but unsuccessfully asserted entitlement to a vendor’s privilege, see In
re Bulk Sales Agreement, 365 So. 2d 547 (La. Ct. App. 1978), holding that a
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privilege does not arise from a loan transaction by which the
purchaser borrows the money to be used to purchase the property.75
The vendor’s privilege is accessory to the obligation that it
secures and thus transfers automatically with the transfer of the
instrument evidencing the price, without the need for a special
stipulation to that effect.76 Accordingly, even though a loan
transaction does not itself give rise to a vendor’s privilege, it is

buyer of goods who made advance payments in an amount greater than the price
of the goods ultimately purchased was not entitled to a vendor’s privilege.
75. See, e.g., Johnson v. Turner, 218 So. 2d 363, 365 (La. Ct. App. 1969)
(holding that a creditor who lent a purchaser the funds with which to purchase
property had no vendor’s privilege on the property purchased). By contrast, the
Uniform Commercial Code grants purchase money security interest status not
only to a consensual security interest in favor of the actual seller but also to a
security interest held by a secured party that lent the purchaser the money with
which to make the purchase. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-103 (Supp. 2015).
House Bill 266 of 2011, if passed by the Louisiana Legislature, would have
amended Louisiana Civil Code article 3307 to provide that “when the proceeds
of a mortgage are used by the mortgagor to purchase immovable property, the
mortgagee shall have the same ranking as a vendor in accordance with the rules
set forth in Article 3251.” H.B. 266, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2011). Though
this bill did not proceed beyond assignment to committee, it spawned a
resolution requesting the Louisiana State Law Institute to study the advisability
of creating a purchase money special mortgage. H. Con. Res. 15, 2011 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (La. 2011). After a comprehensive study, the Law Institute
recommended against adoption in Louisiana of the concept of a purchase money
mortgage with special priority. See Louisiana State Law Institute, Report of the
Louisiana State Law Institute to the Louisiana Legislature in Response to HCR
No. 15 of 2011 (Nov. 12, 2014) (regarding purchase money mortgage) (on file
with the Louisiana State Law Institute). The French Civil Code now grants to
the lender of funds for the acquisition of an immovable a privilege upon the
immovable, even in the absence of subrogation from the vendor, but only if it is
provided in an authentic act that the funds were borrowed for this purpose and
the vendor acknowledges in an authentic act that he has been paid from the
borrowed funds. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2374(2) (Fr.). The reason for the
requirement of authentic declarations concerning the use of the borrowed funds
is to prevent a debtor from favoring one creditor to the prejudice of others by a
false claim that the loan proceeds were used to acquire the immovable. See
PHILIPPE SIMLER & PHILIPPE DELEBECQUE, DROIT CIVIL: LES SURETES LA
PUBLICITE FONCIERE § 419 (6th ed. 2012); JEAN-LOUIS BERGEL, LA VENTE
D’IMMEUBLES EXISTANTS No. 297, at 203 (1983); AUBRY ET RAU, supra note
20, § 263; HUC, supra note 42, No. 114.
76. See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 232, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE (4th ed. 2014); see also Perot v. Levasseur, 21 La. Ann. 529, 530
(1869); see generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2645, 3136 (2015); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 10:9-203(f) (Supp. 2015). But see First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of
Warner Robins, Ga. v. Delta Towers, Ltd., 544 So. 2d 1331, 1343 (La. Ct. App.
1989) (making the rather astonishing statement that a vendor’s privilege is not
an accessory obligation).
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possible for a creditor who finances the purchase price to acquire a
vendor’s privilege through the simple expedient of having the
seller sell the property on credit, thus creating a vendor’s privilege,
and then assign to the creditor the instrument evidencing the
buyer’s obligation to pay the price. The vendor’s privilege, as an
accessory, is transferred with the assignment of the instrument. For
many years, institutional lenders in Louisiana followed this very
practice in order to gain the benefit of a vendor’s privilege.
In the case of movables, the vendor’s privilege affords the
seller automatic security in the form of a right to be preferred over
other creditors of the buyer. Historically, the only other security
device available to the seller was the pledge,77 but a pledge could
be created only if the seller retained possession.78 In a time before
recognition of chattel mortgages79 and certainly before security
interests under the Uniform Commercial Code,80 the vendor’s
privilege allowed the seller to deliver possession and yet retain
security. This same benefit still exists today, regardless of whether
the seller for some reason failed to arrange for the buyer on credit
77. For a comprehensive history of the development of mortgages and an
explanation of the reasons why France did not retain the Roman rule permitting
movables to be encumbered by mortgage, see DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 4. See
also BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 326.
78. Under article 3152 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, delivery of the
thing pledged was essential to the very existence of the contract of pledge, even
between the parties. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3149 (2015) (requiring “the
thing pledged . . . [to be] delivered to the pledgee or a third person who has
agreed to hold the thing for the benefit of the pledgee” to create an effective
pledge of a corporeal movable”).
79. Chattel mortgages were not recognized in Louisiana until the enactment
of the first chattel mortgage law, Act 65 of 1912, which allowed a debtor to
grant security in corporeal movable property without the necessity of placing the
creditor into physical possession. See Act No. 65, 1912 La. Acts 75. The
impetus for the adoption of the chattel mortgage law came from Judge David B.
Samuel, who had practiced law in Arkansas, where chattel mortgages were then
extensively used. See DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 6. Wisely, however, there was
no attempt to import Arkansas notions of chattel mortgage; instead, the chattel
mortgage was fashioned upon the model of the civilian mortgage upon
immovables. Id. Because of political opposition to an exemption provision
contained in the act, Governor Luther T. Hall refused to sign it, instead allowing
it to become law without his signature. Id.
80. Louisiana was the last state to adopt Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. See Act No. 528, 1988 La. Acts 1367, amended by Act No.
135, 1989 La. Acts 417 (adopting “Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial
Laws” effective January 1, 1990). With the enactment of Act No. 128, 2001 La.
Acts 561, Louisiana finally embraced the title “Uniform Commercial Code” in
place of “Commercial Laws,” which a quarter century earlier had been
considered to be a more apt description of a set of laws that were derided as
being neither uniform nor worthy of the term “code.” See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§10:1-101 cmts. (2003 & Supp. 2011).
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to grant him a consensual security interest.81 However, the sale
must be a Louisiana sale; otherwise, no vendor’s privilege arises
under Louisiana law.82
For immovables, the privilege affords even greater rights and is
much stronger. As discussed below, the vendor’s privilege on
immovables is unquestionably a real right, giving the vendor who
has properly recorded the act of credit sale the right to assert his
privilege even after the immovable has passed into the hands of a
third person. The vendor’s privilege exempts the seller from having
to bear the general privileges as mere mortgagees are forced to do.83
More importantly, timely recordation of the vendor’s privilege
causes it to outrank even previously existing mortgages against the
vendee.84 This includes not only mortgages that may be recorded
within the period of time prescribed for recordation of the privilege
but also pre-existing mortgages bearing against the vendee’s
property.85
81. See, e.g., Johnson v. Midland Ins. Co., 541 So. 2d 1010, 1012 (La. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that the failure of the seller of an item of farm equipment to
obtain a chattel mortgage did not deprive him of his vendor’s privilege and he
therefore retained an insurable interest in the equipment).
82. See McIlvaine v. Legaré, 34 La. Ann. 923, 926 (1882); Fred E. Cooper,
Inc. v. Farr, 165 So. 2d 605 (La. Ct. App. 1964); see also MICHAEL H. RUBIN,
LOUISIANA LAW OF SECURITY DEVICES: A PRÉCIS § 31.1 (LexisNexis 2011); cf.
De La Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. New Orleans & W.R. Co., 26 So. 455
(La. 1899) (holding that, where a contract of sale made in New York
contemplated delivery and testing of the movables in Louisiana, and the buyer’s
acceptance was dependent on the results of the test and the movables remained
the property of the seller and at its risk until thus tested and accepted, the
contract was a Louisiana sale creating a vendor’s privilege). But see Jones v.
Bradford, 353 So. 2d 1348, 1352 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (appearing to assume,
without discussion, that a vendor’s privilege arose from the sale of equipment in
Mississippi and holding that the privilege continued to be effective after the
equipment was subsequently removed to Louisiana without the seller’s consent).
Under a modern conflicts of law analysis, the inquiry should focus upon whether
Louisiana substantive law is applicable to the sale, rather than merely the situs
of the thing sold or the parties. See generally TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING,
supra note 73, §§ 1:11–18.
83. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3267 (2015).
84. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3186, 3274 (2015).
85. Until recently, there was another significant advantage of a vendor’s
privilege as compared to a mere conventional mortgage: Under former
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:2183, vendor’s privileges, unlike
conventional and judicial mortgages, were not divested by the expiration of the
three-year redemptive period following a tax sale. Conservative Homestead
Ass’n v. Flynn, 150 So. 564 (La. 1933); Whitfield v. Jones, 270 So. 2d 153 (La.
Ct. App. 1972). However, the 2009 revision of the law of tax sales removed this
advantage. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 47:2121(C) (2009) (enacted by Act No.
819, 2009 La. Acts 3105). See also PETER S. TITLE, LOUISIANA REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS § 17:37 (2d ed. 2014). The holder of a vendor’s privilege is
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The vendor’s privilege secures not only the price itself but also
interest accruing on the price,86 attorneys’ fees stipulated in the
obligation representing the purchase price,87 and any other monetary
obligation of the purchaser undertaken in the sale transaction.88 In
one relatively recent case, the Supreme Court held that a vendor’s
privilege even secured the purchaser’s obligation to pay the seller an
additional amount of money in the event that a reversionary clause
in the act of sale was found to be unenforceable.89 It has also been
held that a buyer’s agreement to reimburse the seller for the amount
needed to clear encumbrances on property that the buyer “traded in”
was an integral part of the purchase price secured by the vendor’s
privilege, rather than an obligation separate and distinct from the
sale.90 If several things are sold at the same time with an allocation
of the purchase price among them, the vendor’s privilege on each
thing sold secures only the portion of the price allocated to that
thing.91
nonetheless entitled to notice of the tax sale, and without notice to him the tax
sale is absolutely null. Padilla v. Schwartz, 11 So. 3d 6, 14 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
86. Caldwell v. His Creditors, 9 La. 265, 267–68 (1836). See also BAUDRYLACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 490.
87. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. McCall Bros. Planting & Mfg. Co., 73
So. 857, 858 (La. 1917).
88. VETTER & HARRELL, supra note 14, at 155; HUC, supra note 42, No.
112.
89. Lessard v. Lessard Acres, Inc., 349 So. 2d 293 (La. 1977). The Court
cited Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. McCall Bros. Planting & Manufacturing
Co., 73 So. 857 (La. 1917), for the proposition that a vendor’s privilege secures
payment of attorney’s fees stipulated in the promissory note even though that is
only a conditional obligation and found that the same principle applied to the
conditional obligation of the purchaser in Lessard to pay the seller an additional
sum in the event the reversionary clause was unenforceable. Lessard, 349 So. 2d
at 297. According to the majority opinion, there is no reason why the seller and
purchaser could not agree that the price would include an additional amount if
the purchaser failed to comply with obligations imposed upon him. Id. Justice
Tate dissented, believing that the stipulated payment was merely a penalty in
lieu of the reversion of the property to the seller and, not being part of the
purchase price, was not secured by the vendor’s privilege. Id. at 299. See
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 490; AUBRY ET RAU, supra
note 20, § 263; HUC, supra note 42, No. 91 (expressing the view that the
vendor’s privilege does not include damages that are awarded by the courts or
that are due under a clause for stipulated damages).
90. Scott v. Reed, 524 So. 2d 756, 759 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
91. See HUC, supra note 42, No. 91. For a modern case applying this rule,
see Ford v. J & J Pallets, Inc., 623 So. 2d 91 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (where a sale
contract executed in connection with the sale of a business allocated the total
purchase price between inventory and other assets and provided that the
purchase price for the inventory would be payable over time, the court held that
the vendor’s privilege attached only to the inventory). The court distinguished
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A sale and resale of a thing made for the sole purpose of
acquiring a vendor’s privilege on the object is recognized under the
law. For instance, it is lawful for the parties to an out-of-state sale to
enter into another sale–resale in Louisiana for the purpose of
creating a vendor’s privilege.92 As is well known, building and loan
associations for decades used the sale–resale transaction for the
express purpose of creating a vendor’s privilege in the association’s
favor—a practice that is discussed in detail below.
As the cases cited in the introduction to this Article illustrate, the
assumption of a debt due to one of the vendor’s creditors—such as a
mortgagee—creates a vendor’s privilege in favor of that creditor on
the thing sold.93 It has been held that, if the vendee assumes a debt
secured by an outstanding mortgage that burdens only a portion of
the estate sold to the vendee, the vendor’s privilege thus created in
favor of the mortgagee nonetheless burdens the entire estate.94
De La Vergne Refrigerating Machine Co. v. New Orleans & W.R. Co., 26 So.
455 (La. 1899), in which the parties made no allocation of the purchase price
between two items of equipment sold. Ford, 623 So. 2d at 94.
92. Pratt Eng’g & Mach. Co. v. Cecelia Sugar Co., 65 So. 100 (La. 1914);
Edward J. Gay & Co. v. Crichlow & Donelson, 29 La. Ann. 122, 123 (1877).
93. De L’Isle v. Succession of Moss, 34 La. Ann. 164 (1882); Conté v.
Cain, 33 La. Ann. 965 (1881); Franklin Press, Inc. v. Nat’l Diversified Corp.,
286 So. 2d 469, 472 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
94. Citizens’ Bank of La. v. Succession of Cuny, 38 La. Ann. 360 (1886).
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5383 appears to intend to alter this result,
though the statute is awkwardly worded and written in a way that seems not to
recognize that the assumption itself creates a new vendor’s privilege:
In a transfer of more than one parcel of immovable property, no
assumption in globo is created by the assumption by a purchaser of
more than one vendor’s privilege and/or mortgage, unless the contrary
is expressed in said transfer. In such cases, whenever separate parcels
of immovable property are transferred to a purchaser who expressly
assumes the payment of the vendor’s privileges and/or mortgages
bearing against the immovable property purchased, each vendor’s
privilege and/or mortgage shall be deemed to have each been assumed
separately and distinctly as if only one parcel of immovable property
had been transferred, and each such vendor’s privilege and/or mortgage
shall continue to affect and bear against only the specific immovable
property described in the instrument by which the vendor’s privilege
and/or mortgage was originally created. Likewise, unless the contrary is
expressed in said transfer, any resolutory condition or right to rescind
arising in favor of the vendor as a result of the failure to pay any of the
vendor’s privileges and/or mortgages shall be deemed to apply only to
the immovable property affected by its respective vendor’s privilege
and/or mortgage.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5383 (2007); VETTER & HARRELL, supra note 14,
at 162 (explaining that this statute was “apparently intended to create a
presumption that the vendor’s privilege on each piece of property is limited to
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As will be explored in considerable depth below in the
discussion of whether vendor’s privileges constitute real rights, the
vendor’s privilege on a movable is lost when the vendee sells and
delivers the thing to a second buyer. Because the vendor does not
have a general privilege on the property of the vendee, the vendor
does not have a privilege on the cash price received by the vendee
from the sale of the movable subject to the vendor’s privilege, even
though that sale causes the loss of his privilege.95 However, if the
second sale is made on credit, the original vendor’s privilege
nonetheless continues to encumber the unpaid price owed by the
second buyer.96 The vendor’s privilege similarly continues to exist
upon proceeds of the sale of the thing by a receiver and proceeds
of the judicial sale of a thing while the proceeds are still in the
hands of the court.97 By special statute, the holder of a vendor’s
privilege on movable property destroyed by fire has a privilege,
with the rank of a vendor’s privilege, on the claim for money due
to the vendee under insurance policies covering the property.98
As a procedural matter, the assertion of a vendor’s privilege
enables seizure of the property by sequestration before judgment.99
Enforcement of the vendor’s privilege is subject to the Deficiency
Judgment Act,100 and the creditor’s extrajudicial sale of the
property subject to a vendor’s privilege, or a judicial sale without
appraisement, will thus cause a loss of the creditor’s deficiency
rights.101

that part of the indebtedness that was assumed which is secured by a preexisting mortgage or privilege on that property, unless the parties provide to the
contrary”).
95. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 496;
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 232.
96. S.O. Nelson & Co. v. John C. Simpson-Hill, McLean & Co., 9 La. Ann.
311, 313 (1854). For a discussion of the reasons why the privilege attaches to
the unpaid price owed by the second buyer, see BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL.,
supra note 26, No. 497, and BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 511. But see
HUC, supra note 42, No. 92 (questioning the soundness of this rule).
97. Millaudon v. New-Orleans Water Co., 11 Mart. (o.s.) 278, 279 (La.
1822); Terry v. Terry, 10 La. 68 (1836). See also YIANNOPOULOS, supra note
76, § 232; HUC, supra note 42, No. 91.
98. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4581 (2007). This principle is in accord with
French doctrine. See AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 20, § 263; BAUDRYLACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 499 (noting the insurance proceeds
being assimilated to the price produced by the sale).
99. See W. T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 269 So. 2d 186 (La. 1972); see also
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3571 (2015).
100. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4106 (2006).
101. See Cormier v. Castille, 488 So. 2d 247, 248 (La. Ct. App. 1986);
Justice v. Caballero, 393 So. 2d 866, 869 (La. Ct. App. 1981). In contrast,
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In an apparent attempt to strengthen the protections afforded by
vendor’s privileges on immovables, the legislation that adopted a
non-uniform version of Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, effective January 1, 1990,102 also enacted Louisiana Revised
Statutes sections 9:5550 through 9:5554, which somewhat
surprisingly pair vendor’s privileges with collateral mortgages.103
The definition given to the term “vendor’s privilege” in Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 9:5550(2),104 which contemplates that a
vendor’s privilege might secure a collateral mortgage note, reflects
a misunderstanding of the fundamental nature of a vendor’s
privilege, which can arise only by operation of law and therefore
could never secure a collateral mortgage note. Section 5554
provides, in the case of both collateral mortgages and vendor’s
privileges, that there is no requirement of registry of the pledge,
transfer or assignment of, or the granting of a security interest in,
the obligation secured by either.105 Section 5553 in effect makes

enforcement of a security interest arising under the Uniform Commercial Code
is exempt from the provisions of the Deficiency Judgment Act. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10:9-626(c) (Supp. 2015).
102. Act No. 135, 1989 La. Acts 417.
103. For a discussion of the nature and theory of a collateral mortgage, see
Diamond Services Corp. v. Benoit, 780 So. 2d 367 (La. 2001), and First
Guaranty Bank v. Alford, 366 So. 2d 1299 (La. 1978). See also Max Nathan, Jr.,
& H. Gayle Marshall, The Collateral Mortgage, 33 LA. L. REV. 497 (1973). A
“collateral mortgage note” is defined in Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which, since 1990, has governed the granting of a security interest in a
collateral mortgage note. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-102(d)(3) (Supp.
2015). Apparently unaware of this change in the law in 1990, some courts
appear to labor under the erroneous belief that the Civil Code articles governing
pledge continue to apply to collateral mortgage notes. See, e.g., CadleRock Joint
Ventures Co. v. J. Graves Scaffolding Co., 152 So. 3d 1079 (La. Ct. App. 2014);
Nine-O-Five Royal Apartment Hotel, Inc. v. Atkins, 151 So. 3d 739 (La. Ct.
App. 2014); Gulf Nat., L.L.C. v. Alfortish, Inc., 926 So. 2d 676 (La. Ct. App.
2006); see also Michael H. Rubin, Ruminations on Pledge, 75 LA. L. REV. 697,
704 n.39 (2015); David S. Willenzik, Louisiana Future Advance Mortgages: A
20-Year Retrospective, 75 LA. L. REV. 613, 695 (2015).
104. “‘Vendor’s privilege’ shall mean a vendor’s lien or vendor’s privilege
on immovable property that secures a written obligation, such as a collateral
mortgage note, negotiable or nonnegotiable instrument, or other written
evidence of debt.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5550(2) (2007).
105. Although there may be no requirement of registry of the pledge, transfer
or assignment, there is a consequence of failing to record the instrument. See
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3356 (2015). What the statute may have intended is that there
is no requirement of registry in order for executory process to be available to
enforce a collateral mortgage or vendor’s privilege. Act 135 of 1989 made
substantial changes to the articles of the Code of Civil Procedure bearing upon
the requirements for executory process. See Act No. 135, 1989 La. Acts 417.
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certain defenses, other than the defense of forged signatures,
personal to the original obligor and precludes other persons from
raising them as a basis for extinguishment of a vendor’s privilege
if the original obligor does not do so. Included among these
defenses are the invalidity or extinguishment of the underlying
obligation and the lack of registry of the transfer, assignment, or
pledge of the obligation secured by the vendor’s privilege. As yet,
only one case has applied this statute, holding that a third possessor
may not assert prescription of an obligation secured by a vendor’s
privilege on an immovable when the original obligor has not raised
this defense.106
V. THE PRIVILEGE DISTINGUISHED FROM
THE RIGHT OF DISSOLUTION
The vendor’s privilege is, of course, but one arrow in the
quiver of the seller, who also enjoys the right of dissolution of the
sale in the event the vendee fails to pay the price.107 The exercise
106. Giddens v. Giddens, 722 So. 2d 114 (La. Ct. App. 1998). The opinion
might be criticized on both the ground that it treats the accrual of liberative
prescription as an extinguishment of the prescribed obligation and the ground
that it ignores Louisiana Civil Code article 3453, which specifically provides
that persons having an interest “in the extinction of a claim or of a real right by
prescription may plead prescription, even if the person in whose favor
prescription has accrued renounces or fails to plead prescription.” On the former
ground, see Louisiana Civil Code article 3447, which provides that liberative
prescription is a means of barring an action (rather than a means of extinction of
an obligation), and Louisiana Civil Code article 3277, which lists both
extinction of the debt secured by a privilege and prescription as separate causes
for the extinction of a privilege. On the latter ground, see Louisiana Civil Code
articles 3453 and 3447. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3277 (1870); AUBRY ET
RAU, supra note 20, § 292 (asserting on the basis of the article of the French
Civil Code analogous to Louisiana Civil Code article 3453, that a third
possessor can plead prescription even if the debtor has renounced it).
107. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2561–2653 (2015). Under the Code Napoléon, the
unpaid seller of a movable is granted four different rights correlative to the
buyer’s obligation to pay the price: (i) the right of retention until payment is
made; (ii) the vendor’s privilege; (iii) the right of dissolution; and (iv) the right
of revendication discussed above. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra
note 26, No. 482. The unpaid seller of an immovable enjoys only the first three
of these, but his rights are nonetheless much stronger because his privilege
entails a right of pursuit, obviating the need for the right of revendication
accorded to the seller of a movable. Id. No. 566. In a credit sale of either a
movable or an immovable, the seller is afforded only the vendor’s privilege and
right of dissolution. See BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 507. The Louisiana
Civil Code recognizes all four of these rights, in addition to the remedy of
stoppage in transit allowed to the seller of a movable under Louisiana Civil
Code article 2614. That remedy was borrowed from Article 2 of the model
Uniform Commercial Code, which has not been adopted in Louisiana.
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of this right is, of course, antithetical to the vendor’s privilege.
With the exercise of the right of dissolution of the sale, the vendor
undoes the sale and must return whatever portion of the price that
has been paid.108 Enforcement of the vendor’s privilege, on the other
hand, is an affirmation of the sale by which the vendor seeks to
enforce the vendee’s obligation to pay the price.109 The right of a
vendor to seek dissolution of a sale upon non-payment of the price
and the vendor’s privilege are distinct remedies, neither of which is
dependent on the existence of the other.110 Thus, the Supreme Court
has held that a provision in an act of sale to the effect that the
vendee’s obligation to pay the price would be a personal obligation
and that no “lien” would exist in favor of the vendor does not waive
the vendor’s separate right of dissolution.111 Another difference
between the two alternative rights is recordation: Where immovables
are concerned, the vendor’s privilege must be evidenced by a
recordation in the mortgage records.112 On the other hand, the right of
dissolution can be asserted against third persons113 without the
necessity of recordation in the mortgage records, so long as the act
conveying the immovable to the vendee does not reflect that the
price was paid.114 The fact that the vendor has lost, or failed to
108. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2561 cmt. e (2015). See also Lee v. Taylor, 21 La.
Ann. 514 (1869); Louis Werner Saw Mill Co. v. White, 17 So. 2d 264, 268 (La.
1944); see generally TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 73, §§ 15:9–
22.
109. Robertson v. Buoni, 504 So. 2d 860, 862 (La. 1987).
110. Id. at 863; Johnson v. Bloodworth, 12 La. Ann. 699 (1857); Louis
Werner Saw Mill Co. v. White, 17 So. 2d 264 (La. 1944). See also Shapiro v.
Kimbrough, 20 So. 2d 24, 29 (La. Ct. App. 1944) (holding that a previous suit
for judgment on the note secured by the vendor’s privilege is not a bar, under a
theory of either estoppel or res judicata, to a subsequent claim for dissolution).
Shapiro v. Kimbrough cites Canal Bank v. Copeland, 15 La. 75 (1840), for the
proposition that “a previous suit for the specific performance of a contract, far
from being a bar to subsequent action for its rescission, is by our law considered
as one of the preliminary steps to be resorted to.” Shapiro, 20 So. 2d at 29.
111. Sliman v. McBee, 311 So. 2d 248, 252 (La. 1975) (holding that in order
for the seller to waive his separate and independent right to dissolve the sale, he
must express his intent to do so in words that make specific reference to the
action to dissolve as distinguished from the action to enforce the contract).
112. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3271, 3274 (2015). See discussion infra Part VI.
113. The right to dissolution of the sale of an immovable for non-payment of
the price is not contingent on the absence of a third-party purchaser, and a
vendor seeking dissolution of the sale may do so even after the property has left
the hands of the original purchaser. See Buoni, 504 So. 2d 860.
114. See, e.g., City Bank & Trust Co. v. Caneco Constr., Inc., 341 So. 2d
1331 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the seller was barred by both the parol
evidence rule and the public records doctrine from seeking to enforce to the
prejudice of a mortgagee either the seller’s right to dissolve or its vendor’s
privilege, where the act of sale recited that the purchase price had been paid in
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preserve, a vendor’s privilege presents no obstacle to the exercise
of the separate right of dissolution.115
Until the revision of the sales articles of the Civil Code in
1993, there was another interesting distinction between the
vendor’s privilege and the right of dissolution. Following prior
jurisprudence, Louis Werner Saw Mill Co. v. White116 held that the
action to dissolve a sale for the non-payment of the purchase price
is a personal action that prescribes in 10 years,117 running from the
moment the buyer defaults on the payment of the credit portion of
the price. Applying the rule that the right of dissolution is
independent of the vendor’s privilege and is not dependent on the
preservation of the privilege, the Court reaffirmed earlier holdings
to the effect that the right of dissolution may be exercised even if
the notes given to evidence the price have prescribed.118 The Court
rejected an argument that this rule was altered by a 1924
amendment to Civil Code article 2561 making the right of
dissolution an accessory to the credit representing the price.119
Nevertheless, the rule established in Louis Werner Saw Mill Co.
was ultimately altered in the 1993 revision of the law of sales: If an
instrument is given to evidence the price, the right of dissolution
now prescribes at the same time and in the same period as the

full, and rejecting arguments that mortgagee, as the drawee bank, knew that a
check given to the seller for the remaining balance of the purchase price had
been returned for insufficient funds).
115. Stevenson v. Brown, 32 La. Ann. 461, 464 (1880). See also LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2561 cmt. h (2015).
116. 17 So. 2d 264, 269 (La. 1944). See supra note 110.
117. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3499 (2015).
118. See, e.g., Sch. Dirs. v. Anderson, 28 La. Ann. 739, 741 (1876) (holding
that “the prescription of the notes given as evidence of the price does not affect
[the right of action to dissolve a sale], the right to dissolve not being an
accessory to but different from the right to enforce the payment of the price”);
see also Templeman v. Pegues, 24 La. Ann. 537, 543 (1872) (spawning a dissent
by Justice Howe complaining that, under the majority’s holding, “the action to
dissolve still exists—wandering about like a disembodied evil spirit”—a result
he viewed to be “not a trifle worse than the system of unrecorded tacit
mortgages from which we boast a recent deliverance”).
119. According to the court’s opinion:
By amending and reenacting Article 2561 of the Code so as to provide
that ‘This right of dissolution shall be an accessory of the credit
representing the price’, the Legislature evidently did not intend to put
the ‘right to dissolve’ on ‘all-fours’ with the accessory right of
mortgage and vendor’s privilege ‘as regards the term of its existence’.
In other words, it did not intend to change the prescriptive period
applicable to actions to enforce the resolutory condition.
Louis Werner Saw Mill Co., 17 So. 2d at 269.
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instrument.120 The vendor’s privilege, being an accessorial right, is
also extinguished when the underlying obligation prescribes.121
It is equally important, in the case of the sale of movables, not
to confuse the seller’s right of dissolution with the right of
revendication, or restitution as it is known in Civil Code articles
3229 through 3231. Originally, the right of revendication afforded to
the unpaid seller who did not grant a term for payment was viewed
in France as a simplified and expeditious means of dissolving a sale
when the conditions for its exercise were satisfied.122 In time,
however, this theory was rejected. Unlike the action in dissolution,
exercise of the right of revendication leaves the contract intact, its
goal being simply to return possession of the thing sold to the seller
so that he can again exercise his right of retention.123 The right of
revendication, leading to restoration of the seller’s right of
retention,124 protects the seller against the possibility of loss of the
vendor’s privilege, which would be extinguished by the buyer’s
further alienation of the movable.125
120. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2561 (2015).
121. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3277 (2015). See, e.g., Dassau v. Seary, 158 So. 2d
243, 244–45 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (holding that where a promissory note secured
by a vendor’s privilege on an immovable contained an automatic acceleration
clause, it prescribed five years after default and the vendor’s privilege of
necessity became unenforceable, because the principal obligation had
prescribed).
122. See BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 521.
123. The seller who exercises the right of revendication finds himself in
exactly the same place in which he was before delivery. Exercise of the right of
revendication is not antithetical to exercise of the right of dissolution. Once the
seller regains possession, he can either enforce payment of the price through the
exercise of his privilege or, if he prefers, institute an action to dissolve the sale.
However, the seller does not necessarily demand the dissolution of the sale by
exercising his right of revendication. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra
note 26, Nos. 520–536. Although Huc admits that this is the prevailing view, he
maintains that a better interpretation of the article allowing the right of
revendication is that it enables the seller to dissolve the sale of right under the
limited circumstances of the article, without incurring the delay and risks
inherent in pursuing a judicial action for dissolution. HUC, supra note 42, Nos.
100–102.
124. The seller’s right of retention, found presently in Louisiana Civil Code
article 2487, is founded on the idea that, in the synallagmatic contract of sale, it
is the buyer who should first perform by paying the price. Of the two parties to
the sale, the buyer places himself less at risk by being the first to perform since,
as owner of the thing sold, he can revendicate the thing in the hands of the seller
and force delivery without coming into competition with the seller’s creditors.
The right of retention does not exist in the case of a credit sale because the seller
has agreed to grant the buyer credit and therefore must perform first. See
BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 507.
125. Though Louisiana Civil Code articles 3229 through 3231 contemplate
that the seller can “prevent the resale” of the thing sold, he cannot undo a resale
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VI. REGISTRY
To affect third persons, a vendor’s privilege on an immovable
must be recorded in the mortgage records by the express command
of article 3271 of the Civil Code.126 Recordation in the conveyance
records alone is insufficient to preserve the privilege.127 In order
for the privilege to enjoy a preference over previously recorded
mortgages, it must be recorded within the period prescribed by
article 3274 of the Civil Code.128 If not recorded within that period,
the privilege enjoys no preference over mortgages that were
previously filed and has “effect against all parties from date of
registry.”129 Vendor’s privileges on immovables are subject to the
same requirements of reinscription that apply to mortgages.130
On the other hand, the law generally excuses the requirement
of recordation of privileges on movable property, except as
otherwise prescribed by law.131 Because the law does not otherwise
prescribe, the vendor’s privilege on movables thus exists without the

that has already been made. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3229–3231 (2015); Hill v.
Morgan, 4 Mart. (n.s.) 475, 480 (La. 1826).
126. See also LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3338, 3346 (2015); LA. CONST. art. XIX, §
19 (1921); Morrison v. Trudeaux, 1 Mart. (n.s.) 384 (La. 1823). Registry is
unnecessary for the preservation of the privilege between the parties. See
Schutzman v. Dobrowolski, 186 So. 338, 341 (1939) (interpreting Louisiana
Civil Code article 3271 to refer only to the rights of third persons and not the
immediate parties to the contract of sale).
127. Verges v. Prejean, 24 La. Ann. 78, 78–79 (1872); White v. Union Bank,
6 La. Ann. 162, 164 (1851). Woodward v. Investors-Ryan, 600 So. 2d 855, 858
(La. Ct. App. 1992), applied this rule to an assumption deed, holding that its
recordation in the conveyance records did not preserve the vendor’s privilege
arising from the assumption. See also Comm’r of Ins. v. Terrell, 647 So. 2d 445
(La. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that where an act of sale did not mention a
promissory note that had been given to evidence the unpaid purchase price or
otherwise indicate that the sale was made on credit, but at the same time a
mortgage was executed to secure this note, any vendor’s privilege the seller
might have had was not properly preserved by the recordation of the act of sale
only in the conveyance records, and the vendor’s privilege was therefore
subordinate to a previously recorded judgment against the purchaser. The court
rejected arguments that anyone looking at the recorded act of sale and mortgage
should have seen that the transaction was in the nature of a credit sale and would
have been put on notice of the existence of the vendor’s privilege).
128. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3274 (2015). The period is 7 days if the property is
located in the same parish where the act was passed; otherwise, the period is 15
days.
129. Id.
130. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3357–3365 (2015).
131. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 19 (1921).
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requirement of recordation.132 However, under the express wording of
the Civil Code, the vendor’s privilege is lost when the vendee no
longer possesses the movable.133 Thus, in the absence of an
assumption, a second buyer who obtains possession of a movable
takes free of a vendor’s privilege held by his seller’s vendor.134
Recordation of the vendor’s privilege on a movable does not cause it
to follow the movable into the hands of a third person, nor does
recordation of some other privilege on a movable give that privilege
priority over an unrecorded vendor’s privilege on the same
movable.135
At one time, there was considerable controversy over whether a
vendor’s privilege on a movable had to be recorded in the mortgage
records in order to remain enforceable against third persons after the
movable became immobilized. As more fully discussed below, that
controversy appears to have been resolved by a number of holdings to
the effect that no registry is required.136
VII. VENDOR’S PRIVILEGES AS REAL RIGHTS
If the Latin maxim adheret visceribus rei is a reliable guide, it
would seem that vendor’s privileges must necessarily constitute
real rights, for adhering to the very viscera of a thing might even
be viewed as somewhat of a definition of a real right. As it turns
out, this inference would undoubtedly be correct in the case of
immovables. In contrast, for the vendor’s privilege on movables,
the issue is as complex as its resolution is uncertain.
Before turning to the interesting question of the status of vendor’s
privileges as real rights, it is useful to formulate a workable definition
of what is meant by the term.137 In a comprehensive article on the
subject written in 1963,138 Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos writes that
132. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 232.
133. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3227 (2015).
134. This issue is considered in depth below in the discussion of whether
vendor’s privileges constitute real rights. See discussion infra Part VII.
135. German v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 5 Teiss. 184, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1908).
136. Nonetheless, the very existence of the vendor’s privilege following
immobilization is now doubtful, irrespective of the recordation issue. See
discussion infra Part VIII.E.
137. The term real right is nowhere defined in the articles of the Louisiana
Civil Code. But see LA. CIV. CODE art. 476 cmts. b, d (2015); LA. CIV. CODE art.
1763 cmt. b (2015). Article 1763 defines a real obligation as the duty correlative
and incidental to a real right, and comment (b) to that article includes a
definition of a real right as “a right in a thing that can be held against the world.”
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1763 & cmt. b (2015).
138. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law:
Part I, 23 LA. L. REV. 161 (1963) [hereinafter Yiannopoulos, Real Rights].
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the traditional definition of a real right in France is “said to involve
subjection of a thing, in whole or in part, to the authority of a person
by virtue of a direct relationship which can be asserted against the
world.”139 He concludes that real rights are ultimately distinguishable
from personal rights in France by the presence of two essential
attributes: the right to follow and the right of preference.140 It seems
to be a fair inference from his work that these same two defining
characteristics are, or at least should be, observed in Louisiana.141
Privileges, of course, by their very nature always involve a right of
preference. It follows then that a privilege can be classified as a real
right only if it also entails a right of pursuit of the thing sold in the
hands of third persons.142
There is little doubt of the nature of vendor’s privileges on
immovables as real rights.143 Planiol refers to them as “veritable
mortgages” and includes them among the “privileged mortgages.”144
But, he emphatically insists that privileges on movables—the
vendor’s privilege included—are mere rights of preference:
But for all the other privileged creditors [i.e., other than those
holding special privileges on immovables and pledges], no real
right exists. Only those are real rights which protect a person
against all others in the total or partial possession of a thing.
Such are ownership, usufruct, servitudes, emphyteusis,145
139. Id. at 171.
140. Id. at 174. In French terminology, these characteristics are known as the
droit de suite and the droit de préférence. At Roman law, privileges conferred
only a right of preference assertable against the creditors of the debtor and did
not include any right of pursuit. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note
26, at i.
141. See also YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 215.
142. F. LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS No. 314 (2d ed.
1878) (asserting that, even though privileges on movables do not include a right
of pursuit, it would be error to conclude that they are not real rights, for the fact
that a right exists in a thing suffices for the right to be considered a real right).
According to Laurent, the absence of a right of pursuit results not from the
nature of privileges on movables but rather from application of the doctrine of la
possession vaut titre. See also id. No. 485 (specifically referring to the vendor’s
privilege on a movable as a real right).
143. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 232. For recent cases affirming the
principle that a vendor’s privilege on an immovable follows the property into the
hands of third persons, see Newman v. Livingston Parish Police Jury, 603 So. 2d
250, 253 (La. Ct. App. 1992), and Verret v. Rougeau, 579 So. 2d 1239, 1240
(La. Ct. App. 1991).
144. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, Nos. 2548, 2886. See also BAUDRYLACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, at ii; VETTER & HARRELL, supra note 14,
at 155.
145. Professor Yiannopoulos describes emphyteusis as an institution of
Greek law borrowed by Roman law consisting of “a contract according to which
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pledge; such is also the mortgage, because it tends to leave the
thing to the creditor and authorizes the latter to transfer the
ownership to another. In privileges there is nothing like that: It
is a simple right of priority between creditors, a permit to come
in out of turn in the division of the price, and it is thus that the
law looks upon it in defining it “as a right which the creditor
has to be preferred.”146
Laurent147 and Aubry and Rau148 are in accord. However, a
number of French commentators disagree. For instance, in response to
the argument that the vendor of a movable has no right of pursuit
because a creditor is not permitted to seize things that have been
alienated by his debtor, Baudry-Lacantinerie counters that “all
privileges, the privileges on movables like privileges on immovables,
are real rights” and that “real rights engender a right of pursuit.”149
In Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Leger,150 the court embraced the
notion that a vendor’s privilege on a movable, unlike a duly recorded
chattel mortgage, is a mere right of preference giving the creditor no
right of pursuit:
Furthermore, the courts of this state should note a difference
between a privilege which confers a right of preference and
one delivered to another a piece of land either in perpetuity of for a long period
of time, the recipient undertaking the obligation to cultivate the land and to pay
an annual rent.” Yiannopoulos, Real Rights, supra note 138, at 185. See also
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 225. Emphyteusis was known under the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 as the “rent of lands” governed by articles 2779
through 2792. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 225. These articles were
left intact without revision in the 2004 revision of the law of lease, but the real
right known as the rent of lands was suppressed in the 2012 adoption of the
annuity charge. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2787 (2015), enacted by Act No. 258,
2012 La. Acts 1698.
146. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2548. See also BAUDRYLACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, Nos. 361–363 (explaining that, on account of
the rule of la possession vaut titre, privileges on movables, whether general or special,
confer only a right of preference and no right of pursuit).
147. According to Laurent, the fact that the Civil Code provides that the
vendor’s privilege on a movable is lost when the buyer no longer has possession
does not mean that it necessarily continues to exist so long as the buyer retains
possession. Upon the buyer’s alienation of the thing, the privilege is lost because
it is no longer within his patrimony and his creditors thus no longer have
recourse against it. See LAURENT, supra note 142, Nos. 478–479.
148. AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 20, § 261.
149. “On peut répondre tout d’abord que tous les privilèges, les privilèges
sur les meubles comme les privilèges sur les immeubles, sont des droits réels. Or
the droits réels engendrent un droit de suite . . . . ” BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET
AL., supra note 26, No. 495 (author’s translation).
150. 169 So. 170 (La. Ct. App. 1936).
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one which also gives the additional right to follow the property
on which it rests into the hands of a third person or persons. . . .
This distinction is marked by the French commentators in
apt phrases. Under their nomenclature, privileges of the first
class, which are by far the most numerous, confer a “droit de
preference” only, while those of the second class confer in
addition a “droit de suite.” It is the holder of a privileged
debt of the first class who is obliged to intervene by way of
third opposition and to ask for a separate appraisement and
sale of the property on which he has a privilege in order to
preserve his rights when said property is seized in globo with
other property of the debtor by a third person. The reason is
obvious. In such a case, the property passes to the purchaser
free of encumbrances. The contest for preference is then
fought out over the proceeds. . . . 151
Professor Yiannopoulos asserts that the entire controversy of
whether privileges on movables create real rights is “without
purpose” in Louisiana because, contrary to the practice in France
where legal classification drives the consequences, Louisiana
courts “are seldom inclined to derive practical consequences from
abstract qualifications” (i.e., abstract labels). He maintains that the
process is in effect reversed in Louisiana, with the classification of
the privilege as real or personal being made “only in light of its
function.”152 Thus, the question becomes whether, from a functional
standpoint, the vendor’s privilege on a movable can be regarded as a
real right. Under both the Code Napoléon and the Louisiana Civil
Code, the vendor’s privilege on a movable exists only for as long as
the movable remains in the possession of the vendee.153 Thus,
continued possession—rather than continued ownership—by the
vendee appears to be the critical factor. It is clear that if the vendee
re-sells the thing to a third person who has taken possession, the
151. Id. at 173–74. As the court in Liquid Carbonic notes, it is not only a
private sale that will cause the holder of a privilege to lose his rights; the same
effect will result from a judicial sale, even if the sale is made at the instance of a
creditor holding an inferior privilege or an unsecured creditor. In order to
preserve his rights, the holder of the superior privilege must intervene to assert
his rights to the proceeds from the sale. In any event, he has no right of pursuit
against the property, even though his right is superior to that of the seizing
creditor.
152. See Yiannopoulos, Real Rights, supra note 138, at 223–24;
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 231.
153. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3217, 3227 (2015); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2102
(Fr.) (1804). The same rule is found in article 2332 of the current French Civil
Code. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2332 (Fr.).
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privilege is lost, even if the original vendor and vendee have
attempted to derogate from this rule by agreement.154 But, the
vendee might very well have sold the thing to a second buyer, yet
remain in physical possession. Does the original vendor’s privilege
persist? Planiol observes that the concept that a vendor’s privilege is
available “as long as the effects sold are still in the possession of the
debtor” is borrowed from ancient authors, who probably meant “not
having been alienated by him.”155 According to Planiol, it is not the
fact of possession but rather the fact of alienation that must be
considered. Thus, if the buyer pledges or deposits the thing sold, the
privilege still subsists, because the buyer is still the possessor of the
thing by the intermediation of another. In the situation in which the
buyer has alienated the thing but has not yet delivered possession,
Planiol notes that some authors believe that the privilege subsists
because the thing is still in the possession of the buyer, but he argues
that this is error because the original vendee now holds precariously
for his own buyer. Since the thing has passed from the patrimony of
the original seller’s debtor, it is no longer the common pledge of his
creditors, and to seize it again despite the alienation would give him
a right of pursuit that the law does not permit.
As Planiol himself observes, his views on this issue are by no
means universally accepted. For instance, Beudant156 argues that the
possession requirement is a simple application of article 2279 of the
French Civil Code: En fait de meubles, la possession vaut titre.157
Thus, the vendor’s privilege is lost when the thing is sold and
delivered to a third person who is in good faith, that is, who is
unaware of the continued existence of the vendor’s privilege.158
Mere alienation does not cause a loss of the privilege or a right of
pursuit to enforce it, because delivery of “real possession” is
essential to the third person’s ability to invoke the protection of la
possession vaut titre.159
154. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 491; BEUDANT
supra note 18, § 511; HUC, supra note 42, No. 91.
155. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2618.
156. BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 511.
157. In English: With respect to movables, possession is equivalent to title
(author’s translation). See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2276 (Fr.) (formerly article
2279).
158. BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 511; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL.,
supra note 26, No. 491; HUC, supra note 42, No. 91.
159. BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 511. Similarly, Baudry-Lacantinerie
asserts that the vendor’s privilege on a movable can still be exercised if the
buyer has sold the thing to a second buyer who has not yet taken possession;
however, if possession has been delivered to the second buyer, exercise of the
original seller’s privilege is “paralyzed” by application of the doctrine of la
possession vaut titre. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 495.
ET AL.,
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Dreyfous v. Cade160 is an early example of the application in
Louisiana of the rule that delivery of possession to a second buyer
will cause a loss of the vendor’s privilege. In that case, the buyer
of certain items of agricultural equipment on credit placed them on
his plantation for its service and improvement and then sold both
the plantation and the equipment to a third person. Afterward, the
original seller of the equipment sought to enforce a vendor’s
privilege against the second buyer. The Court held that, with very
limited exceptions,161 the vendor’s privilege on movable property
exists only so long as the property remains in the possession of the
vendee.162 Because the equipment had left the possession of the
original buyer, the vendor’s privilege was no longer enforceable.163
The Court held that this result was not altered by the fact that the
second buyer “may have known of the embarrassed circumstances
of his immediate vendor.”164 On this point, the Court’s holding

According to Baudry-Lacantinerie, if there has been no delivery, there is no real
exercise of a right of pursuit, because the exercise of a right of pursuit
presupposes that the thing is in the hands of a third person.
160. 70 So. 231 (La. 1915).
161. See, e.g., Act No. 63, 1890 La. Acts 51 (allowing the seller of
agricultural products of the United States in any chartered city of the state to
have a special privilege for a period of five days after delivery, within which he
can seize the products in whosoever hands they may be found); see also supra
note 44.
162. The jurisprudence has held that delivery of a warehouse receipt or bill
of lading covering goods that are affected by a vendor’s privilege is considered
to constitute actual delivery of the goods, extinguishing the vendor’s privilege.
See, e.g., Fetter v. Field, 1 La. Ann. 80, 83–84 (1846); Laughlin v. Ganahl, 11
Rob. 140, 143 (La. 1845).
163. Another factor behind the Court’s decision in Dreyfous was that the
equipment, with the plaintiff’s knowledge, had become immovable by
destination and, since the contract out of which the privilege arose was
unrecorded, the Court found that it became utterly null and void against the
purchaser of the plantation under the rule of McDuffie v. Walker, 51 So. 100 (La.
1909). See Dreyfous, 70 So. at 233. The Court’s holding on this point would
now appear questionable in light of subsequent jurisprudence. See discussion
infra Part VIII.E.
164. Dreyfous, 70 So. at 232. Professor Daggett maintains that the Court’s
holding on this point applies only in the absence of fraud, and if the resale is
made in bad faith for the purpose of defeating the vendor’s privilege, the court
will not further the vendee’s purpose by decreeing the privilege lost. See
DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 51. For another case holding that a second buyer’s
knowledge of the existence of an existing vendor’s privilege on a movable does
not cause the vendor’s privilege to survive a sale to that buyer, see Queen City
Broad. Co. v. Wagenwest, Inc., 264 So. 2d 336 (La. Ct. App. 1972). In Queen
City, the court held that where equipment is sold subject to, but without
assumption of, a debt owed to the seller’s own vendor, the vendor’s privilege is
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diverges from the views of most French writers, who maintain that
the vendor’s privilege is not lost when possession is delivered to a
second buyer who knows of the existence of the privilege because
that second buyer is not in good faith and therefore not protected
by the doctrine of la possession vaut titre.165
But what of Planiol’s example of the pledge of a thing that is
burdened by a vendor’s privilege? Planiol, and most if not all other
French writers, maintain that the privilege persists, because the
thing still belongs to the vendee and remains in his possession by
virtue of the precarious possession exercised by his pledgee.166 The
Supreme Court was presented with precisely this issue in Pierson
v. Carmouche167 on certification of a question from the court of
appeal. The question was formulated as follows:
May a purchaser on credit of movable property validly give
it in pledge to a third person, who knows that he has not
paid the price (but is otherwise in good faith), so as to vest
in the pledgee a right superior to that of the vendor, whose
privilege thereupon ceases by reason of the property having
passed out of the possession of the vendee?168
Though the Supreme Court answered the question in the
affirmative, its opinion recites no facts, and it is impossible to
determine whether the Court held that the vendor’s privilege was
wholly lost or that the vendor’s privilege was simply outranked by the
rights of the pledgee.169 The only support given by the Court for its
extinguished, rejecting an argument by the original vendor that the second
vendee’s knowledge of the existence of the vendor’s lien should preserve it. Id.
165. See supra note 158.
166. See, e.g., BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, Nos. 492–493
(expressing the view that the buyer still possesses the thing after he delivers it to
pledgee, lends it to a friend or deposits it with a depositary. All of those persons
possess under precarious title for the buyer as owner. Thus, even though the
buyer does not physically detain the thing under these circumstances, the
privilege of his vendor is nonetheless preserved. The rule that the pledgee is
preferred to the vendor under these circumstances results from application of the
doctrine of la possession vaut titre, at least if the pledgee is in good faith.); see
also LAURENT, supra note 142, No. 483; HUC, supra note 42, No. 91.
167. 84 So. 59 (La. 1920).
168. Id. at 59.
169. Professor Yiannopoulos cites Pierson v. Carmouche for the proposition
that “a pledge constituted on a thing subject to a vendor’s privilege involves
transfer of possession and terminates the privilege of the vendor.”
Yiannopoulos, Real Rights, supra note 138, at 226 n.301. On the other hand,
Professor Daggett appears to espouse the view that Pierson v. Carmouche
should be interpreted as a ranking case rather than a case involving the outright
loss of a vendor’s privilege. See DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 51; see also Ralph
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answer to the question was the holding of Dreyfous v. Cade; however,
that case involved a second sale (an alienation) and not a mere pledge
by the purchaser. If Pierson means that the vendor’s privilege is lost
when the purchaser pledges the property, it would certainly contradict
the concepts expressed by Planiol and other French writers.
A Comment appearing in the Tulane Law Review in 1929
addressed this very topic—the kind of possession by a vendee
necessary to maintain the continued validity of a privilege in favor of
his vendor.170 Though the student author of this Comment, Bessie
Margolin,171 certainly could not have envisioned it at the time, her
scholarly research and thoughtful analysis would, nearly four decades
later, persuade the federal courts to hold that the vendor’s privilege on
a movable is effective against a bankruptcy trustee.
In the 1968 bankruptcy case of In re Trahan,172 the issue facing
the court was whether the vendor’s privilege held by a seller that had
supplied merchandise to a furniture store was enforceable against the
bankruptcy trustee after the furniture store applied for bankruptcy
relief. Two years earlier, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act in
order to invalidate any statutory lien that was not perfected or
enforceable on the date of a bankruptcy filing against one acquiring
the rights of a bona fide purchaser from the debtor on that date.
Finding first that a vendor’s privilege meets the definition of a
“statutory lien,” the court noted the rule under the Civil Code that if
the original vendee resells the thing to a third-party purchaser who

Slovenko, Of Pledge, 32 TUL. L. REV. 59, 69 (1958) (opining that the vendor’s
privilege is surely not lost when the vendee lends or bails the property).
170. See Margolin, supra note 37.
171. For a recent biography of Bessie Margolin, see Marlene Trestman, Fair
Labor: Remarkable Life and Legal Career of Bessie Margolin (1909-1996), 37
J. SUP. CT. HIST. 43 (2012). The daughter of Russian immigrants, she spent her
childhood from age four at the New Orleans Jewish Orphans home. Id. at 42–43.
After two years at Newcomb College, she transferred to Tulane University to
begin the study of law. Id. at 46. In 1930, at age 21, she received both a
bachelor’s degree and her law degree from Tulane, having served as civil law
editor of the Tulane Law Review, in which she wrote three comments, including
one on vendor’s privileges, cited supra note 37. Id. at 46–47. Three years later,
she received her doctorate of juridical science from Yale University, but her
credentials entitled her to no better offer of employment on Wall Street than in a
firm’s law library. Id. at 47–48. Undaunted, she seized upon the opportunity to
join the legal staff of the newly created Tennessee Valley Authority. Id. at 48.
Later, she had an outstanding career at the Department of Labor in the
enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Equal Pay Act, arguing 26
cases before the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 49–54. Retired Chief
Justice Earl Warren was the speaker at her formal retirement dinner in 1972. Id.
at 69. She died in 1996 at age 87. Id. at 70.
172. 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1968).
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takes possession, the privilege of the original vendor is lost.
Nonetheless, the court held that a vendor’s privilege survives a
bankruptcy filing.
In reaching this holding, the court quoted extensively from Bessie
Margolin’s Comment, in which she outlined the majority view of the
French commentators that a resale of the property by the vendee does
not divest the original vendor of his privilege unless there is actual
physical delivery to the second vendee, the views of Planiol and other
members of the vocal minority notwithstanding. The court also cited
her analysis that three additional articles found in the 1870
Louisiana Civil Code but not found in the French Civil Code—
articles 1922, 1923 and 2247173—were even greater justification in
Louisiana for the majority view of the French commentators that a
vendor’s privilege survives a subsequent sale by the vendee when
unaccompanied by delivery. Those articles provided that the sale of
a movable does not affect third parties until actual delivery of the
object is made and that creditors of a seller may still seize a movable
he has sold while it remains in his possession. In holding that the
vendor’s privilege survived the bankruptcy filing, the Trahan court
placed great weight upon the argument that, because a sale
unaccompanied by delivery is not effective against third persons,
and because the seller’s creditors, including presumably his own
unpaid vendor, still have the right to seize his assets, the vendor’s
privilege should remain effective until delivery occurs.174 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the Trahan ruling in a per curiam opinion.175
173. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 518 (2015).
174. The court also reviewed the jurisprudence, including Continental Bank
& Trust Co. v. Succession McCann, 92 So. 55 (La. 1922), which reaffirmed that
a vendor’s privilege primes a subsequently arising chattel mortgage and rejected
an argument that the execution of the mortgage was an alienation causing the
loss of the vendor’s privilege. Another case cited was Flint v. Rawlings, 20 La.
Ann. 557 (1868), in which the Court held that a vendor’s privilege on movables
continues as long as the vendee has possession, but is lost by a subsequent sale
and actual delivery to a third person. Regardless of whether the second sale is
simulated or real, it has no effect upon the vendor’s privilege in the absence of
actual delivery. In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. at 626. The court also cited Wilson v.
Lowrie, 101 So. 549, 550 (La. 1924) (holding that a vendor’s privilege on
drilling pipe was lost when the vendee sold and delivered the pipe to a third
person). A final case cited by the Trahan court was Alex Kuhn & Co. v. Embry,
35 La. Ann. 488 (1883), which appears to provide scant authority for the
proposition for which it is cited. In that case, the vendor sought sequestration of
mules for fear that the defendant might dispose of them. Alex Kuhn, 35 La. Ann.
at 488. The plaintiff established by evidence that the defendant had in fact sold
the mules. Id. at 488–89. The Court found that the fact of the sale of the mules
justified the plaintiff’s apprehensions regarding their potential disposition by the
defendant. Id. There was no discussion of the possible extinguishment of the
vendor’s privilege or the effect of the non-delivery of the mules. Id. at 489.
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The Trahan analysis was rejected by the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit in the case of In re J.R. Nieves &
Co.,176 which involved a consideration of whether a vendor’s
privilege arising under the Puerto Rican Civil Code was avoidable
in bankruptcy. The Nieves court felt that the reality of whether the
bankrupt vendee still had possession was irrelevant to the issue and
that it would be “ridiculous” to require a debtor to bring all of his
possessions to the bankruptcy trustee at the time he files his
bankruptcy petition. As the court put it, when Congress spoke of a
hypothetical purchaser, “it contemplated a full blooded, not an
anemic, purchaser.”177 The court did concede that Louisiana sales
law is different from that of Puerto Rico, which apparently does
not allow ownership of a movable to transfer in the absence of
delivery. Thus, the possibility relied upon by the Trahan court of a
hypothetical purchaser having acquired ownership even though not
yet in possession did not exist under Puerto Rican law.
After the new Bankruptcy Code was adopted in 1978, a
Louisiana bankruptcy court considered in the case of In re
Hughes178 whether the holding of Trahan remained valid. Voiding
the vendor’s privilege, the court found the Trahan analysis to be
faulty because it “overlooked the fundamental issue of whether the
device could be defeated by a bona fide purchaser by improperly
emphasizing whether or not such a purchaser existed in the case
under consideration.”179 The Hughes court based its holding at
least in part upon legislative history indicating a desire to adopt a
stronger position toward statutory liens under the Bankruptcy
Code. The court invited the Fifth Circuit to examine more closely
this “vexing problem” in light of the adoption of the Bankruptcy
Code. The Fifth Circuit did in fact consider the issue the following
year in In re Tape City USA,180 but it re-affirmed the Trahan
holding under the new Bankruptcy Code without even a passing
mention of either Nieves or Hughes.
Ironically, even though the Trahan court would later quote her
summation of the majority view of the French commentators in
support of its holding, Margolin actually wrote that “[t]he real right
argument is weak and has been ably refuted by those
Indeed, it is not clear from the case whether the mules were ever delivered to the
second purchaser or from whose hands they were seized. Id.
175. In re Trahan, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968).
176. 446 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1971).
177. Id. at 192.
178. 9 B.R. 251 (W.D. La. 1981).
179. Id. at 256.
180. 677 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1982).
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commentators in the minority who say that the vendor’s privilege
is lost by a resale even though there has been no delivery.”181 She
felt that a more convincing reason in support of the majority view
was that the word “possession” in article 2102 of the French Civil
Code,182 which provides that the privilege exists only so long as
the original buyer remains in possession, refers to physical
possession. Those French commentators in the majority support
this argument by citing the rule of la possession vaut titre under
article 2279 of the French Civil Code.183 As the argument goes, the
unmodified use of the word “possession” in article 2279 must
plainly mean physical possession, and the article should be used to
interpret what is meant by the same word in article 2102.184
However, Margolin felt that the majority took an inconsistent view
when confronted with the issue—faced by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Pierson—of whether a vendor’s privilege is extinguished
when the vendee enters into a pledge, loan, or bailment of the thing
sold. She points out that, in that case, the French commentators
almost unanimously agree that the privilege is not lost, even
though the vendee no longer has physical possession and exercises
only civil possession.185 Margolin favored the consistent “civil
possession” theory of article 3227 of the Louisiana Civil Code (as
opposed to actual possession) because that theory would allow the
object in question to be pledged, loaned, or bailed without
destruction of the vendor’s privilege. Consistently applied, this
theory would, of course, mean that a privilege is lost if there is a
sale to a purchaser who does not take immediate physical delivery.
The second purchaser would have civil possession, and the original
vendee’s mere physical possession would be insufficient to
maintain the vitality of the vendor’s privilege. She asserted that
this rule would make little practical difference, because the original
vendor would still have the right to seize the property as a general
181. Margolin, supra note 37, at 245.
182. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2332 (Fr.).
183. See discussion supra Part VII.
184. This reasoning has even greater appeal when it is remembered that the
limitation arising under former article 2102 of the French Civil Code (now
article 2332) is itself a specific application of the doctrine of la possession vaut
titre. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 491; BEUDANT ET
AL., supra note 18, § 511.
185. See, e.g., BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 492. It
might be countered, however, that this view is not necessarily as inconsistent as
Margolin asserts. Beudant explains that, when the thing is delivered to another
person under a loan, lease or deposit, that person possesses precariously for the
owner, who thus continues to have possession. It is different when the thing is
pledged, for in that case the pledgee is a “quasi-possessor.” BEUDANT ET AL.,
supra note 18, § 511.
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creditor of his vendee under article 1923 of the 1870 Code.186 But,
if that were the case, the unpaid vendor would be in competition
with all other creditors of his debtor and would not enjoy the
preference over other creditors that is the very purpose of his
privilege. More importantly, however, federal bankruptcy law has
developed in a way Margolin could not have anticipated so that
there is now a huge practical and legal difference: Following her
civil possession theory, with the result that the privilege is lost
immediately upon the vendee’s sale to a second buyer irrespective
of delivery, would mean that the vendor’s privilege on a movable
would of necessity be a voidable statutory lien in bankruptcy court.
In Louisiana, attempting to interpret the possession requirement
of Civil Code articles 3217(7) and 3227 on the basis of la possession
vaut titre would rest on precarious footing indeed, because that
doctrine is of questionable effect in this state and may not apply at
all.187 Perhaps a better approach would be to return to the literal text
of these code articles, which use the word “possession” without
any qualification. When these articles speak of possession, they
must mean exactly that—any kind of possession, whether
exercised corporeally by the vendee or exercised by a precarious
possessor on his behalf. Thus, when the vendee retains physical
possession after a second sale, the privilege held by his vendor is
preserved. If the vendee delivers physical possession to someone,
such as a pledgee, whose possession is precarious, the vendor’s
privilege is still preserved, since the precarious possession is for
the benefit of the vendee.188 Only when the vendee fully
relinquishes possession is the privilege lost, as when the vendee
delivers physical possession to a second buyer.
Purists might object that this approach improperly transforms
the vendor’s privilege on a movable into a real right, because the
privilege would survive a second sale that is unaccompanied by
delivery. Although there is certainly room for disagreement on that
issue among French commentators, that objection would appear
186. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 518 (2015).
187. The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 did not include a provision analogous
to French Civil Code article 2279. The 1979 revision of the Civil Code articles
in the law of property enacted a new article 520, which provided that a
transferee in good faith and for fair value acquires ownership of a corporeal
movable if the transferor had possession with the consent of the actual owner.
However, that article was repealed by Act 125 of 1981, while the surrounding
articles that presupposed its existence were left intact, thus creating considerable
uncertainty over the rights of a good faith transferee. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra
note 76, § 232; see also Tanya Ann Ibieta, Comment, The Transfer of
Ownership of Movables, 47 LA. L. REV. 841 (1987).
188. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3437 (2015).
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unfounded under the Louisiana Civil Code because of its rule that
transfer of ownership of a movable is effective against third persons
when possession is delivered to the transferee and, until that occurs,
creditors of the transferor can seize it.189 Thus, until possession is
delivered to the transferee, the alienation that Planiol and others argue
extinguishes the privilege is simply not effective as to third persons,
including the transferor’s unpaid vendor and other creditors, who may
ignore the alienation altogether. Moreover, there is a justification for
the survival of the privilege under these circumstances: Since all of the
transferor’s creditors continue to have recourse against the thing, a
privilege is necessary so that the unpaid vendor will still be preferred
over those creditors in the proceeds of the thing. To the extent that this
causes the vendor’s privilege on a movable to function as a real
right,190 it is a very limited and ephemeral one that owes its existence
more to the rules on transfer of ownership of a movable than to the
rules applicable to privileges.
There is at least one circumstance under which a vendor’s
privilege on a movable will appear to survive a second sale by the
vendee even after delivery has been made to the second buyer: when
this second buyer assumes payment of the debt owed by his seller to
the original vendor. Under those facts, the court in Central Finance
Co. v. Keating191 held, based on De L’Isle,192 that the original
vendor was entitled to assert a vendor’s privilege against the second
buyer, notwithstanding the original vendee’s loss of possession.193
189. LA. CIV. CODE art. 518 (2015).
190. Because the vendor’s privilege on a movable exists only for as long as it
remains in the possession of the vendee, Professor Yiannopoulos is emphatic
that, as to movables, “it is quite clear from the Code and the cases that the
vendor’s privilege is merely a right of preference which may be exercised as
long as the thing remains in the physical possession of the debtor.”
Yiannopoulos, Real Rights, supra note 138, at 229. See also YIANNOPOULOS,
supra note 76, § 232. Professor Daggett observes that:
The question of whether or not the vendor’s privilege confers a real
right in the property or creates merely a preference unattached to the
property itself has not been definitely settled. The court has not
committed itself in so many words, but the trend of the decisions
indicates that the court considers it a real right in the property which
has not been paid for.
DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 36, at 94.
191. 6 La. App. 155 (Ct. App. 1927).
192. 34 La. Ann. 164 (1882).
193. See Central Finance, 6 La. App. at 155; see also Cormier v. Castille,
488 So. 2d 247 (La. Ct. App. 1886) (holding that the original sellers’ vendor’s
privilege was not lost when the property was sold to a second buyer who
assumed the debt owed to the original sellers in an act in which the original
sellers joined and the original buyer remained bound as a solidary co-obligor);
cf. Queen City Broad. Co. v. Wagenwest, Inc., 264 So. 2d 336 (La. Ct. App.
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What the court must have meant, and all that De L’Isle would have
supported, is that a new vendor’s privilege arose in favor of the
original vendor by virtue of the second buyer’s assumption of the
balance still owed to him.194
VIII. LOSS OF VENDOR’S PRIVILEGE
As discussed in the preceding section, alienation of a movable
burdened by a vendor’s privilege, coupled with delivery, causes the
loss of the vendor’s privilege. Alienation of an immovable subject to
an unrecorded vendor’s privilege will also cause a loss of the privilege
by operation of the public records doctrine.195 As an accessorial right,
a vendor’s privilege is, of course, extinguished when the vendee’s
obligation to pay the price becomes extinguished for any reason and
also when that obligation prescribes.196 A number of other events can
also deprive the vendor of his privilege.
A. Novation
Does a vendor’s action in accepting a note to evidence the
purchase price extinguish the privilege, on the theory that the
1972) (holding that where equipment is sold subject to, but without assumption
of, a debt owed to the seller’s own vendor, the vendor’s privilege is
extinguished).
194. There are a few cases involving unusual circumstances under which a
vendor’s privilege on a movable was held to survive a second sale. In Hooper v.
Maruka Machinery Corp. of America, 525 So. 2d 1113 (La. Ct. App. 1988), the
court held that a vendor’s privilege upon an item of equipment continued to
exist after it was sold to a second buyer that immediately leased it back to the
original buyer. The court’s rationale did not, as might have been expected, focus
upon the continued possession by the original buyer but rather the facts that the
majority stockholder of the original buyer was the managing partner of the
second buyer and that this person had concocted a scheme, apparently not in
good faith, which, if followed, would effectively “remove the teeth” from a
vendor’s privilege. See also Warren Refrigerator Co. v. Fosti Midstream Fueling
& Serv., Inc., 462 So. 2d 1343 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a vendor’s
privilege on a movable is viable so long as the right to possession of the
movable remains in the vendee, although others “without color of right” have
taken physical possession of the movable).
195. See Yiannopoulos, Real Rights, supra note 138, at 226.
196. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3277 (1870). See also AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 20,
§ 292; HUC, supra note 42, No. 112. Thus, where a buyer tenders payment of the
entire remaining balance of the purchase price before the seller files suit seeking
to enforce a contractual right of retrocession, both the right of retrocession and
the seller’s vendor’s privilege are extinguished. Vermilion Sand Co. v. H. & D.
Sand & Gravel Co., 304 So. 2d 378 (La. Ct. App. 1974). See also Cormier v.
Ransom, 420 So. 2d 1227 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
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acceptance of the note constitutes a novation of the vendee’s
obligation to pay the price? Although there might once have been
some disagreement on this point among French writers,197 the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 added an express provision to the effect
that the vendor nonetheless enjoys the privilege even though he may
have taken a note, bond, or other acknowledgment from the vendee.198
The same rule applies even if the note is not made payable to the
vendor but, by arrangement between the parties, is payable to a third
person.199
B. Waiver
In Pratt v. Hart Jewelry Co.,200 the court found an implied
waiver of the vendor’s privilege when a husband purchased a gold
purse from a jeweler and, in the jeweler’s presence, donated it to
his wife.
The long-established rule is that a vendor’s privilege and a
mortgage may co-exist on the same property, and one of them might
be renounced or extinguished without affecting the other.201 In
Succession of Osborn,202 the Court held that a vendor, by knowingly
accepting part payment of the purchase price from a third person
197. See Margolin, supra note 37, at 240 n.7.
198. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3194 (1825). See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3227
(1870); Adler v. Burton Lumber Co., 15 So. 156 (La. 1894) (observing that no
extinguishment resulted from vendor’s acknowledgment that payment had been
made by the giving of notes).
199. See Jeckell v. Fried, 18 La. Ann. 192 (1866) (holding that where the
seller was indebted at the time of the sale to a third person and, by agreement of
the parties, the note given for the purchase price was made payable to this third
person in order to satisfy a debt owed to him by the seller, the holder of the note
was entitled to a vendor’s privilege on the property sold). But see Cottonport
Bank v. Dunn, 21 So. 2d 525 (La. Ct. App. 1945) (finding a lack of sufficient
proof in the record to demonstrate the arrangement between the parties and why
the note in question was made payable to a bank rather than the vendor of the
equipment). Professor Daggett infers a number of other rules from the caselaw:
The execution of a renewal note does not constitute a novation or destroy the
privilege. A compromise between the vendor and vendee as to the price,
whereby a new note is made changing the amount of the debt and extending the
term, does not destroy the privilege. However, where a note of a third party is
given, particularly without the purchaser’s endorsement, the giving of the note
constitutes payment of the price and the vendor’s privilege is extinguished. This
is especially true where the third party’s note is endorsed without recourse. See
DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 51.
200. 14 Teiss. 94 (La. Ct. App. 1916).
201. Graves v. Joyce, 590 So. 2d 1261 (La. Ct. App. 1991); State ex rel.
Landry v. Broussard, 177 So. 403 (La. Ct. App. 1937); Boner v. Mahle, 3 La.
Ann. 600 (1848).
202. 4 So. 580 (La. 1888).
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who lent funds to the purchaser on the condition that the vendor
allow the third person’s mortgage to be a first mortgage, had
renounced the rank of his vendor’s privilege in favor of the third-party
lender.203 By contrast, in Howard v. Thomas,204 the Court in effect
held that a seller’s agreement not to reserve a special mortgage on the
land did not constitute a waiver of his vendor’s privilege. In Citizens
Bank of Louisiana v. Cuny,205 the vendor caused to be written on the
face of the act of sale, at the time it was recorded, a recitation to the
effect that he was releasing the mortgage stipulated in the act of sale
“without, however, acknowledging the payment of the price of the
purchase money.”206 The Court found this not to constitute a
renunciation of his vendor’s privilege.207 In Bacchus v. Moreau,208 the
Court held that, because a mortgage and a vendor’s privilege are
distinct rights, an act of sale providing that a mortgage is reserved
only on a certain portion of the property sold does not constitute a
waiver of the vendor’s privilege on the remainder of the property.
Similarly, in Boner v. Mahle,209 the Court held that the vendor’s
failure to take a mortgage on the property sold, though he did take
a mortgage on other property, could not be construed to be a
waiver of his vendor’s privilege on the property sold. According to
the Court, the implied renunciation of the important right of a
vendor’s privilege “should be established, not by doubtful, but by
clear and cogent inferences from the language of the parties.”210
203. See Osborn, 4 So. at 580; see also Hyster Co. v. Reeves, 541 So. 2d 363
(La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that, even though an unrecorded vendor’s privilege
would ordinarily prime a chattel mortgage that is later recorded in compliance
with the vehicle certificate of title law, the seller through its conduct waived its
right to assert the vendor’s privilege by failing to note the vendor’s privilege on
the vehicle’s certificate of origin and failing to record its chattel mortgage in the
proper records, thus showing no reliance on the vendor’s privilege and an
apparent intent for the buyer to deal with third parties in a way that would defeat
the vendor’s privilege). According to the opinion, a vehicle dealer who sells a
vehicle to another on credit and gives the vendee sufficient paperwork to allow
that vendee to obtain a clear certificate of title waives his vendor’s privilege.
204. 3 La. 109 (1831).
205. 12 Rob. (La.) 279, 280 (1845).
206. Id.
207. Apparently it was significant to the court that no third person had relied
to his prejudice on the gratuitous release of the mortgage.
208. 4 La. Ann. 313 (1849).
209. 3 La. Ann. 600 (1848).
210. Id. at 603. Compare id., with Hunter v. Sandel, 160 So. 87 (La. 1935).
In Hunter, a co-owner sold by credit sale all of her interest in the property to her
three co-owners, each of whom executed a promissory note and granted a
mortgage on other lands he owned as security for his own note. Hunter, 160 So.
at 87. The Court held that the vendor waived her vendor’s privilege on the
interest she sold, although it would appear that the actions relied upon by the
Court as evidence of waiver were, at least viewed individually, scant evidence of
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Pelican Homestead & Savings Ass’n v. Royal Scott Apartments
Partnership211 involved a simultaneous closing at which the same
notary public passed an act of cash sale from the vendors to the
vendee, a first mortgage from the vendee in favor of a building and
loan association, and a second mortgage from the vendee to the
vendors as security for a portion of the sales price which apparently
remained unpaid. The act of cash sale recited that the entire
purchase price had been paid, and the second mortgage in favor of
the vendors specifically subordinated the mortgage to the rights of
the building and loan association. Nonetheless, at the time of the
foreclosure by the association, the vendors intervened, claiming that
their vendor’s privilege was superior to its rights. The court rejected
this claim primarily on the ground that the act of sale by its terms
gave “full acquittance and discharge” for the purchase price,212 thus
expressing a clear intent to waive the vendor’s privilege.213
a waiver. First, the obligation to pay the purchase price was intended to be the
several obligations of each of the vendees, whereas the Court believed that
retaining a vendor’s privilege would necessitate joint liability. Secondly, the act
of sale used the words “said $50,000 being paid as follows,” thus indicating the
promissory notes were taken as final payment for the balance. Third, the
promissory notes were paraphed for identification “with this act of mortgage”
rather than with the act of sale. The pact de non alienando was contained only in
the mortgages, and not in the act of sale. Finally, the act of sale was recorded in
the mortgage records only in those parishes where the specially mortgaged
property was located, and not in other parishes in which the property sold was
located. A more recent case finding an implied waiver of the vendor’s privilege
is Graves v. Joyce, 590 So. 2d 1261 (La. Ct. App. 1991), in which a credit sale
provided that “this mortgage” did not encumber specified lots. According to the
court, the language in the credit sale declared an intent by the vendor to release
certain lots and any third person relying on the public records would not have
been alerted by the language of the release that the vendor intended to preserve
his vendor’s privilege on the lots released from the mortgage. Id. at 1263.
211. 541 So. 2d 943 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
212. Id. See also City Bank & Trust Co. v. Caneco Constr., Inc., 341 So. 2d
1331 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Alison Mtg. Inv. Trust v. BPB Contractors, Inc., 362
So. 2d 1203 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that, where an act of sale recited that
the vendor had been paid in full, even though the seller had in fact taken two
promissory notes for a large portion of the purchase price, any vendor’s
privilege that the seller might have retained was subordinate to a mortgage
executed in favor of a third-party lender, notwithstanding the fact that the
lender’s representative was present at the closing of the sale and knew that a
portion of the purchase price had been paid in notes). Both cases cite McDuffie
v. Walker for the rule that even actual knowledge is not a substitute for the
requirement to properly record privileges. See McDuffie v. Walker, 51 So. 100
(La. 1909). Another case held that where the mortgage records stated that partial
payment had been made in cash when in fact drafts were given for the partial
payment, the holder of the drafts could not be paid from the proceeds of the
property in preference to innocent persons to whom notes given for the
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Must the vendor’s spouse concur in granting a waiver or
subordination of the vendor’s privilege burdening an immovable? One
case, in dicta, suggests that the concurrence of both spouses is required
for subordination, because a vendor’s privilege on an immovable is an
incorporeal immovable and, according to the court, subordination is an
alienation of the right to a preference in ranking requiring the
concurrence of both spouses.214 The same logic would, a fortiori,
apply to an outright waiver of the vendor’s privilege encumbering an
immovable.
C. Transformation into Another Movable
There is no textual provision in either the Code Napoléon or the
Louisiana Civil Code that directly addresses the issue on whether a
vendor’s privilege survives the transformation of the thing into
another movable, as when a block of stone is transformed into a
statue,215 hops into beer,216 wheat into flour, or grapes into wine.217
The French article allowing the right of revendication to the unpaid
seller of a movable218 requires that the thing be “in the same

remainder of the purchase price had been transferred. See Durham v. Heirs of
Daughtery, 30 La. Ann. 1255 (1878); see generally HUC, supra note 42, No. 112
(indicating that the vendor’s privilege on an immovable “can exist only on the
condition that the act of sale reveal to third persons the amount of the price and
the fact that it has not been paid”).
213. The court also observed that the language of subordination in the second
mortgage furnished at least some support for a finding of a waiver of the
vendor’s privilege. Curiously, the court felt that its finding of waiver was further
bolstered by the absence of any recordation of the vendor’s privilege in order to
protect the vendors against third persons. It would appear that that fact alone,
irrespective of the issue of waiver or subordination, would have been sufficient
to defeat the claims of the vendors, since they had not preserved their privilege
against third persons, and the building and loan association was a third party to
the sale.
214. Cf. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Warner Robins, Ga. v. Delta
Towers, Ltd., 544 So. 2d 1331 (La. Ct. App. 1989). Nevertheless, the court held
that the spouse who did not sign the act of subordination had nonetheless
renounced her right to concur by executing a modification agreement containing
a declaration that her husband was the owner and holder of the note secured by
the vendor’s privilege and in any event had ratified the subordination by signing
tax returns taking advantage of the substantial tax benefits attributable to the
subordination.
215. See Margolin, supra note 37, at 240 n.5.
216. See PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2614.
217. See BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 512.
218. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2101(4) (Fr.). See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art.
2332(4) (Fr.).

1208

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

condition.”219 Because of the absence of any similar textual limitation
on the vendor’s privilege,220 Planiol notes that an argument has arisen
that the privilege should persist so long as the identity of the thing can
be followed through its transformations.221 Interestingly, the 1825
Louisiana Civil Code dropped the “same condition” requirement in
the article governing revendication under the Digest of 1808,222
substituting the formulation that “the identity of the objects be
established.”223 Arguably, this more liberal standard should also
apply by analogy to the vendor’s privilege.224
219. In French this phrase is: “dans le même état,” a phrase that was
translated in the English version of the Digest of 1808 as “in the same
condition.” See LA. DIGEST OF 1808, supra note 52. A more literal translation
would be “in the same state.”
220. One French treatise indicates that the absence of this limitation on the
vendor’s privilege cannot be logically explained, speculating that the redactors
of the Code Napoléon had perhaps forgotten that they had modified the
principles of transfer of ownership and that the Roman notions of revendication
based on ownership therefore no longer applied. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET
AL., supra note 26, No. 534; cf. LAURENT, supra note 142, No. 485 (expressing
the view that, in theory, the privilege should be subject to the requirement of
being “in the same condition” that applies to the right of revendication, which is
established merely to conserve the privilege, but the legislator has nonetheless
wisely chosen not to include that requirement as a condition for the exercise of
the privilege, since the vendor has enriched the patrimony of the debtor,
regardless of the fact that the thing sold may have later changed in state).
221. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2614. See, e.g., BAUDRYLACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 501 (expressing the view that the
vendor’s privilege persists notwithstanding the transformations in the thing sold,
so long as the thing sold is still be recognizable). Thus, if the buyer of wood has
transformed it into charcoal, the seller can still exercise his privilege on the
charcoal; however, the seller of hops cannot exercise his privilege on the beer
made with them. See also BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 512 (asserting that
the thing subject to the privilege must remain recognizable, if not in the same
condition); cf. HUC, supra note 42, Nos. 96–98 (acknowledging the prevailing
rule that a change in the state of the thing is no obstacle to enforcement of the
vendor’s privilege, but arguing that a thing that has changed in condition is
necessarily no longer recognizable and that application of the “in the same
condition” rule to the vendor’s privilege would place the existence of the
privilege in harmony with the rules on revendication designed to preserve it).
222. LA. DIGEST of 1808, supra note 52, art. 74.
223. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3196 (1825). See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3229 (1870).
224. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 232, at 463–64. A modern
example of the requirement that the separate identity of the movable not have
been lost is found in Aetna Business Credit Corp. v. Louisiana Machinery Co.,
409 So. 2d 1304 (La. Ct. App. 1982), in which the lessee of a drilling rig pump
had caused a replacement engine to be bolted to the pump but the engine could
be easily removed without damage to either the pump or itself. The court held
that the rule of accession under Louisiana Civil Code articles 482 and 510 did
not apply and that the seller of the replacement engine continued to have a
vendor’s privilege upon the engine, which had retained its separate identity.
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D. Sale with a Mass of Things
Civil Code article 3228 provides that the vendor’s privilege on a
movable is lost when the vendor allows the thing to be sold
“confusedly with a mass of other things belonging to the purchaser”
without making his claim. At first blush, this article seems to be
wholly unnecessary in light of the rule that any resale of a movable
subject to an existing vendor’s privilege, if accompanied by delivery to
the second buyer, causes a loss of the vendor’s privilege. As Professor
Yiannopolous explains, this article can be viewed analytically as the
combination of a loss of identity of the thing in tandem with a loss of
the original purchaser’s possession.225 Professor Daggett argues that
the article has effect only when the movable subject to the vendor’s
privilege, though sold with a mass of other goods, remains in the
hands of the original buyer or when a mass of property has been sold
and the contest is over the proceeds of the sale.226 Thus, the article can
be viewed as an exception to the general rule of Civil Code article
3228, which ordinarily allows a vendor to proceed against goods that
have been re-sold so long as they remain in the original buyer’s hands.
Application of the article under these circumstances extinguishes the
vendor’s privilege, even though the thing remains in the hands of the
immediate buyer.227
E. Incorporation into an Immovable
When a movable burdened by a vendor’s privilege is incorporated
into or attached to an immovable so as to become its component part, a
number of difficult issues arise. Is the privilege lost by virtue of the
attachment? Does the privilege remain enforceable against third
persons, such as a mortgagee who holds or later acquires a mortgage
on the immovable? Does it matter whether the vendor’s privilege was
recorded? Will the vendor’s privilege survive an enforcement of the
mortgage or other alienation of the immovable?

225. Yiannopoulos, Real Rights, supra note 138, at 228.
226. See DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 51.
227. Professor Daggett finds no policy justification for this exception. For
modern cases involving contests over the proceeds from a sale in mass, see
Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System v. Campo Realty Co., 380 So. 2d
1377 (La. Ct. App. 1980), and Weber v. Press of H. N. Cornay, Inc., 144 So. 2d
581 (La. Ct. App. 1962). Both cases cite Louisiana Civil Code article 3228 for
the proposition that a vendor’s privilege is lost when the property subject to the
privilege is sold in globo with other things unless the holder of the privilege
demands separate appraisement of the property subject to the privilege prior to
the sale.
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To understand the jurisprudence bearing upon these issues, it is
important first to recall the rules of the 1870 Civil Code governing the
classification of immovables.228 Under that regime, there were
immovables by nature that served the use or convenience of a
building,229 immovables by destination that were merely placed upon
a tract of land for its service or improvement,230 and immovables by
destination consisting of things that were permanently attached to a
building.231
The easiest case to consider is that involving a thing that becomes
immovable by destination simply by virtue of its placement upon a
tract of land for service or improvement. The case law has had no
difficulty holding that, in this instance, the vendor’s privilege is
unaffected.232 However, this rule is not particularly important today
because of the suppression of this classification of immovable by
destination, although the rule might be applied by analogy to
things that are immovable by mere declaration under article 467 of
the present Civil Code.
228. See generally Elizabeth Ruth Carter, Comment, Ghosts of the Past and
Hopes for the Future: Article 466 and Societal Expectations, 81 TUL. L. REV.
1665 (2007); John A. Lovett, Another Great Debate?: The Ambiguous
Relationship Between the Revised Civil Code and Pre-Revision Jurisprudence
as Seen Through the Prytania Park Controversy, 48 LOY. L. REV. 615 (2002);
A.N. Yiannopoulos, Of Immovables, Component Parts, Societal Expectations
and the Forehead of Zeus, 60 LA. L. REV. 1379 (2000); YIANNOPOULOS, supra
note 76, § 142.5.
229. LA. CIV. CODE art. 467 (1870).
230. LA. CIV. CODE art. 468(1) (1870).
231. LA. CIV. CODE art. 468(2) (1870). The type of attachment needed was
explained in Article 469, which set forth something similar to the now familiar
“substantial damage” test: The owner was supposed “to have attached to his
tenement or building forever such movables as are affixed to the same with
plaster, or mortar, or such as can not be taken off without being broken or
injured, or without breaking or injuring the part of the building to which they are
attached.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 469 (1870). The 1978 revision of the Civil Code
replaced the 1870 Code’s classification scheme with three articles: article 465,
dealing with movables that are incorporated into an immovable; article 466,
dealing with movables that are permanently attached to an immovable; and
article 467, dealing with movables that are made immovable by declaration.
Over the ensuing years, article 466 has seen substantial revision, the last
occurring with the enactment of Act No. 632, 2008 La. Acts 2573. The author
was the reporter of the Louisiana State Law Institute Committee that drafted the
most recent revision to article 466.
232. Shelly v. Winder, 36 La. Ann. 182 (1884) (“This Court has adopted the
view of Troplong, to the effect: ‘That the purchaser of such movables as mules,
agricultural implements, etc., cannot affect the rights of the vendor thereof by
impressing upon them the purely metaphysical quality of immovables. The thing
sold subsists in all its parts just as it was when sold, without any change in its
nature, or otherwise, except in its destination; and such destination is considered
as imperfect and subordinated to the rights of the vendor.’”).
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The issue becomes more difficult when the thing is physically,
rather than just intellectually, attached to an immovable.233 In the
1857 case of Gary v. Burguieres, involving an engine that had been
attached to a sugar mill, the Supreme Court held that the mortgagee
foreclosing on the immovable took free of a vendor’s privilege on
the engine because the contract giving rise to the vendor’s privilege
had not been recorded.234 A few decades later, the Court in Carlin v.
Gordy235 was presented with a case in which the contract establishing
the vendor’s privilege on the movable had in fact been recorded.
Critical of its own prior holding in Gary, which was in any event
readily distinguishable on account of the lack of recordation in the
earlier case, the Court formulated the rule that the vendor’s privilege
should continue notwithstanding the attachment of a movable to an
immovable if the movable can be removed without damage to the
structure to which it is attached.236
The Supreme Court further refined the governing rule in two cases
decided in the 1930s. In Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co.,237 the Court
reaffirmed earlier holdings to the effect that a movable remains subject
to a vendor’s privilege notwithstanding its immobilization by
attachment, so long as the movable can be identified and reclaimed in
substantially the same condition as when sold and without material
injury to the structure to which it is attached, even though use of the
structure may be temporarily impaired. The movables in Caldwell
consisted of railroad materials that had been used in the construction
on a mortgaged plantation of a railroad track that could be removed

233. Some French writers view the ultimate issue to be whether the thing has
been incorporated into an immovable so as to become an immovable by nature,
rather than being immobilized by the legal fiction of destination. However, even
in the latter case, they assert that the vendor’s privilege cannot be exercised to
the prejudice of a mortgagee, just as it cannot be exercised to the prejudice of a
pledgee. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, Nos. 502–504;
BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 512; HUC, supra note 42, No. 95.
234. Gary v. Burguieres, 12 La. Ann. 227 (1857).
235. 32 La. Ann. 1285 (1880).
236. See In re Receivership of Augusta Sugar Co., 64 So. 870 (La. 1914);
Pratt Eng’g & Mach. Co. v. Cecelia Sugar Co., 65 So. 100 (La. 1914). However,
neither of these opinions reflects whether the contract establishing the vendor’s
privilege was recorded or discusses any recordation issue. A pair of decisions in
the second decade of the twentieth century held that gears and shafts, and
railroad ties, lost their character as movables and lost their identity when
incorporated into an immovable. See Milliken v. Roger, 70 So. 848 (La. 1916);
Morgan’s La. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Himalaya Planting & Mfg. Co., 78 So. 735
(La. 1918). These holdings were, however, overruled in Caldwell v. Laurel
Grove Co., 144 So. 718 (La. 1932).
237. Caldwell, 144 So. at 718.
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without any injury at all to the plantation.238 The vendor of the railroad
materials was thus allowed to assert its privilege against the holder of a
mortgage on the plantation. In Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co. v.
Bell,239 which involved an automatic sprinkler system that had been
installed in a factory, the Court held that the vendor’s privilege
remained intact, summarizing the law as follows:
And the uniform jurisprudence of the state is where
machinery or mechanical equipment is installed in a building
by the owner but can be removed without substantial injury
to the structure to which it is attached, even though it is
necessary to temporarily destroy part of the building, the
vendor’s lien attaches and is enforceable.240
Another issue presented in Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co. was
whether the vendor’s privilege on a movable that had become attached
to an immovable could survive the buyer’s transfer and delivery of the
immovable to the mortgagee under a giving in payment. Somewhat
surprisingly, the Court held that the privilege survived. The Court’s
reasoning was that, if the mortgagee had been relegated to enforcing
its rights judicially, protections would have been available to the
unpaid vendor. According to the Court, “[t]he parties’ substitution of a
non-judicial proceeding for a judicial proceeding cannot have the
extraordinary effect of obliterating all claims and privileges acquired
by third persons against the property while it was in the possession of
the purchaser.”241 Thus, the Court seemed to afford the vendor with a
right of pursuit after dation en paiement, as opposed to after any
other sort of voluntary alienation or a judicial sale.242
238. The Court expressly overruled its prior contrary holding in Morgan’s
Louisiana & T.R., which had presented “practically similar” facts. The holding
in Caldwell was itself later overruled by the Louisiana Supreme Court. See Am.
Creosote Co. v. Springer, 241 So. 2d 510 (La. 1970); see also discussion supra
Part VIII.E.
239. 165 So. 150 (La. 1935).
240. Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
241. Id.
242. Cf. Royal Oldsmobile Co. v. Yarbrough, 425 So. 2d 823 (La. Ct. App.
1983). In that case, an attorney’s client, in the attorney’s presence, purchased an
automobile that the client immediately gave to him in payment of his fee. Id. at
824. The client paid for the automobile with a check that was ultimately
dishonored by the drawee bank. Id. Holding that the dealership’s vendor’s
privilege was lost when the vehicle left the hands of the immediate purchaser
(the client), the court found that, even though the attorney was present at the
dealership to help select the car and had the title placed directly in his name, he
did not undertake to buy the automobile or to pay the purchase price; rather, he
simply agreed to accept the car in payment of the debt due him by his client. Id.
at 825.
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The Court also addressed in Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co. the
issue of recordation, which Gary and other earlier cases seemed to find
necessary to enable the vendor to assert his rights against third
persons. Even though the vendor’s contract in Globe Automatic
Sprinkler Co. had in fact been recorded, the Court expressed its view,
albeit in what certainly appears to be dicta, that the vendor’s privilege
was not destroyed “[i]rrespective of whether the recordation of a
contract between the Globe Automatic Sprinkler Company and [the
original buyer] was sufficient to bind the [mortgagee accepting the
giving in payment].”243
Thus, the jurisprudence established the rule that the test of
whether the vendor’s privilege is lost is not whether the thing has
been converted into an immovable by nature or destination but
rather whether it can be removed without substantial injury to the
immovable to which it is attached.244 As settled as this rule might
have appeared by the mid-20th century, the Supreme Court
appeared to chart an entirely new course in American Creosote Co.
v. Springer,245 a case that did not even involve a claim of a vendor’s
privilege but, instead, presented a contest between a railroad
company that had leased a railroad track to the owner of an
immovable under an unrecorded lease and a third-party purchaser to
whom this owner later sold the immovable. Deciding the contest in
243. Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co., 165 So. at 152. Several years later, a
court of appeal case lent further reinforcement to the principle that so long as
“the movable has not lost its identity, and can be separated from the land,
tenement, or building to which it has been attached without injury to the
immovable, as to the vendor it remains a movable, and he may subject the same
to his vendor’s privilege, the registry of the same being immaterial.” Cristina
Inv. Corp. v. Gulf Ice Co., 55 So. 2d 685, 690 (La. Ct. App. 1951). An earlier
appellate court case had also reached the conclusion that recordation was
unnecessary to protect the vendor, though by somewhat strained logic. See
Hamilton Co. v. Med. Arts Bldg. Co., 135 So. 94 (La. Ct. App. 1931). Because
it had previously been held that an unrecorded vendor’s privilege outranks a
subsequently recorded chattel mortgage, the court in Hamilton deduced that the
unrecorded vendor’s privilege on a movable must necessarily prime a later
recorded mortgage on the building to which the movable is attached:
It follows from this decision and others on the same subject that, if
property has become immovable by destination and its identity is
preserved, and it may be removed without material injury to building to
which it is attached, and thereafter a chattel mortgage is placed on it,
still the unrecorded vendor’s lien may be enforced against to the
prejudice of the chattel mortgage. A fortiori, it follows that a mortgage
on the building wherein the immovable by destination is located does
not prime the unrecorded vendor’s lien.
Id. at 99. This reasoning implicitly assumes that a component part of a building
could be subjected to a chattel mortgage after it had already been immobilized.
244. See DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 51.
245. 241 So. 2d 510 (La. 1970).
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favor of the purchaser, the Court held that the railroad track was an
immovable by nature and passed with the sale. In support of this
holding, the Court cited its previously overruled holding in
Morgan’s Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Himalaya Planting &
Manufacturing Co.,246 in which the Court had held that ties, rails,
spikes, irons, plates, and ballasts lost their character as movables for
purposes of the vendor’s privilege “since such privileges can no
more be enforced with respect to its several constituents without
destroying the thing into which they have thus been merged than it
can be enforced with respect to the canvas upon which a picture has
been painted without destroying the picture.”247
Even though American Creosote Company did not involve an
unpaid vendor asserting a vendor’s privilege, the Court nonetheless
expressly overruled Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co., which itself had
overruled Morgan’s Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co. The Court
intentionally chose not to distinguish Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co.
on the basis of the status of the parties involved or other facts,
because it felt that such a distinction would be invalid as to the
“real” issue of whether the rails constructed into a railway became
immovable by nature. As to that proposition, the Court found that
the two cases were irreconcilable, for if “a thing is immovable by
nature, it is immovable as to everyone.”248 What American Creosote
Company implies with respect to the continued existence of a
vendor’s privilege on a movable following immobilization is not
entirely clear. Given its most expansive interpretation, the case
supports the proposition, albeit in dicta, that the vendor’s privilege is
irretrievably lost upon immobilization, regardless of whether the

246. 78 So. 735 (La. 1918).
247. Id. at 736.
248. American Creosote Company, 241 So. 2d at 515. The Court’s premise
that if “a thing is immovable by nature, it is immovable as to everyone” is
questionable, specifically where security rights are concerned. Id. At the time
the case was decided, the Chattel Mortgage Law provided that a thing subject to
a chattel mortgage remained movable following attachment to an immovable
insofar as the chattel mortgage was concerned. This provision, which was first
enacted by Act No. 166, 1932 La. Acts 539, and later appeared as Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 9:5357, represented a legislative reversal of the Court’s
prior contrary holding in Baton Rouge Rice Mill v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 114
So. 633 (La. 1927). Thus, it certainly was possible at the time of the decision in
American Creosote Company for a thing to be movable as to certain persons but
immovable as to all others. Another example of a thing being considered
movable only as to designated persons is found in Louisiana Civil Code article
474, which provides that unharvested crops and ungathered fruits encumbered
with security rights of third persons are movables by anticipation “insofar as the
creditor is concerned.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 474 (2015).
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movable subject to the privilege has retained its identity or can be
removed without substantial injury to the immovable.
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in American Creosote
Company, the law governing component parts of an immovable has
undergone at least three substantive changes.249 If, as that case
suggests, immobilization imports a loss of the vendor’s privilege, then
each of these changes might have had some effect upon the rights of
the unpaid vendor of a movable that becomes attached to an
immovable. The courts have had occasion to revisit this issue only
rarely. In Hyman v. Ross,250 perhaps the only case to consider the
issue since the revision of Civil Code article 466 in 1978,251 the
court applied the “societal expectations test”252 under article 466 to
find that heating and air conditioning units sold to the owner of a
hotel had become its component parts and were therefore encumbered
under a mortgage previously granted upon the immovable. Although
the seller of the heating and air conditioning units had moved for
separate appraisal prior to the foreclosure sale of the immovable, the
court found that the pre-existing mortgage attached to the units and
therefore outranked the vendor’s privilege, with no citation to the
previous jurisprudence involving vendor’s privileges or any
reasoning other than that the units had become component parts of
an immovable that was subject to a previously recorded mortgage.
Without specifically citing American Creosote Company, the court
appears to have followed its implication that the immobilization of a
thing subject to a vendor’s privilege necessarily implies a loss of the
privilege.253
249. See supra note 231.
250. 643 So. 2d 256 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
251. See Act No. 728, 1978 La. Acts 1900.
252. See Equibank v. U.S. IRS, 749 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1985).
253. If the attachment or incorporation of the movable occurs as a result of
work for the improvement of the immovable, the seller does not lose all security,
for he becomes entitled to a privilege upon the immovable as a seller of
movables under the Louisiana Private Works Act. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4801(3) (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4802(A)(3) (Supp. 2015); RUBIN,
supra note 82, § 37.11, at 252. Outside of situations covered by the Private
Works Act, if the seller obtains a purchase money security interest in the thing
sold and perfects this security interest by making a fixture filing in the Uniform
Commercial Code records before attachment of the thing to an immovable, the
purchase money security interest not only will survive attachment but will have
priority over even a previously filed mortgage burdening the immovable. See
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-334(d) (Supp. 2015). A “fixture” is defined to be a
thing that, after placement on or incorporation in an immovable, or on account
of a declaration of immobilization, has become a component part of the
immovable under the Civil Code. Id. § 10:9-102(a)(41). A security interest
cannot exist in ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on
land. Id. § 10:9-334(a).
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The present rule is far from clear. Insofar as it purported to
address vendor’s privileges, the decision in American Creosote
Company was dicta. Professor Yiannopolous, acknowledging that
the “test of loss of identity involves difficulties,” cites Hyman for the
proposition that a vendor loses his privilege when the thing subject
to the privilege becomes a component part of an immovable under
Civil Code articles 465 or 466. However, after reviewing the
jurisprudence under the 1870 Code, which had established the rule
that the vendor’s privilege was lost only when the thing subject to
the privilege had become incorporated to such an extent that its
removal was physically impossible or economically unfeasible, he
states that “whether the vendor’s privilege primes a real
mortgagee’s right to claim things that become component parts of
an immovable is ordinarily determined by reference to the test of
facility of removal.”254 Support can, of course, be found in the
jurisprudence for all of these propositions, though they do not
seem to be entirely consistent with each other. Until the Supreme
Court rules again on the issue, uncertainty will likely persist.255
In those cases in which the vendor’s privilege remains intact
notwithstanding the attachment of the thing to an immovable, the
vendor has two alternative remedies available to vindicate his
rights and only a limited period of time within which to exercise
them, as the court explained in Walburn-Swenson Co. v. Darrell.256
One remedy is to intervene seeking a separate appraisement of the
movable and proportionate payment from the entirety of the
proceeds from the sale of the immovable. The other remedy is to
seize and sell the movable on which the vendor’s privilege rests in
the enforcement of a judgment recognizing the privilege, even
though the movable has become attached to an immovable. In
Walburn-Swenson Co., the remedy of separate appraisement was
254. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 232, at 465.
255. It should be remembered that both American Creosote Company and
Hyman involved claims by third persons having an interest in the immovable of
which the thing subject to a vendor’s privilege had become a component part.
Perhaps there is still room for application of the “substantial injury” test that
existed before American Creosote Company if the thing subject to a vendor’s
privilege becomes a component part of an immovable but the vendor is not in
conflict with a third person having or acquiring an interest in the immovable.
The approach of permitting a vendor’s privilege to survive immobilization if the
thing remains identifiable, yet refusing to allow it to be asserted after
immobilization against a mortgagee or other third person having rights in the
immovable, has been espoused by some French writers. See supra note 233.
256. 22 So. 310, 311 (La. 1897). The plaintiff in the case was the unpaid
vendor of machinery that had been installed on a plantation. Mortgage creditors
seized the plantation and, on the eve of its sale, the unpaid vendor applied for
the separate appraisement and sale of the machinery. Id. at 310.
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refused in view of the untimeliness of the unpaid sellers’ request
just over an hour before the scheduled sheriff’s sale to be held in
enforcement of a mortgage upon the immovable; however, the
Court held that the lower court should have granted injunctive
relief to the sellers so that they could pursue the second remedy of
provoking their own seizure and sale of the movable. The Court
rejected the mortgagee’s argument that the vendor’s right to a
separate sale was lost after the mortgagee had seized the property.
As Professor Yiannopoulos explains the holding, the vendor can
seize the movable as long as it remains in the hands of his vendee,
and his right of seizure is not defeated because the mortgage
creditor has seized the property or the judicial sale of the
immovable is close at hand.257 If the vendor fails to exercise either
remedy before the foreclosure sale of the immovable, the vendor’s
privilege is lost.258
IX. RANKING OF THE VENDOR’S PRIVILEGE ON MOVABLES
The articles found in the Louisiana Civil Code on ranking of
privileges on movables originated in the Projet of 1825; they were
not taken from the Code Napoléon. Planiol noted that the absence
of a legislative ranking of privileges had the fortunate result of
allowing time for “the doctrinal writers to study this matter and to
arrive at scientific solutions.”259 He asserted that the special
privileges can be placed into three principal categories: those based
on the preservation of the thing, those based on an implied pledge,
and those based on augmentation of the patrimony.260 His
arguments concerning the ranking of the privileges within each

257. Yiannopoulos, Real Rights, supra note 138, at 227–28; YIANNOPOULOS,
supra note 76, § 232, at 465.
258. See Pan Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Reynaud, 4 La. App. 290 (Ct. App. 1926)
(holding that the holder of a vendor’s privilege upon a movable lost his privilege
when he allowed the immovable to which it was attached to be sold at a
foreclosure sale instituted at the request of a second mortgagee, without
provoking a separate appraisement of the thing on which he claimed a
privilege). Moreover, once the privilege was destroyed, a foreclosure upon the
same immovable by the first mortgagee did not have the effect of reviving the
privilege nor permitting the privileged creditors to ask for a separate
appraisement in connection with the later foreclosure sale.
259. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2622, at 460.
260. Id. No. 2637, at 465. Cf. AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 20, § 289
(concluding, based on inferences drawn from the few express ranking rules
found in the French Civil Code, that special privileges on movables rank in the
following order: (1) privileges based on the notion of an express or implied
pledge; (2) preservation privileges; and (3) the vendor’s privilege).
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class and among classes have largely been accepted by modern
French writers,261 whose views might be summarized as follows:
1. Preservation privileges rank in inverse chronological
order, because the preservation performed by each of them
inures to the benefit of all who have come before.262
2. Among creditors holding an implied pledge, there is
little opportunity for conflict unless a third party holds the
thing for the benefit of more than one creditor. In that case,
the rule of first in time, first in right applies.
3. Among two creditors whose privileges are based on
augmentation of patrimony, such as two successive
vendors, the first to arise primes, for the reason that the first
seller is the creditor of the second seller for the unpaid
price due to him. Also, this principle draws by analogy
upon the rule ranking successive vendor’s privileges upon
immovables.
Between two privileges found within different classes, ranking
is as follows:
a. Preservation versus pledge. Preservation privileges
arising after the pledge prime, because they inured to the
benefit of the pledgee. Preservation privileges arising
before the pledge are inferior if the pledgee was unaware of
them, because the pledgee is entitled to the benefit of the
doctrine of la possession vaut titre.263
b. Preservation versus augmentation of patrimony. The
preservation privilege primes, regardless of when the
preservation occurred. If it occurred after the vendor’s
privilege arose, it primes because the preservation inured to
the benefit of the vendor as privilege holder. If it occurred
beforehand, the preservation privilege still primes because
it inured to the benefit of the vendor when he was owner.
c. Pledge versus augmentation of patrimony. The pledge
primes by operation of the doctrine of la possession vaut

261. See, e.g., SIMLER & DELEBECQUE, supra note 75, §§ 784–791, at 706–
10.
262. See also AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 20, § 289.
263. Id.
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titre, unless the pledgee was aware of the earlier privilege.
In that event, the pledge is inferior.264
In large measure, these principles find expression in a single
ranking article of the French Civil Code adopted in 2006.265
As mentioned above, the Projet of 1825 added specific ranking
rules to Louisiana’s Civil Code, many of which are based upon this
same logic. For example, the lessor’s privilege outranks the vendor’s
privilege.266 This is because the lessor’s privilege, at least historically,
was based upon the notion of an implied pledge.267 An instance in
which the Supreme Court applied these principles to a privilege for
which the Civil Code gives no ranking rule at all is the artisan’s
privilege.268 In Cozzo v. Ulrich,269 the court held that the artisan’s
privilege has priority over the vendor’s privilege, because the vendor
has a mere privilege, while the artisan is entitled to a right of pledge,
including the right to retain the object until payment. Interestingly,
the statutory repairman’s privilege,270 which does not carry with it
any right or requirement of detention, is by the express wording of
the statute subject to a vendor’s privilege. Thus, the repairman has
priority over the vendor so long as he retains possession and can
claim an artisan’s privilege under the Civil Code. If he relinquishes
possession, he retains, for a short period of time, a statutory
repairman’s privilege that is subordinate to the vendor’s privilege.
It is well known that there are myriad vicious circles in the
ranking of privileges on movables.271 The classic example of a
264. Id.
265. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2332–3 (Fr.).
266. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3263 (2015). For an application of this rule, see
Interstate Electric Co. v. Tucker, 2 So. 2d 56 (La. 1941) (holding that a lessor’s
privilege primed a vendor’s privilege on equipment, despite contentions by the
vendor that the lessor and vendee were actually co-partners in a commercial
partnership).
267. In the 2004 revision of the Louisiana Civil Code articles governing
lease, the notion of an implied pledge was eliminated; thus, the superior ranking
given to the lessor’s privilege no longer has any doctrinal basis in Louisiana. See
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2707 cmt. a (2015). However, comment (d) to article 2707
observes that the change in the article “does not affect either the nature or
priority of the privilege vis-à-vis other creditors of the lessee.” This is
undoubtedly correct insofar as competition with the vendor’s privilege is
concerned, even though its doctrinal underpinnings have been removed;
Louisiana Civil Code article 3263 continues to rank the vendor’s privilege
behind the lessor’s privilege.
268. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3217(2) (2015).
269. 14 Teiss. 137 (La. Ct. App. 1916).
270. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4501, 4502 (2007 & Supp. 2015). The
statutory and code privileges are independent, and neither limits the other.
271. See Joseph Dainow, Vicious Circles in the Louisiana Law of Privileges,
25 LA. L. REV. 1 (1964). The solution to vicious circles offered by Professor
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vicious circle involved competition among the vendor, the chattel
mortgagee, and the lessor. A debtor purchased movable property
on credit, executed and recorded a chattel mortgage bearing upon
this property, and then brought the property upon leased premises.
The Civil Code gives the lessor priority over the vendor.272 Under
the former Chattel Mortgage Law, a chattel mortgage primed all
privileges arising after the chattel mortgage was filed for public
registry.273 Thus, under the facts assumed, the chattel mortgage
would yield to the vendor’s privilege but would have priority over
the lessor’s privilege.274 Fortunately, this vicious circle was
eliminated by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, which
ranks security interests ahead of privileges held by both the vendor
and the lessor.275 Thus, the priority of a modern day security interest

Dainow is to give effect first to the ranking of competing privileges provided by
the latest legislation, even if this had the effect of re-ordering the priorities of
some of these privileges established under prior legislation. For criticism of this
solution, see RUBIN, supra note 82, § 32.2, at 227 (“The problem with looking at
the last amended statute is that often this will not resolve the vicious circle, for
almost never does the ‘last’ amended statute expressly refer to the ranking of
three or more privileges.”).
272. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3263 (2015).
273. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5354, repealed by Act No. 128, 2001 La. Acts
206. Although not repealed outright until 2001, the Chattel Mortgage Law had
already been superseded with respect to transactions occurring after January 1,
1990 by the adoption of Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which
became effective on that date. See Act No. 135, 1989 La. Acts 417.
274. Noting the existence of this vicious circle, Professor Dainow concludes
that, by application of the later legislation embodied in the Chattel Mortgage
Law, the proper ranking is (1) vendor’s privilege, (2) chattel mortgage, and (3)
lessor’s privilege. See Dainow, supra note 271, at 5.
275. Under section 9–322(h) of the Uniform Commercial Code and section
10:9-322(h) of Louisiana Revised Statutes, security interests—whether perfected
or not—outrank all privileges, unless the statute creating the privilege provides
otherwise. See UCC § 9-322(h) (2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-322(h)
(Supp. 2015). The Civil Code articles providing for the vendor’s and lessor’s
privileges do not provide otherwise, and indeed section 9:4770 of Louisiana
Revised Statutes specifically provides that the privileges of both the vendor and
lessor are subordinate to Chapter 9 security interests. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4770 (Supp. 2015). As originally enacted, section 9:4770 expressly purported
to subordinate even vendor’s privileges that were in existence at the time of its
enactment. The constitutionality of this retroactivity has not been challenged in a
reported case and, in view of the passage of over a quarter century since the
enactment of the statute, likely will not ever be raised. For a case involving
competition between a Chapter 9 security interest and vendor’s privileges, see
Tetra Applied Tech., Inc. v. H.O.E., Inc., 878 So. 2d 708 (La. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding a perfected security interest in the accounts of a manufacturer to be
superior to vendor’s privileges claimed by the manufacturer’s suppliers). The
court relied upon First National Bank of Boston v. Beckwith Machinery Co., 650
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against these two privileges would be certain but different from the
ranking that existed under the Chattel Mortgage Law: the first
priority would be the security interest, which would prime the
lessor’s privilege, which would prime the vendor’s privilege.
Numerous other vicious circles involving the vendor’s
privilege have arisen, chiefly because the Legislature has often
shown a propensity to protect the vendor when creating a
competing privilege.
A. Vendor/Widow/Lessor
The needy widow’s privilege, which is a general privilege on
both movables and immovables, was first established by Act 255 of
1852 and later incorporated into the Civil Code of 1870 as article
3252.276 The purpose of the privilege was poetically articulated in
Succession of White:277
[T]o ward off from the widow and young children of one
recently dead, the misery of unmitigated destitution, and to
cover, as with a shield, these helpless mourners from the
pitiless shafts of poverty, at the moment when the protecting
arm of the husband and father was made powerless by
death.278
The original text of the 1852 statute and of article 3252 of the
1870 Code provided that the widow’s privilege was outranked by
the vendor’s privilege but was superior to all other debts.279 This
led to the obvious possibility of a vicious circle in the ranking of
privileges affecting movables, because the Civil Code ranks the
vendor’s privilege behind the lessor’s privilege. In order to avoid
this vicious circle, the Court in Succession of Cooley280 held that
the reference to the “vendor’s privilege” in article 3252 meant only
So. 2d 1148 (La. 1995), in which the Supreme Court held that a previously
perfected Chapter 9 security interest has priority over a non-possessory
materialman’s privilege granted to a supplier of ship building materials under
Louisiana Civil Code article 3237(8).
276. The privilege is sometimes known as the “widow’s homestead” because
the original purpose of the privilege, as stated in the title of the 1852 legislation,
was to provide a homestead for the widow and children of deceased persons.
However, the text of the statute did not tie the privilege in any manner to a
homestead, thus leading to an unsuccessful constitutional challenge that the
statute differed from its title. See Succession of Lanzetti, 9 La. Ann. 329 (1854).
277. 29 La. Ann. 702 (1877).
278. Id. at 703.
279. See Act No. 255, 1852 La. Acts 171; LA. CIV. CODE art. 3252 (1870).
280. 26 La. Ann. 166, 166–67 (1874).
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the vendor’s privilege on immovables, for otherwise an “awkward
confliction” would arise.281 The Court’s valiant attempt at avoiding
a vicious circle was ultimately thwarted, however, by Act 242 of
1918, which amended article 3252 to provide specifically that the
widow’s privilege is primed by vendor’s privileges on both
movable and immovable property. The 1918 Act also amended the
article to provide that the widow’s privilege is primed by all
conventional mortgages,282 thus, with apparent indifference to the
consequences, establishing no fewer than four vicious circles
through a single enactment of the Legislature.283
B. Vendor/Repairman/Lessor
The statutes creating the garageman’s and repairman’s
privileges284 rank those privileges behind the vendor’s privilege but
not behind that of the lessor. Thus, the vendor primes the mechanic,
who primes the lessor, who primes the vendor.285

281. Succession of Thompson, 12 Teiss. 24 (La. Ct. App. 1914).
282. See Act No. 242, 1918 La. Acts 433. Act 17 of 1917 provided that the
widow’s privilege would be outranked by conventional mortgages securing
money lent for not less than one year at no greater than 6% per annum interest.
These limitations were removed by the 1918 legislation. See Act. No. 17, 1917
La. Acts 26.
283. The other vicious circles on immovables are (i) the widow primes
general privileges, which prime conventional mortgages, which prime the
widow; and (ii) the widow primes judicial mortgages, which prime a
subsequently recorded conventional mortgage, which primes the widow. Putting
these two together yields a vicious circle with four participants: widow primes
general privileges, which prime judicial mortgages, which prime a subsequently
arising conventional mortgage, which primes the widow. By 1932, the Supreme
Court seemed to have lost its desire to interpret the law in order to avoid vicious
circles. In Morelock v. Morgan & Bird Gravel Co., 141 So. 368 (La. 1932), the
Court was faced with the problem of ranking the vendor’s privilege on movables
against a privilege created under the corporate receiver statute in favor of those
creditors lending money to the receiver. The receiver’s certificates evidencing
these loans were given a privilege over all other creditors of the corporation
“save the vendor’s lien and privilege.” Id. at 372. Citing Cooley, the Court
originally ruled that the vendor’s privilege in question was limited to that on
immovables. Id. On rehearing, the Court held that this exception applied to the
vendor’s privilege on both movable and immovable property, notwithstanding
arguments that the holding would create the possibility of a conflict among the
holders of the receiver’s certificates, the lessor and the vendor. Id.
284. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4501, 4502 (2007).
285. Since the repairman’s statute is newer legislation, Professor Dainow
concludes that the proper ranking is (1) vendor’s privilege, (2) mechanic’s
privilege, and (3) lessor’s privilege. See Dainow, supra note 271, at 6–7.
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C. Repairman/Unperfected Security Interest/Vendor
As mentioned above, the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code eliminated a common vicious circle involving chattel mortgages,
but it also created at least one new vicious circle. When the Uniform
Commercial Code was enacted, the statute creating the repairman’s
privilege was amended to provide that the repairman’s privilege is
subject to previously perfected security interests.286 This created a new
vicious circle where an unperfected security interest is involved.
Suppose that a debtor has granted a security interest in all of his
present and future equipment, and this security interest is not properly
perfected. He purchases an item of equipment on credit from a vendor
who does not obtain a consensual security interest and therefore holds
only a vendor’s privilege. The debtor then causes the equipment to be
repaired by the repairman. Under the repairman’s statute, the
repairman would have priority over the secured party, because the
secured party does not have a previously perfected security interest.
The secured party, even though his security interest is unperfected,
would have priority over the vendor.287 But, the vendor would have
priority over the repairman by the express command of the
repairman’s statute.288
D. Vendor/Widow/Repairman/Lessor
In a four-way contest among the widow, the vendor, the lessor,
and the repairman, the vendor can claim priority over both the
repairman and the widow, for the reasons mentioned above. By
operation of the repairman’s statute, the repairman is inferior to the
vendor but can claim priority over the widow and the lessor.289
Under article 3252, the widow is superior to all but the vendor. The
286. See Act No. 137, 1989 La. Acts 527, amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
9:4501, 4502 (2007).
287. See supra note 274.
288. Using Professor Dainow’s solution of following the latest enacted
legislation, the provisions of section 9-322(h) of the Louisiana Uniform
Commercial Code (last amended in 2001), must be given full effect
notwithstanding any earlier legislation. Thus, the repairman must outrank the
unperfected security interest, since that is the result which section 9-322(h)
ordains, even though it does not provide that result directly within its own
provisions. In addition, section 9-322(h) requires that the unperfected security
interest outrank the vendor. Therefore, the priority would appear to be: (1)
repairman; (2) unperfected security interest; and (3) vendor. For a four-way
variation on this problem, adding the involvement of a lessor’s privilege, see
RUBIN, supra note 82, § 32.2, at 226.
289. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4501, 4502 (2007).
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lessor can claim preference over the vendor by operation of article
3263.290
E. Vendor/Funeral Charges/Lessor
Professor Dainow identifies one vicious circle arising under the
unamended Civil Code itself.291 Under article 3257, the general
privilege for funeral charges primes the lessor. Under article 3263,
the lessor primes the vendor, but the vendor’s privilege primes the
privilege for funeral charges. Professor Dainow argues that there
was no intent to create a vicious circle in this instance but rather
simply an express subordination of the lessor’s privilege to the
general privilege for funeral charges. Thus, he concludes that the
proper ranking is the vendor’s privilege, the privilege for funeral
charges, and the lessor’s privilege.
Professor Dainow observes that the lessor once had one of the
most favored privileges, but later legislation seems to have
consistently preferred the vendor, but not the lessor, over special
statutory privileges, while leaving intact the ranking rule under the
Civil Code preferring the lessor over the vendor.292 We have gone
even further in this evolution in recent years, since the doctrinal
basis for the superiority of the lessor’s privilege has been removed,
though the lessor’s privilege nonetheless remains superior to that of
the vendor.293 More importantly, the privileges of both the lessor
and the vendor upon movables, each of which under former law
primed later-arising chattel mortgages,294 have seen their ranking,
and therefore their overall importance, greatly reduced by the
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. Under its provisions,
both of these privileges rank behind all Chapter 9 security
interests, irrespective of the order in which the competing rights
arise and apparently irrespective of whether the security interest is
even perfected.295 Whatever it might once have meant, the idea of

290. Professor Dainow concludes that the repairman’s statute, as the latest
enacted legislation, governs, with the result that priority is (1) vendor’s
privilege, (2) mechanic’s privilege, (3) widow’s privilege, and (4) lessor’s
privilege. See Dainow, supra note 271, at 8.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 8 n.38.
293. See supra note 265.
294. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5354 (repealed by Act No. 128, 2001 La.
Acts 206).
295. See UCC § 9-322(h) (2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 10:9-322(a) (Supp.
2015). See generally James A. Stuckey, Louisiana’s Non-Uniform Variations in
U.C.C. Chapter 9, 62 LA. L. REV. 793, 844–46 (2002).
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adheret visceribus rei has itself been eviscerated, at least insofar as
the vendor’s privilege on movables is concerned.
X. RANKING OF THE VENDOR’S PRIVILEGES ON IMMOVABLES
The Civil Code lists very few special privileges on immovables;
chief among them are that of the vendor and those in favor of
contractors, subcontractors, laborers, materialmen, and others
supplying goods, labor, and services in constructing, rebuilding, or
repairing buildings or other work.296 The latter category of special
privileges has been effectively supplanted by the Louisiana Private
Works Act.297 The following discussion addresses the ranking of a
timely filed vendor’s privilege on an immovable against the
general privileges arising under the Civil Code, its ranking against
previously filed general mortgages, the ranking of vendor’s
privileges held by building and loan associations, the ranking of a
vendor’s privilege that is not filed in a timely manner, and the
ranking of a vendor’s privilege against privileges arising under the
Private Works Act.
A. Ranking of a Vendor’s Privilege Against General Privileges
The first few words contained in article 3267 of the Civil Code
give the impression that the article is designed to rank the vendor’s
privilege on movables against other privileges:
If the movables of the debtor are subject to the vendor’s
privilege, or if there be a house or other work subjected to
the privilege of the workmen who have constructed or
repaired it, or of the individuals who furnished the materials,
the vendor, workmen and furnishers of materials, shall be
paid from the price of the object affected in their favor, in
preference to other privileged debts of the debtor, even
funeral charges, except the charges for affixing seals,
making inventories, and others which may have been
necessary to procure the sale of the thing.298

296. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2772, 3249 (2015).
297. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4801 (2007). See Robertshaw Controls Co. v.
Pre-Eng’d Prods., Co., 669 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that based upon
language of exclusivity found in Act No. 298, § 12, 1926 La. Acts 540, that the
enactment of the predecessor to the Private Works Act in 1926 was intended to
cover the whole subject matter and thus repealed Louisiana Civil Code article
2772 by implication). See also VETTER & HARRELL, supra note 14, at 245–46.
298. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3267 (2015) (emphasis added).
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However, when the entire article is read, it is readily apparent that
the word “movables” at the beginning of the article must mean
“immovables.” If the article were applied as written, then the vendor’s
privilege on movables would be ranked quite unnecessarily against
general privileges on immovables.299 This article was not borrowed
from the Code Napoléon, and for that reason, the error cannot be
attributed to a fault in translation.300 If this error is corrected in the
interpretation of the article, its meaning is that special privileges on
immovables, including the vendor’s privilege, outrank general
privileges other than those for fixing seals, making inventories and law
charges for things necessary to procure the sale of the thing subject to
the special privilege.301

299. Professor Dainow wrote an entire article dedicated solely to the proof
that the word movables in Article 3267 should be immovables. See Joseph
Dainow, Art. 3267 and the Ranking of Privileges, 9 LA. L. REV. 370 (1949). He
observes that, at the time of his writing, there was not a single decision
predicated upon the application of the article to a vendor’s privilege on
movables. No such case appears to have arisen in the five and a half decades
since the time of his writing.
300. Both the French and English versions of the 1825 Code, which
introduced the article, contained the same error. The English version of the
article also contains an unrelated, though perhaps benign, error in translation
from the French version of the 1825 Code: “privileged debts” should be
“privileged creditors.” The words “créanciers privilégiés” were used in the
French version of the 1825 Code.
301. See Salaun v. Their Creditors (In re Contonio), 30 So. 696 (La. 1901);
Marcelin v. His Creditors, 21 La. Ann. 423 (1869); Monrose v. His Creditors, 2
Rob. (La.) 280 (1842). In Marsh v. His Creditors, 11 La. Ann. 469 (1856), the
Court explained that the charges superior to the vendor’s privilege should be
restricted to those charges without which the sale could not have taken place
(and in that case, it was conceded that the sheriff’s, clerk’s, notaries’ and
appraiser’s fees were necessary charges in procuring the sale), but following
Monrose, the Court also held that the syndic’s commission upon the property
sold was an expense of administration inuring to the benefit of the vendor and
therefore priming the vendor’s privilege. In Succession of Lauve, 18 La. Ann.
721 (1866), the Court observed that, even though succession charges inuring to
the benefit of all parties concerned are of higher dignity than debts of the
deceased, article 3234 of the 1825 Code (article 3267 of the 1870 Code) is an
exception to this rule, and the holder of the vendor’s privilege cannot therefore
be charged with general privileges or succession charges. A more recent claim
of priority under article 3267 over a vendor’s privilege appeared in Norvell v.
Crichton, 150 So. 2d 621 (La. Ct. App. 1963), in which, following the credit
sale of an immovable, the buyer’s attorney exerted efforts to have the property
declared the buyer’s separate property. Finding that this attorney’s services were
not rendered “to procure the sale of the thing” within the meaning of article
3267, the court held that his privilege for his fees was subordinate to the
vendor’s privilege. Id. at 623.
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B. Ranking of a Vendor’s Privilege Against Previously Filed
General Mortgages
Pedesclaux v. Legare302 is an illustration of the preference of a
timely filed vendor’s privilege over a previously recorded general
mortgage. That case involved a contest between a wife’s legal
mortgage upon her husband’s property and a vendor’s privilege
arising out of his subsequent purchase of an immovable. Curiously,
both counsel argued the case on the basis of the supposition that
the law in force in April 1869, when the vendor’s privilege arose,
required recordation of the vendor’s privilege on the very day of
the passage of the act. However, that law did not come in force
until the adoption of the 1870 Code a year later. Article 3240 of the
1825 Civil Code had imposed a time limitation for recordation of a
vendor’s privilege, but an 1868 statute removed the time limitation
altogether. Thus, the Court held that the vendor’s privilege, by its
very nature alone and irrespective of the time of its recordation,
outranked the legal mortgage.303
Gallaugher v. Hebrew Congregation involved a contest between
the holder of a judicial mortgage and a third person who had
purchased an immovable from the judgment debtor.304 Under the facts
of the case, the judicial mortgage was recorded long before the
judgment debtor acquired the immovable in question and even longer
before he sold it to the third person.305 However, the act of credit sale
by which the judgment debtor acquired the property was not
recorded until three days after recordation of the judgment debtor’s
sale of the property to the third person.306 The third person cleverly
contended that the judicial mortgage never attached to the
immovable, on the theory that a judicial mortgage cannot attach
until the judgment debtor’s title has been recorded and in this case,
by the time the judgment debtor’s title was recorded, he had
already alienated the property in favor of the third person.307
Rejecting this contention, the Court held that the Civil Code
provides that no act affecting immovable property shall have any

302. 32 La. Ann. 380 (1880).
303. Id. The Court observed that, even if it were to apply the period that had
applied under article 3240 of the 1825 Code before the 1868 amendment, the
same result would obtain, since the vendor’s privilege was recorded in a
seasonable manner based upon the time originally given for recordation under
the 1825 Code. Id.
304. Gallaugher v. Hebrew Congregation, 35 La. Ann. 829 (1883).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 830.
307. Id.
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effect against third parties until deposited for registry.308 The law
requiring registry is intended to protect the vendor’s creditors and
other third persons who do not know of the existence of an
unrecorded transfer; it was never designed to prevent property
from passing from vendor to purchaser or to prevent general
mortgages from reaching and encumbering immovables acquired
under an unrecorded title. Thus, judicial and legal mortgages
recorded against the purchaser encumber immovables from the
very instant of purchase whether the title is recorded or not but
rank subordinate to encumbrances existing on the property against
the vendor at the moment of transfer.309
A sequel to Gallaugher, Givanovitch v. Hebrew Congregation,310
arose from the same set of facts and addressed the issue of whether
the privilege of the unpaid vendor under the late-filed act of credit
sale had priority over the pre-existing judicial mortgage against his
purchaser. In holding the vendor’s privilege to be inferior, the Court
followed previous authorities to the effect that previously recorded
general mortgages will take precedence over a vendor’s privilege
unless the contract from which the vendor’s privilege arises is
seasonably recorded in the mortgage records.311 The reverse set of
circumstances involving a timely filed vendor’s privilege was
presented in the much more recent case of Lawyers Title Insurance
Corp. v. Valteau,312 which is discussed more fully in the following
section of this Article. In that case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the principle that a timely filed vendor’s privilege outranks a
previously recorded judicial mortgage against the vendee.313
308. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2264 (1870). See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1839
(2015).
309. To the extent the Court’s prior holding in Rochereau v. Colomb, 27 La.
Ann. 337 (1875), implied to the contrary, it was expressly overruled. Gallaugher,
35 La. Ann. at 832.
310. 36 La. Ann. 272 (1884).
311. In Ridings v. Johnson, 128 U.S. 212 (1888), the United States Supreme
Court considered the issue of whether a vendor’s privilege recorded several
years after the date of the sale, but simultaneously with the recordation of the
contract of sale, granted the vendor a privilege. Citing both Gallaugher and
Givanovitch, the Court held that even though the unrecorded act of sale passed
title to the vendee such that he had the power to grant mortgages upon it, the
vendor’s privilege had no priority over mortgages granted by the vendee in the
interim where the vendor’s privilege was not recorded within the period of time
required by article 3274. Id. at 223–24. For a more recent case holding that a
vendor’s privilege that is not timely recorded does not outrank a previously
existing judicial mortgage, see Commissioner of Insurance v. Terrell, 647 So. 2d
445 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
312. 558 So. 2d 1319 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
313. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Valteau, 563 So. 2d 260 (La. 1990).
Following Lawyers Title Insurance Corp., the court in Verret v. Rougeau
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Planiol enunciates essentially the same conclusion that the
Supreme Court reached in Valteau:
Because of its nature, the privilege necessarily ranks all
mortgages established on the same immovable, although
anterior to it. This is what Art. 2095 provides: “The privilege is
the right to be preferred to the other creditors, even
mortgages.” It is clear that a privileged creditor cannot acquire
on the property which is subject to it, a mortgage which will
rank those which already exist on his own account or on
account of his authors; the debtor, who sells his property and
becomes privileged as a vendor, is necessarily primed by his
own creditors. A vendor can prime only the creditors who
acquire mortgages against the purchaser: they are like him
creditors of such purchaser, and they will be paid
proportionately if no cause of preference intervenes.314
....
The vendor, creditor of the price, conflicts not only with the
creditors of the buyer who will in the future obtain mortgages
but also with creditors having pre-existing general mortgages. .
. . The latter will have a mortgage on the immovable on the
very day of the purchase. On the property sold their mortgage
right is therefore of the same rank as the right of the vendor.
The vendor is nevertheless preferred over such prior creditors
because he is “privileged.” Such was already the language of
Pothier: . . . he who has sold the heritage should be preferred to
all the other creditors, for as this owner has acquired the
heritage with the charge of the mortgage which his vendor has
reserved on it in alienating it, he cannot mortgage it to his
other creditors except subject to the charge of this mortgage,
not being able to transfer to them a greater right than he had on
it himself.315

applied the rule that a vendor’s privilege outranks a prior recorded judicial
mortgage against the vendee. See Verret v. Rougeau, 579 So. 2d 1239 (La. Ct.
App. 1991).
314. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 3139, at 700.
315. Id. No. 3140, at 700–01. See also RUBIN, supra note 82, § 33.3(c), at
282.
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C. Ranking of a Vendor’s Privilege in Favor of Building and Loan
Associations316
Over the course of time, building and loan associations
developed the use of a sale/resale procedure to create a vendor’s
privilege even in those cases in which a sale was not otherwise
involved.317 This practice was made possible by the enactment of
legislation in 1888 providing that “in case any such association
shall purchase property from any person and shall afterwards sell
the same property to the same person, then such association shall
have the vendor’s lien and privilege upon the property so sold.”318
As the Supreme Court later explained, this enactment was necessary
in order to overcome prior jurisprudence that a transaction by which
a borrower made a cash sale of his property to a lender, which then
immediately resold the same property to the borrower on terms of
credit, was a mere pignorative contract that did not create a vendor’s
privilege.319 The policy reasons motivating this favored treatment
for building and loan associations have been explained in the
following terms:
The purpose for which building and loan associations are
established is to enable persons of small means and limited
incomes to acquire homes and thus become better citizens
and more identified with the welfare and growth of the
community. Because of the advantageous results attending
the operation of such associations and their beneficient [sic]
purpose, they have been favored and granted special
privileges by various state Legislatures. Our own Legislature
has deemed it to be in the interest of our people to encourage
the formation and operation of building and loan
associations, and has enacted special laws giving them

316. This section draws upon, and to a large extent reproduces, the author’s
work embodied in the November 2014 Report of the Louisiana State Law
Institute to the Louisiana Legislature in Response to House Concurrent
Resolution No. 15 of 2011 Relative to Purchase Money Mortgages, which was
authored by the author of this Article with the assistance of members of the
Security Devices Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute. This Report is
on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute.
317. Under this practice, the borrower, already the owner of the immovable,
would sell it to the building and loan association, which then resold the property
back to the borrower, reserving both the vendor’s privilege provided by law and
a conventional mortgage upon the immovable.
318. Act No. 115, § 4, 1888 La. Acts 177.
319. Capillon v. Chambliss, 29 So. 2d 171, 175–76 (1946).
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certain well-defined powers and privileges to be exercised in
the promotion of their objects.320
This legislation spawned a considerable amount of litigation in
which the courts were called upon to determine the extent to which
these sale/resale transactions would be treated as true sales.321
In 1902, the Legislature reinforced the 1888 legislation, providing
“that every loan [made by a building and loan association] on real
estate shall be secured by vendor’s privilege and first mortgage upon
real property.”322 This enactment not only made the vendor’s privilege
mandatory, but it introduced into the law a certain ambiguity, for the
act provided that “[s]uch vendor’s privilege and mortgage shall
have priority over all other liens, charges, privileges, incumbrances
[sic] and mortgages . . . which shall be recorded or claimed
subsequent to the recording of such vendor’s privilege and
mortgage.”323 The 1902 Act then repeated the provisions of the
1888 legislation that allowed associations to enter into sale/resale
transactions, stating that in such cases “such association shall have
a privilege of equal rank as the vendor’s lien and privilege upon
the property so acquired.”324 There is obvious tension between
these two provisions, for a true vendor’s privilege outranks even
pre-existing mortgages, as discussed in the preceding section of
this Article. This tension persists in the law today. One paragraph
320. Mayre v. Pierson, 133 So. 163, 165 (La. 1931).
321. See, e.g., Am. Homestead Co. v. Karstendiek, 35 So. 964, 966–67 (La.
1903) (observing that a sale and resale involving a building and loan association
is a valid sale creating a vendor’s privilege in favor of the association); Hutts v.
Crowley Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 83 So. 417, 418 (La. 1919) (noting that a sale of
community property to an association followed by a resale to the husband after
the wife’s death did not vest any interest in the property in the deceased wife’s
heirs); George P. Caire v. Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 1 Pelt. 166, 168 (La. Ct.
App. 1918) (hurricane damage occurring while title was vested in the
association was borne by the association). But see Capillon, 29 So. 2d at 176
(holding that sale of wife’s separate property to the association followed by
resale did not change the character of the property from separate to community,
because the transaction is merely a pignorative contract designed to secure, by
means of a vendor’s privilege, the loan made by the building and loan
association to the mortgagor). Ruffino v. Hunt, 99 So. 2d 34 (La. 1958), applied
this rule to a sale–resale transaction entered into by a husband, irrespective of
the absence of a declaration of separateness in the act of reconveyance from the
building and loan association, declining to distinguish Mayre on the ground that
it had involved the sale by a married woman of her separate property to a
building and loan association. See also Fontenot v. Fontenot, 339 So. 2d 897
(La. Ct. App. 1976); Feinhals v. Campbell, 145 So. 2d 622 (La. Ct. App. 1962);
Lazaro v. Lazaro, 92 So. 2d 402 (La. Ct. App. 1957).
322. Act No. 120, 1902 La. Acts 156.
323. Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
324. Id.
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of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 6:830 authorizes building
and loan associations to enter into sale/resale transactions and
provides that such a transaction is treated as a purchase and sale
vesting in the association a privilege of equal rank with the vendor
of immovable property.325 Another paragraph in the same statute
provides that all mortgages in favor of building and loan
associations “shall have a rank equal to that of a vendor’s privilege
. . . and shall have priority over all other liens, privileges,
encumbrances, and mortgages . . . which are recorded or arise in
any manner subsequent to the date of recordation of the mortgage
in favor of the association.”326
Surprisingly, the courts have only rarely addressed the priority
of a vendor’s privilege held by a building and loan association. In
one early case, the Court held that a timely filed vendor’s privilege
arising in favor of an association from a sale/resale transaction
primed a conventional mortgage executed at the same time in favor of
another creditor.327 The issue of whether a timely recorded vendor’s
privilege in favor of a building and loan association outranks a preexisting judicial mortgage against the association’s borrower was
addressed by the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Homes
Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Tri-Parish Ventures.328 Significantly, the
building and loan association in this case was not a seller under a
sale/resale transaction but instead claimed the ranking of a vendor’s
privilege on the basis of Louisiana Revised Statutes section
6:830(H). The association’s mortgage was in competition with a
judicial mortgage that had been filed against the association’s
borrower before the borrower acquired the property and mortgaged
it to the building and loan association. Citing Civil Code article
3273 to the effect that privileges are effective against third persons
from the date of recordation, the court held that article 3274 is
simply a limited exception to this rule, “in which a grace period is
given to the privilege holder over intervening mortgages only,
where the act importing privilege is recorded within a very limited
period after the date of execution.”329 The court observed that a
similar grace period was created for mortgages in favor of building
and loan associations pursuant to the savings and loan association
law; “however, the special ranking date, as in Louisiana Civil Code
article 3274, affects intervening mortgages only.”330 Later the court
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:830(D)(2) (2005).
Id. § 6:830(H).
Union Homestead Ass’n v. Fink, 156 So. 458, 460 (La. 1934).
505 So. 2d 165 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 167.
Id.
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remarked that “[a] vendor’s privilege which is preserved and
perfected against third parties through recordation primes subsequent
mortgages affecting the property.”331 The court thus found that the
holder of the previously filed judicial mortgage had priority. What is
surprising about the court’s holding is that it did not seem to be based
upon an interpretation of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 6:830 but
rather upon an interpretation of those articles of the Civil Code
applicable to all vendor’s privileges.332
This rationale was called into question in Lawyer’s Title
Insurance Corp. v. Valteau,333 in which the court was faced with a
true credit sale in favor of purchaser against whom a judicial
mortgage had been recorded five years earlier. No building and
loan association was involved. In affirming a finding by the trial
court that the vendor’s privilege outranked the previously recorded
judicial mortgage against the purchaser, the Fourth Circuit went to
great lengths to explain its prior opinion in the Home Savings case,
maintaining that the building and loan association in that case was
never a vendor and that Louisiana Revised Statutes section 6:830(H)
does not actually afford building and loan associations a vendor’s
privilege that outranks pre-existing interests.334 The Fourth Circuit
in Valteau further explained that its holding in Home Savings was
that mortgages and other encumbrances emanating from the vendee
are primed by the vendor’s privilege even when recorded before a
credit sale is consummated.335 In its opinion denying a writ
application in Valteau, the Supreme Court limited the holding of the
case to a mere statement that a vendor’s privilege arising from a sale
to a vendee outranks a prior recorded judicial mortgage against the
vendee.336 The Supreme Court explained that the decision in Home
Savings involved a situation in which a judgment debtor already
owned the property before mortgaging it to the building and loan
association in a refinancing transaction.337 For that reason, the prior
recorded judicial mortgage against that judgment debtor outranked
any vendor’s privilege arising from his mortgage of the property in
331. Id.
332. See also Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass’n v. Royal Scott Apartments
P’ship, 541 So. 2d 943, 946 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Home Savings, 505 So.
2d at 167, for the proposition that a vendor’s privilege in favor of a building and
loan association under section 6:833(H)(1) has priority over only those
privileges and encumbrances that are recorded subsequent to the date of
recordation of the mortgage in favor of the building and loan association).
333. 558 So. 2d 1319 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
334. Id. at 1320–21.
335. Id. at 1322.
336. Lawyer’s Title Ins. Corp. v. Valteau, 563 So. 2d 260 (La. 1990).
337. Id. at 261.
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favor of the building and loan association.338 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court found that the Fourth Circuit’s observations
concerning the nature and effect of the vendor’s privilege granted to
building and loan associations under Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 6:830H were “clearly dicta” since there was no building and
loan association involved in Valteau.339
The courts have not since been called upon to determine whether,
in the absence of a sale/resale transaction, Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 6:830 grants a building and loan association mortgage the
ranking of a true vendor’s privilege that outranks pre-existing
mortgages or whether, as the statute itself provides, this statutory
vendor’s privilege outranks only later arising encumbrances. One
Louisiana treatise argues persuasively that Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 6:830 cannot be construed to grant a building and loan
association’s mortgage priority over a pre-existing mortgage in the
absence of an actual sale, for that interpretation would grant the
association priority any time it lent money.340 It seems to be a fair
inference from the jurisprudence that, if a building and loan
association enters into an actual sale/resale transaction, it enjoys a true
vendor’s privilege that, upon timely recordation, will outrank any
mortgage bearing against the vendee other than mortgages that
burdened the property at the time it was conveyed to the association.341
If, on the other hand, the building and loan association merely obtains
a mortgage on the property without actually participating in the
transaction as a vendor, its “vendor’s privilege” should outrank only
later arising encumbrances.

338. Id.
339. Id.
340. TITLE, supra note 85, § 15:7, at 1315–18.
341. With true sale and resale transactions, there are two different factual
circumstances leading to wholly different results. If the property is burdened by
a judicial mortgage before it is ever sold to the building and loan association, the
association’s vendor’s privilege, even if timely filed, will not outrank the
previously filed judicial mortgage. This occurs, for instance, when a borrower
whose title to property is subject to a judicial mortgage sells the property to a
building and loan association that then immediately re-sells the property to the
borrower. If, on the other hand, the association acquires unencumbered title to
the property from a seller who is not its borrower, and then immediately sells the
property to its borrower, at which time a judicial mortgage previously filed
against the borrower attaches, the building and loan association’s vendor’s
privilege, if timely filed, will outrank the previously filed judicial mortgage
against the borrower. These outcomes are not the result of any special legislation
affecting building and loan associations; they result from the general rules
applicable to vendor’s privileges as interpreted in the cases discussed above.

2015]

VENDOR’S PRIVILEGE

1235

D. Ranking of Vendor’s Privileges That Are Not Timely Filed
Article 2113 of the Code Napoléon provides that all privileges
which are required to be inscribed and as to which the conditions
required to preserve the privilege have not been fulfilled do not
cease to operate as mortgages, but the mortgage has effect as to
third persons only from the time of the inscription. As Planiol
explains,342 if a privileged creditor fails to inscribe his privilege
within the time required by law, he does not lose his right to
inscribe. The privilege can still be inscribed after the delay has
elapsed, but its rank is diminished: Its ranking ceases to be
regulated under the law as a privilege but instead depends upon the
date of its inscription. Thus, if the inscription is made after the
expiration of the delay given for recordation, the privilege as such is
lost, and it “degenerates” into nothing more than an ordinary mortgage
which is assigned its rank according to usual rules based upon the date
of recordation.343 These concepts appeared in the 1825 Louisiana Civil
Code,344 and their application is illustrated by Succession of
O’Laughlin.345 In that case, the curator of a succession proposed to
allocate the general law charges of the succession proportionately to
two separate immovables, both of which were subject to untimely filed
vendor’s privileges. Because the vendor’s privileges were not
inscribed in a timely manner, their character as privileges had been
lost, and the creditors were entitled only to the rights of mortgagees,
with the result that one or both of them had to contribute to the
payment of general privileges.346
342. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, Nos. 3149–3150.
343. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2379 (Fr.) (formerly article 2113).
Interestingly, a vendor’s privilege could not originally degenerate into a mere
mortgage because the French Civil Code did not at first prescribe a time during
which its inscription was required. XIV BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 706.
Currently, however, inscription of a vendor’s privilege is required within two
months from the act of sale under French Civil Code art. 2108. CODE CIVIL [C.
CIV.] art. 2379 (Fr.) (formerly article 2108).
344. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3240–3241 (1825).
345. 18 La. Ann. 142 (1866).
346. The Court then addressed the issue of which of the two mortgages in
question, bearing upon different immovables, had to bear the loss. Id. at 143–44.
To answer this question, the Court turned to articles 3236 and 3277 of the 1825
Code (substantially the same as the 1870 civil code articles 3269 and 3270). Id.
at 143. The former article provides that if general privileges cannot be satisfied
out of the movables, they are paid in preference to all mortgages and privileges
other than special privileges in favor of the vendor and the workmen and
furnisher of materials. The resulting loss falls upon the creditor whose mortgage
is “the least ancient.” The Court found it significant that the former article
makes no reference to the dignity of mortgages, but only to their dates. Id. at
144. Thus, the Court rejected the argument that the reference to different
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The rules governing the effect of the untimely reinscription of a
privilege were dramatically changed in the 1870 Code. Article
3274 suppressed the “degeneration” concept, providing instead that
an untimely inscribed privilege affords no preference over
creditors who have previously acquired mortgages. In other words,
the creditor in question still holds a privilege, but that privilege is
robbed of its priority over mortgages that were recorded prior to the
date the privilege was recorded. This is not a distinction without a
difference, for the vendor’s privilege on immovables enjoys favored
treatment over general privileges.
The Court in Wheelright v. St. Louis, N.O. & O. Canal
Transportation Co.347 seized upon the opportunity to explain the effect
of the adoption of article 3274 of the 1870 Code. Under the facts of the
case, the privileged creditor, who apparently claimed a mechanic’s
privilege on an immovable, filed an affidavit of his privilege long after
the registry of the plaintiff’s mortgage and after expiration of the time
limitation for filing his privilege provided under article 3274.348 The
Court examined differences existing between the 1825 and 1870
Codes.349 Under the 1825 Code,350 a privilege was valid against
third persons from the date of the act if recorded within a specified
period of time. If not recorded within that time, it lost its effect as a
privilege; that is to say, it conferred no preference over a creditor
who had acquired a mortgage in the meantime. However, it was

mortgages according to their dates must be taken to refer to different mortgages
bearing upon the same thing. Id. Accordingly, the Court held that the later of the
two mortgages had to contribute to the payment of the general privileges, and
the earlier of the two was required to contribute only to the charges necessary to
procure the sale of the property subject to the mortgage. Id. at 144–45. The
result of the case would likely be different under the 1870 Code, since article
3274 now provides that untimely inscribed vendor’s privileges do not lose their
character as privileges and article 3269 takes specific exception to special
privileges in favor of a vendor. See discussion supra Part VIII.D.
347. 17 So. 133 (La. 1895).
348. Id. at 137.
349. There was another change that the Court did not note: The statement in
article 3240 of the 1825 Code that privileges are valid against third persons from
the date of the act, assuming timely recordation, was suppressed in favor of a
provision that privileges are not effective against third persons unless recorded.
See discussion supra Part VIII.E (concerning the ranking of vendor’s privileges
against Private Works Act privileges). Interestingly, the entire discussion by the
Court in Wheelwright was dicta, because it held that the filing made by the
purported privileged creditor was defective since it did not show the creditor’s
claim on its face but rather made reference to documents to be found elsewhere.
350. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3240–3241 (1825).
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still valid as a mortgage.351 Under the 1870 Code, article 3273
provides that privileges are valid against third persons from the date of
the recording of the act of evidence of the indebtedness. Article 3274
provides that no privilege affects third persons unless recorded in the
manner required by law and that no privilege confers a preference on
the creditor who holds it against other creditors who have acquired a
mortgage unless that act is recorded within a specified delay after the
contract is entered into.352 The Court in Wheelwright explained the
difference between the 1825 Code and the 1870 Code as follows:
under the 1825 Code, tardiness of inscription reduced the privilege
forever to a mere mortgage.353 Under the 1870 Code, the character of
the tardily inscribed privilege is not changed; however, its effect as a
privilege, as to mortgagees only, is lost. As to other parties, the
privilege retains its full effect.354
351. These concepts appear consistent with Planiol’s discussion concerning
the “degeneration” of an untimely filed privilege into a mortgage.
352. Under the 1870 Code as originally written, the act of sale had to be
recorded on the very day that it was adopted. By an amendment in 1877, the
present delays of 7 and 15 days were inserted. See Act No. 45, 1877 La. Acts 59.
353. In support of this proposition, the Court cited Succession of O’Laughlin
and article 2095 of the French Civil Code. See Wheelright, 17 So. at 138.
354. The holding of Wheelwright to the effect that the untimely inscription of
a privilege does not cause it to lose its character as a privilege calls into question
the Court’s earlier decision in Succession of Marc, 29 La. Ann. 412 (1877),
which, like Wheelwright, purported to explain the differences between the 1825
and 1870 Codes. In Succession of Marc, the estate consisted of two immovables,
one of which was subject to a mortgage in favor of Soye and the other of which
was subject to a later arising and untimely filed vendor’s privilege in favor of
Gayarre. Id. Both immovables were sold, and the issue was which of the two
creditors had to bear the widow’s privilege and the general privileges. Id. On
original hearing, the Court held that the widow’s privilege had to be paid with
the funds derived from the sale of the immovable subject to the Soye mortgage,
since the widow’s privilege is inferior to the vendor’s privilege. Id. at 414–15.
All general privileges were assessed against the fund derived from the sale of
the Gayarre property, since that mortgage was the least ancient of the two. Id.
On rehearing, however, the Court reassigned the widow’s privilege to the
Gayarre fund in light of a “radical change” of two articles of the Civil Code. Id.
at 415. Under the 1825 Code, the vendor had six days within which to record his
privilege. However, under the 1870 Code as originally adopted, as against
previously recorded mortgages, the vendor’s privilege had effect as such only
when recorded on the very day of the contract creating it. Thus, the Court held
that Gayarre had “no privilege whatever, as against third persons” since his
vendor’s privilege was not recorded on the day the sale was made. Id. at 416.
Gayarre’s mortgage, however, was not lost, but since Gayarre’s mortgage was
the least ancient of the two, the Gayarre fund had to contribute to the widow’s
privilege before the Soye fund. Id. This case appears to represent a classic
application of Planiol’s “degeneration” concept, which the Wheelwright court
would later reject. However, the holding of the case might nonetheless still be
correct if article 3274 is applied not just as a ranking rule when a privilege and
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Another interesting issue that arises when the vendor fails to
record his privilege in a timely fashion is whether the vendor’s
exercise of his right of dissolution for non-payment of the purchase
price will nonetheless cause title to the property to revert to the vendor
free of a judicial mortgage or other general mortgage affecting the
vendee. At least one case holds that, upon exercise of the right of
dissolution, title is returned to the vendor unencumbered by a
previously filed general mortgage; however, the case does not
expressly mention whether the vendor’s privilege was recorded at
all.355 In view of the well-established rules that the privilege and the
right to dissolve are entirely independent rights and that the effect of
the exercise of the right to dissolve is to return the property to the
vendor free of encumbrances placed on it by the vendee,356 the
vendor’s failure to record his privilege in a timely manner, or to record
it at all, should not alter the result.
E. Ranking of a Timely Filed Vendor’s Privilege Against Private
Works Act Privileges
The Civil Code does not purport to rank the vendor’s privilege
on an immovable against the special privileges provided by the
Civil Code in favor of those involved in performing work on the
immovable. Instead, it provides for a separate appraisement
procedure.357 In the 1871 case of City of Baltimore v. Parlange,358
the Court observed that this separate appraisement procedure
“exemplifies the intelligent sense of justice which distinguishes the
civil law.”359 The rationale for the separate appraisement procedure

mortgage exist on the same immovable but instead is given a more expansive
effect to allow a mortgage holder to ignore entirely the status of a privilege as a
privilege when it is not filed in a timely manner. In other words, even though the
untimely filed vendor’s privilege would still count as a privilege insofar as the
widow was concerned, it would not be a privilege—for any purpose—insofar as
the creditor holding a mortgage on another immovable is concerned. Thus, the
other mortgagee could force the unpaid vendor to share in the payment of
general privileges under articles 3269 and 3270 as though the unpaid vendor
held merely an ordinary mortgage. This argument may stretch article 3274
beyond its plain meaning: The article does not provide that an unseasonably
filed privilege is wholly without effect as a privilege as regards mortgagees, but
rather provides simply that an unseasonably filed privilege “confers no
preference” on the creditor who holds it against mortgagees.
355. Adler v. Adler, 52 So. 668 (La. 1910).
356. See discussion supra.
357. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3268 (2015).
358. 23 La. Ann. 365 (1871).
359. Id. at 366.
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is that the contractor, who through his work has increased the value
of the thing, should not be omitted in the distribution of the
proceeds of that thing and is therefore not primed by the privilege
of the vendor.360 Instead, the contractor’s privilege is exercised in
such a way as to give the contractor “the benefit of the increased
value he has given to the property.”361
The present-day Private Works Act seems to have abandoned
this “intelligent sense of justice” in favor of a rule ranking Private
Works Act privileges against vendor’s privileges and mortgages
based strictly upon temporal priority. As revised in 1981, the
Private Works Act362 provides that privileges in favor of claimants
under the Act are inferior to mortgages and vendor’s privileges
“that are effective against third persons before the privileges
granted by [the Act] are effective.”363 The Official Comments to
this provision of the Private Works Act observe that this provision
is not intended to change the law and “leaves to the general law the
matter of determining when a mortgage or vendor’s privilege is
effective.”364 However, the formulation of the predecessor statute
was different, and perhaps materially so. The privileges arising
under that statute were ranked behind those bona fide mortgages
and vendor’s privileges that had been “duly recorded before the
work or labor is begun.”365 Thus, actual recordation at the moment
of commencement of the work—rather than effectiveness against
third persons—was the paramount consideration; the possibility
that a vendor’s privilege might take effect against third persons
from the moment of the act of sale, provided that timely filing later
occurs, was unimportant.
Under the present Private Works Act, if an act evidencing a
bona fide vendor’s privilege is actually recorded before work
begins on the immovable, there is little doubt that the vendor’s
privilege will have priority. But, suppose that, on a Friday afternoon,
a closing occurs in which a purchaser acquires an immovable under
an act of credit sale that is not recorded in the conveyance or
mortgage records until the following Monday morning. In the
meantime, on Saturday, a contractor hired by the new owner begins
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4821 (Supp. 2015).
363. Laborer’s privileges under the Private Works Act outrank all mortgages
and vendor’s privileges, irrespective of the order in which the competing rights
arise or are made effective against third persons. Id. § 9:4821(A)(2). Thus, the
issues discussed in this section are not applicable to laborer’s privileges.
364. Id. cmt. d.
365. Act No. 298, 1926 La. Acts 552, 559 (quoted in Hortman-Salmen Co. v.
White, 123 So. 709, 710 (La. 1929)).

1240

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

work for the construction of a building upon the immovable. The
roofing subcontractor, who is not paid for work performed many
months later, timely files a Private Works Act claim within 60 days
after the work is substantially completed the following year. In a
ranking dispute between this subcontractor and the unpaid vendor,
who wins? The vendor’s privilege was timely filed, but was it
“effective against third persons” when work began?
The case that most nearly answers this question is Security
Homestead Ass’n v. Schnell.366 It should be borne in mind, however,
that the case was decided under the former version of the Private
Works Act, which, as pointed out above, required actual prior
recordation in order for bona fide mortgages and vendor’s
privileges to outrank Private Works Act privileges. Under the facts
of that case, the defendant purchased an immovable under an act of
credit sale that was recorded within the period prescribed by Civil
Code article 3274.367 For reasons that were not entirely clear, he
had apparently obtained materials from two materialmen prior to
the time that he became the owner of the immovable.368 The court
held that, with respect to materials supplied before the date of the
act of credit sale, no materialman’s privilege could arise because
the materialmen did not contract with the owner or lessee as
required by the Private Works Act.369 However, with respect to
purchases of materials made by the defendant on or after the date
of execution of the act of credit sale, a materialman’s privilege
arose and, by virtue of the clear language of the Private Works Act,
that privilege was superior to the unrecorded vendor’s privilege.370
The majority opinion did not cite or discuss Civil Code article
3274 or its temporal filing requirement, though it is clear from the

366. 232 So. 2d 898 (La. Ct. App. 1970). See also Conservative Homestead
Ass’n v. Boyle, 135 So. 663 (La. 1931). However, in Conservative Homestead
Ass’n, the vendor’s privilege in favor of a building and loan association was
acquired after work had begun, and the court had no difficulty ranking it behind
privileges arising from a work that had already begun when the vendor’s
privilege was acquired. No consideration was given to Civil Code article 3274,
and the opinion did not discuss whether timely recordation of the vendor’s
privilege would have given it priority. Based on the reasoning set forth in
Lawyer’s Title Insurance Corp. v. Valteau, it appears that timely recordation
would not have made a difference under article 3274 anyway, because the
building and loan association’s (i.e., the vendor’s) own title was burdened by the
inchoate liens arising from the work at the time of the vendor’s privilege was
created.
367. Security Homestead Ass’n, 232 So. 2d at 899.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 900–01.
370. Id. at 901.
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facts of the case that the vendor’s privilege was recorded in a
timely manner.371
The dissent pointed out the incongruity in allowing a third
person to benefit from an unrecorded sale while at the same time
protecting the third person from the vendor’s privilege arising under
the unrecorded sale.372 In the view of the dissent, where work is in
continuous progress prior to the time the party contracting as owner
actually becomes owner, the work is considered to have commenced
at the moment that registry of his purchase in the conveyance
records makes him owner quoad third persons.373 The only way the
vendor’s privilege could prime the materialman’s privilege would be
if the vendor could show that his privilege was recorded in the
mortgage records before the moment of registry of the sale in the
conveyance records. This is something the vendor could not do
under the facts of the case, and perhaps cannot do under any facts
unless he caused his act of credit sale to be recorded in the
mortgage records before it is recorded in the conveyance records.
The reason that the dissenting judge dissented is that he believed
the materialman’s privilege should have been given effect only
with respect to materials delivered after the date of recordation of
the act of sale in the conveyance records.374 The dissent did discuss
the effect of article 3274, but dismissed that article on the basis
that it protects the vendor only against intervening mortgages, not
against other privileges.375
Of course, Security Homestead was decided under a prior
version of the Private Works Act, which provided that prior
recordation of a vendor’s privilege was the determining factor.
Likely the reason that the current version of the Private Works Act
371. See generally id.
372. Id. at 901–02 (Redmann, J., dissenting).
373. Id. at 903.
374. Id. at 902.
375. To the extent that the dissenting opinion suggests that Civil Code article
3274 is the article that gives the holder of the vendor’s privilege priority over a
mortgage, it seems incorrect. Quite to the contrary, article 3274 is a limitation
upon the priority that a vendor’s privilege enjoys over a mortgage by virtue of
article 3186, which ranks a creditor holding a privilege over other creditors,
even those holding mortgages. The priority of one privilege over another is not
dealt with by article 3274, or even article 3186, but rather by other articles of the
Civil Code that provide no guidance on how to rank a Private Works Act
privilege. The dissent is, however, correct both that the ultimate question is
whether a vendor’s privilege outranks a materialman’s privilege and that this
ranking is fixed by section 9:4812. At the time Security Homestead was decided,
that statute resolved the priority based on whether the vendor’s privilege was
recorded prior to the moment work began. Under the present version of the
Private Works Act, the issue is whether the vendor’s privilege was effective
against third persons before work began.
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shifted the focus from actual recordation of competing mortgages to
their effectiveness against third persons was not any conscious
consideration of the effective date of timely filed vendor’s privileges,
but rather was a recognition of the rule that mere recordation is
insufficient to make a collateral mortgage effective against third
persons; issuance of the collateral note is also required.376 At the time
of the 1981 revision of the Private Works Act, American Bank & Trust
Co. v. F & W Construction377 had only recently been decided.
Construing the former statute, which focused upon whether the
competing mortgage was a bona fide mortgage or vendor’s privilege
recorded before work began, the court held that a collateral mortgage
recorded prior to the commencement of work but without
contemporaneous pledge of the collateral note was not a bona fide
mortgage that would prime privileges arising out of work begun before
the collateral note was pledged.378
There does not appear to be any case decided under the current
Private Works Act considering the issue of whether a vendor’s
privilege that arises before work begins and is filed timely after work
begins is “effective against third persons” before work begins. The
view that it is not would appear to be supported by a plain reading of
article 3273, which provides that privileges are effective against third
persons from the date of the recording of the act or evidence of
indebtedness secured by the privilege. However, the apparent
plainness of the language of article 3272 might be deceptive, for if it
truly means precisely what it seems to say, Private Works Act
privileges themselves would not be effective against third persons
during the period before a statement of claim or privilege is filed of
record.379 Ironically, the very principles by which the courts held that a
timely but later filed Private Works Act privilege could
constitutionally prime a pre-existing mortgage might now be used to
support an argument that a vendor’s privilege that is recorded
within the time set forth in article 3274 outranks Private Works
Act privileges, even though the vendor’s privilege is not recorded
at the time work began. To understand this point, a review of early
376. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5551 (2007) (codifying previous
jurisprudence); see also Nathan & Marshall, supra note 103.
377. 357 So. 2d 1226 (La. Ct. App. 1978). The case is specifically referred to
in comment (d) to section 9:4821.
378. Id. at 1229. For a discussion of the application of this rule under the
current statute, see Michael H. Rubin, Ruminations on the Louisiana Private
Works Act, 58 LA. L. REV. 568, 610 (1998).
379. Of course, this conflict could be removed by application of the familiar
rule that later, more specific legislation, such as the Private Works Act, prevails.
Constitutional considerations, discussed more fully in the text below, originally
precluded this simple resolution.
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cases involving constitutional challenges to the Private Works Act
is necessary.
In Gleissner v. Hughes,380 the Court considered an objection to
the constitutionality of the 1916 predecessor to the Private Works Act,
which at the time provided that a privilege arising under its provisions
and recorded within 45 days after the owner’s acceptance of the work
had priority over all other privileges or encumbrances, even those that
had been recorded before work began. At the time, the Louisiana
Constitution of 1913381 provided that “[n]o mortgage or privilege on
immovable property shall affect third persons unless recorded or
registered in the parish where the property is situated, in the manner
and within the time as is now or may be prescribed by law.”382 The
Court held that, although there is no doubt that the privileges asserted
by the Private Works Act claimants could not affect third persons
unless recorded, the constitutional provision leaves to the Legislature a
determination of the manner and time within which they must be
recorded in order to bind third persons.383 Citing article 3274 of the
Civil Code as an example of another instance in which the Legislature
had allowed a delay for recording a privilege, the Court held that the
1916 act was simply an enlargement of the filing period otherwise
provided in the general rule expressed in article 3274.384 The
Gleissner case was followed four years later in Capital Building &
Loan Ass’n v. Carter.385 Citing its earlier holding in Gleissner and the

380. 95 So. 529 (La. 1922).
381. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 19 (1921).
382. The identical provision had been contained in Article 176 of the 1879
Constitution and later appeared in Article XIX, Section 19, of the Constitution
of 1921. This provision was continued in force as a statute following the
adoption of the Constitution of 1974 and still exists as statutory law today as
Article XIX, Section 19, of the Constitution Ancillaries. It should be noted that
the principle espoused in this provision, but without inclusion of the temporal
element, appears in the 2005 enactment of Civil Code article 3338. Whether the
omission of the reference to the time permitted for recordation is significant or
even intentional, the 2005 revision of the law of registry did not purport to
repeal or modify Article XIX, Section 19, of the Constitution Ancillaries.
383. Gleissner, 95 So. at 532.
384. Id. at 533.
385. 113 So. 886 (La. 1927). Under the facts of the case, the lot owner,
acting as his own contractor, erected a residence on the lot using materials
supplied by two materialmen. After completion, he sold the property to a
building and loan association, which immediately resold the property to a third
person, retaining a vendor’s privilege which was timely recorded. Three months
after completion, the materialmen filed claims under the 1922 predecessor to the
Private Works Act, which generally provided for a 30-day lien filing period but
was unclear as to what the filing period was in the case of a work performed by
the owner himself.
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analogous provision of the Constitution of 1921,386 the Court held
that:
Under this provision a lien or privilege may affect third
persons during the period in which it is not of record, if,
eventually, it is recorded in the manner and the time
prescribed by law.387
The Court found that the 30-day filing requirement that existed
under the 1922 predecessor to the Private Works Act applied and
that, because the materialmen did not file within it, they held no
privilege on the property.388 Because the Court held that the
materialmen had no privilege, what it said about the effect against
third persons of unfiled privileges during the period prescribed for
their filing might rightly be considered dicta; however, that
objection cannot be raised to the nearly contemporaneous holding of
the Court in Central Lumber Co. v. Schroeder,389 in which the
materialman did in fact file within the 30-day filing period.
According to the Court, “since the privilege was recorded within the
time and in the manner prescribed by law, it affected third persons
during the period in which it was not of record.”390 As authority for
this proposition, the Court cited the constitutional provision as well
as its prior holdings in both the Gleissner and the Capital Building
& Loan Association cases.391 Professor Daggett interprets these
holdings as establishing that the principle that the Legislature has
the prerogative of prescribing the time within which privileges on
immovables must be recorded, and, if a privilege is recorded within
the prescribed time, it is effective against third persons during the
period of time that it is not of record.392

386. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 19 (1921).
387. Carter, 113 So. at 888 (emphasis added).
388. Id. at 888–89.
389. 114 So. 644 (La. 1927).
390. Id. at 646 (emphasis added).
391. Though not cited in any of the Louisiana Supreme Court decisions
discussed above, the Orleans Court of Appeal had previously reached a similar
holding based upon nearly identical reasoning. See Pratt v. Damon Castle Hall
Co., 2 Pelt. 67, 70 (La. Ct. App. 1918). Ruling on the effectiveness of a paving
lien recorded within the 60-day period allowed for its recordation, the court in
Pratt analogized to article 3274 and held that “[t]he property was also affected
with the privilege, without recordation, as regards third persons during sixty
days after the issuance of the certificate, because the law, by its very letter,
accorded the contractor these sixty days within which to record his privilege.”
Id. at 72–73 (emphasis added).
392. See DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 72, at 296–321.
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Interestingly, this line of cases impresses upon the 1870 Code a
meaning that was explicitly stated in the 1825 Code393 but was
removed in the 1870 revision, which substituted in place of that
explicit statement a provision, found in article 3273, that privileges
are valid against third persons from the date of the recording of the
act or evidence of the indebtedness.394 That change might, however,
be explained by the fact that the 1870 Code originally shortened the
period for recording a vendor’s privilege to the very day on which
the act of sale was passed; thus, there was no need for the
provision on retroactivity of a timely filing.
Prior to the 1981 revision of the Private Works Act, Gleissner
and its progeny would have been unavailing to a vendor holding a
privilege that was filed in a timely manner but was not of record at
the moment work began because the Private Works Act
specifically required that a mortgage or vendor’s privilege be of
record at the time work began in order for the mortgagee or vendor
to have priority over a Private Works Act claimant. However, since
the 1981 revision to the statute, which now requires simply that the
vendor’s privilege be effective against third persons at the time
work begins, a vendor could seize upon these holdings and turn
back around against a Private Works Act claimant the very
reasoning that allowed the Private Works Act claimant to have
priority over pre-existing interests in the first place.
The 1981 revision was likely intended simply to confine the
field of competing mortgages and privileges that would prime a
Private Works Act privilege to those that are not merely of record
but are also actually effective against third persons. Except in the
case of a collateral mortgage, the two requirements are practically
co-extensive anyway.395 Ironically, however, the formulation
presently used in the statute may actually have increased the field
of competing vendor’s privileges that will have priority to include
both previously filed vendor’s privileges as well as those later filed
vendor’s privileges whose period for filing under article 3274 is
yet unexpired at the moment work begins.
The vendor can make a convincing argument that the
Legislature has already chosen to favor pre-existing vendor’s
privileges over most Private Works Act privileges and that the
Legislature’s policy choice is furthered, not frustrated, by
393. Articles 3240 and 3241 of the 1825 Code provided that a privilege was
valid against third persons from the date of the act if recorded within a specified
period of time. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3240–3241 (1825).
394. See generally Wheelright v. St. Louis, N.O. & O. Canal Transp. Co., 17
So. 133 (1895).
395. See supra note 363; see also Nathan & Marshall, supra note 103.
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application of this rule to those vendor’s privileges that are filed
within the short window of time permitted by article 3274. Even
where the vendor’s privilege is unrecorded at the time work
begins, the Private Works Act claimant would be hard-pressed to
show that he relied on the absence of the filing of the vendor’s
privilege in the mortgage records, because in modern times the
absence of the filing of the credit sale in the mortgage records
almost always implies a lack of recordation of the instrument in the
conveyance records. If there is no recordation of an act translative
of title in favor of the owner who has contracted the work, how can
the claimant claim to be relying on the public records at all?
Moreover, Private Works Act claimants themselves benefit from
relatively long periods of time in which their privileges are
effective against third persons without any recordation.396 Why
should vendors, to whom the law also expressly gives a period of
time for recordation of their privileges, not also be permitted the
same benefit?
On the other hand, the Private Works Act claimant seems to
have the advantage in arguing the black letter of the law: His
privilege is effective from the moment work begins397 and outranks
all competing mortgages and privileges that were not effective
against third persons at that moment.398 Article 3273, which
applies to other privileges, provides that privileges are effective
against third persons from the date of recording.399 The first
sentence of article 3274 unqualifiedly states that privileges—
including vendor’s privileges—are not effective against third
persons “unless recorded in the manner required by law.”400 A
close reading of the article reveals that the second sentence of this
article, which permits the privileged creditor a period of time to
record his privilege after it has arisen, is not necessarily an
exception to the rule espoused in the first sentence, but rather is an
exception to the rule, expressed in article 3186, that privileges by
their nature outrank mortgages.401 The second sentence says
nothing about the ranking of privileges against other privileges and
by its terms does not purport to make unfiled vendor’s privileges
effective against third persons from the moment of the sale if
recorded within the period of time allowed in the article.402 Though
396. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4820(A), 4822 (Supp. 2015).
397. The privilege is effective when notice of contract is filed, if earlier. See
id. § 9:4820(A)(1).
398. Id. §§ 9:4820(A), 4821.
399. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3273 (2015).
400. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3274 (2015).
401. Id.
402. Id.
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that rule was found in prior codes, it was suppressed in the 1870
revision.403
If the law is that a timely but later filed vendor’s privilege is
primed by Private Works Act privileges arising out of a work
commenced during the period allowed by article 3274 for filing the
vendor’s privilege, an anomaly results when there happens to be a
pre-existing judicial mortgage against the vendee. The vendor’s
privilege, even though filed in a timely manner, would nonetheless
be primed by the pre-existing judicial mortgage against the vendee,
contrary to the result that is otherwise mandated by Lawyer’s Title
Insurance Corp. v. Valteau.404 The reason is that the previously
filed judicial mortgage would attach at the instant the vendee
acquires the property405 and would therefore prime Private Works
Act privileges arising out of a work subsequently commenced by
the vendee. Ordinarily, this judicial mortgage would, under the
holding of Valteau and by operation of article 3274, be inferior to a
later but timely filed vendor’s privilege. Unfortunately for the
vendor, however, his priority would rank behind all Private Works
Act privileges and also behind all mortgages that were effective
against third persons before work began because, under the rule
that we are assuming to exist, his privilege was not effective
against third persons at the time work commenced. Thus, under the
ranking provisions of the Private Works Act,406 his vendor’s
privilege would be last in ranking. Though this situation might at
first blush seem to constitute a vicious circle, it is actually a simple
re-ordering of ranking based upon the priority rules contained in
the Private Works Act. What makes the situation all the more
anomalous is that this re-ordering of priorities results solely from
the fortuity of whether, at the time of foreclosure, there happens to
be an unpaid Private Works Act claimant who may be owed an
insignificant amount of money. In the absence of such a claimant,
403. The broader issue of the effectiveness of a vendor’s privilege against
any third person who acquires rights in the property during the period prescribed
for its filing under article 3274 could arise in other contexts as well, such as
when the buyer alienates the property during that period. There are statements in
a number of cases to the effect that the time limitation of the second sentence of
article 3274 “relates only to the effect as to mortgages existing at the date of the
privilege contract” and does not concern subsequent purchasers. Gay v. Bovard,
27 La. Ann. 290, 291 (1875). See also McIlvaine v. Legare, 34 La. Ann. 923
(1882). There is no issue, however, when mortgages, whether conventional or
judicial, attach to the property before or during the period, for the second
sentence of article 3274, in tandem with article 3186, gives a timely filed
vendor’s privilege priority over them.
404. 558 So. 2d 1319 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
405. Gallaugher v. Hebrew Congregation, 35 La. Ann. 829 (1883).
406. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4821 (Supp. 2015).
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the Private Works Act has no application, and the vendor would
rank ahead of the holder of the pre-existing judicial mortgage. Of
course, if the rule is that the timely but later filed vendor’s privilege
outranks Private Works Act privileges, the anomaly is avoided: the
vendor’s privilege ranks first, followed by the pre-existing judicial
mortgage, followed by the Private Works Act privileges. The
vendor’s privilege and judicial mortgage would rank between
themselves in the same order that would apply in the absence of a
Private Works Act privilege.
A similarly anomalous reordering of priorities would arise if an
act of credit sale is recorded in the mortgage records within the
period prescribed by article 3274 but, in the interim before its
recordation occurs, the new owner records a conventional mortgage
and begins work on the immovable, in that order. Under article
3274, the vendor’s privilege would normally outrank the
conventional mortgage, even though the mortgage was recorded
first. However, application of the Private Works Act would re-order
the priorities as follows: (1) laborer’s privileges, because the Private
Works Act accords them priority over all other privileges and
mortgages irrespective of any temporal consideration; (2) the
conventional mortgage, because it was recorded and therefore
effective against third persons before work began; (3) other Private
Works Act privileges; and (4) the vendor’s privilege, because, based
on the assumption we are making, it was not effective against third
persons until the moment of recordation. Again, the anomaly is
avoided if the rule is that the timely but later filed vendor’s privilege
outranks non-laborer privileges under the Private Works Act. The
ranking would be: (1) laborer’s privileges, for the same reason
indicated above; (2) the vendor’s privilege because, under the rule
we are assuming to exist, it was effective against third persons when
work began and also because its timely recordation causes it to
outrank the conventional mortgage; (3) the conventional mortgage,
because it was recorded and therefore effective against third persons
before work began; and (4) other Private Works Act privileges. The
vendor’s privilege and conventional mortgage would rank between
themselves in the same order that would apply in the absence of a
Private Works Act privilege.
XI. CONCLUSION
So how do the two vendor’s privileges fare today? The older of
them has atrophied; the younger remains nearly as vibrant as ever.
From its inception, the vendor’s privilege on movables has
afforded only precarious protection to the seller, given that it has
always been a mere right of preference that is extinguished if the
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buyer alienates the thing subject to the privilege and delivers it to a
third person. Jurisprudence that has evolved over the last few
decades seems to dictate the conclusion that a vendor’s privilege is
similarly extinguished if the thing subject to the privilege becomes a
component part of an immovable, at least in cases where the
privilege becomes in conflict with rights that third persons have or
acquire in the immovable. Once favored by the legislator, who often
statutorily subordinated other special privileges to it, the vendor’s
privilege was dealt a double blow by Louisiana’s adoption of Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. First, Article 9 made it quite
easy for a vendor to obtain a purchase money security interest,
through the simple expedient of having the buyer sign a short
agreement stating that a security interest is granted for the unpaid
purchase price. The purchase money security interest so created is
accorded very favorable treatment, as it outranks most pre-existing
security interests,407 and, in the case of consumer goods, is
automatically perfected without the necessity of filing any
financing statement.408 Of course, the mere creation of another
convenient and powerful form of security would not, of itself, have
caused the vendor’s privilege on movables to lose its allure. The
second blow was the contemporaneous adoption of Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 9:4770, providing that vendor’s privileges
are subordinate to all security interests, even those arising later and
those that are never perfected. Thus, the vendor’s privilege on
movables is now an anemic form of security indeed. Nevertheless,
it still allows the vendor to be preferred over unsecured creditors,
and its existence permits the unpaid seller to obtain a pre-judgment
seizure under a writ of sequestration.409
In contrast, the vendor’s privilege on immovables remains as
useful as ever. Though the preference that it affords the vendor over
the general privileges arising under the Civil Code is perhaps now of
only marginal benefit, because general privileges themselves have
fallen into disuse, the ranking that the vendor’s privilege has over
mortgages—particularly pre-existing judicial mortgages—continues
to be substantially beneficial. Once recorded, the vendor’s privilege
on an immovable is a powerful real right that follows the immovable
into whatever hands it may pass. Its benefits and protections remain
sufficiently attractive that, in recent years, proposals have been
made to make them available even to creditors who are not
sellers.410 Whether those proposals will continue to be made, or if
407.
408.
409.
410.
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Id. § 10:9-309(1).
See supra note 99.
See supra note 75.
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made will ultimately succeed, will be known only with the passage
of time.
Perhaps our long experience with vendor’s privileges allows us
to draw conclusions that are valid with respect to the concept of
privileges in general. Where privileges, such as those on movables,
are allowed to proliferate, and to exist without a system of registry
with the result that their effectiveness against third persons is of
necessity severely restricted, the security that they afford becomes
so weak that the regime under which they exist is ultimately
replaced by another system that more effectively protects the rights
of the creditor and third persons alike. Accordingly, the Uniform
Commercial Code, with its simplified form of a single security
interest that is easily made effective against third persons through a
mechanism of publicity, has nearly supplanted the law of privileges
on movables, the vendor’s privilege included. On the other hand,
where privileges, such as those on immovables, are relatively few in
number, are subjected to a system of registry, and are granted the
status of real rights, they can continue to serve as effective security
for the privileged creditor without unfairly prejudicing the rights of
third persons. The vendor’s privilege on immovables endures as a
fitting example. Adheret visceribus rei.

